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Abstract:  
 
This thesis utilizes Gramscian theory to explore the antimafia movement’s shift in 
tactics from the 1980s to present day. The movement that arose out of the violence of 
1980s Sicily is hardly the same in nature as the contemporary movement. During the 
1980s, the mafia was conceptualized mainly as a political problem requiring political 
solutions. When legislative reforms did not eradicate the mafia’s entrenched power, 
however, Cosa Nostra came to be perceived as a cultural phenomenon. In order to curb 
mafia power, therefore, the antimafia movement recognized the need to focus on society 
as the agent that could deliver Sicily into a new future. Using my own fieldwork from 
Sicily, it will be shown that the movement has changed its focus over time from state to 
society. Gramscian theory will be employed to argue that the antimafia movement is 
counter-hegemonic in nature, as it works to eliminate the physical and ideological 
domination Cosa Nostra has held over Sicilians for nearly 150 years. Moreover, 
Gramsci’s ideas will show why—when challenging hegemonic power—it is not enough 
for civil society to target the state for reform. Rather, the antimafia movement must 
engage in a deliberate and evolving attack on Cosa Nostra, working amongst society in 
order to redirect Sicily’s political, social, and economic trajectory that the mafia has 
dictated since the 1860s.   
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INTRODUCTION:  
 
 It is a Saturday morning, but Gobina Scuola in Sicily is full of students. Today 
represents an important day for the high school children; while school is not in session, 
attendance is taken to see how many students have shown up for the antimafia lecture. 
The turnout is remarkable, forcing students and teachers alike to sit on the floor or stand 
in the doorway of the classroom. All attendees have come to hear five members of one of 
Sicily’s leading antimafia organizations, Libera, speak to the students about their role in 
la lotta contro la mafia. The atmosphere in the room is one of intrigue, curiosity, and a 
touch of skepticism. Libera is just one of several antimafia organizations working to 
drastically alter the political and social trajectory of Sicily by destroying Cosa Nostra. 
Images of fallen antimafia heroes flash across the projector screen and video clips are 
shown of emotive speeches against the mafia at the height of its violence in the 1980s. It 
is a day of education in civic responsibility, for all young Sicilians are told today that 
they have the power and obligation to resist, denounce, and actively fight against the 
mafia just as these fallen martyrs did. The students are encouraged to view themselves as 
part of a society that respects and values legality, law and order, and the dignity of 
legitimate work—a marked departure from decades of acquiescence to criminality on the 
island. Scrap pieces of paper are passed around displaying a famous quote from now 
immortalized antimafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone who first called ordinary citizens to 
action in the form of the antimafia movement in the late 1980s. The paper reads: “yes, I 
am afraid, but we all should be more courageous.” 
 This educational lecture represents a key component of the contemporary 
antimafia movement: working at the societal level, and particularly among Sicilian youth, 
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to destroy Cosa Nostra. Thirty years ago, such cultural work was not prudent or effective 
among a society that had not yet broken free of its stupor of acquiescence and fear that 
reigned in Sicily as long as the mafia has been a dominant power on the island. This 
widespread sentiment was responsible for effectively suppressing any limited forms of 
resistance that occurred in the years prior to the 1980s. Indeed, thirty years ago in Sicily 
the mafia ruled with heavy hand, as any opposition or resistance to its authority was met 
with violence or murder, and consequently apathy and turning a blind eye to pervasive 
mafiosi illegality became an everyday survival mechanism. The general conviction in 
Sicily for decades was that “to save your life…you have to be careful, wary, silent.”1 The 
civilian-based antimafia movement is responsible for transforming the Sicilian climate 
from trepidation to one in which individuals can now collectively stand up against mafia 
power and influence. While much progress has occurred, there are still many who believe 
that Cosa Nostra represents the “irreversible destiny” of Sicily—a scar that is imprinted 
too deep upon the land to remove. One of the most significant challenges the antimafia 
movement faces today, therefore, is overcoming and dismantling the insidious mentality 
of apathy and passive acceptance of mafia domination of social, economic, and political 
affairs on the island—sentiment that has become solidified over a period of 150 years.   
 While educational lectures are a common tactic among many contemporary 
antimafia organizations, this now widespread practice represents a fairly new 
development and phase in antimafia strategy. Now attending exclusively to efforts at the 
societal level, the antimafia movement is very different from when it first arose out of the 
violence and chaos of 1980s Sicily. The reason for the uniqueness of the 1980s was the 
evolving and growing nature of Cosa Nostra during these years. In the late 1970s, the 
                                                 
1
 Roberto Saviano, Gomorrah (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 119. 
Diefendorf 7 
mafia entered the drug trafficking market and began acquiring unprecedented wealth. As 
a result, a “mafia war” between competing mafia families waged publicly in the streets as 
mafiosi vied for supremacy and the chance to head Cosa Nostra whose power was 
growing ever more potent. This publicly fought war began compromising law and order 
and the safety of ordinary civilians.2 This decade, therefore, stood apart from previous 
decades of mafia power, where in the past Cosa Nostra had taken strides to avoid 
implicating civilians unnecessarily in its affairs, as long as the criminal organization’s 
ability to maintain a dominant influence over businesses, attitudes, and culture was not 
impeded.  
 Another important factor contributing to mafia power during the 1970s-80s was 
the Italian state and its historical relationship with Cosa Nostra. Since unification in 1860 
and particularly after World War II, the Italian state has depended on and utilized Cosa 
Nostra as an organization to help carry out state functions of controlling order, 
monopolizing violence, and providing essential services to citizens. The mafia has grown 
over the years as a result of this partnership. Particularly after the 1950s, the state 
informally granted legal impunity to the mafia in exchange for electoral support from 
Cosa Nostra—a mutually beneficial transaction that allowed the mafia to acquire a new 
level of dominance by the 1980s.3 This symbiotic relationship largely went unnoticed and 
unchallenged for many years, as Sicilians became accustomed to such state of affairs, not 
questioning this system as long as their basic needs were met by some higher authority—
whether that authority was the state or mafia. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when it became increasingly clear that the Italian state had delegated its roles to the mafia 
                                                 
2
 Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 24-5.  
3
 Jamieson, 16.  
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to the extent that the state was incapable of carrying out basic functions of enforcing 
order and providing protection to civilians, powerful state authorities came forward 
calling for an end to state-mafia relations, and more importantly, the eradication of Cosa 
Nostra from the Sicilian landscape.  
 Early antimafia activists primarily hailed from the state level, including General 
dalla Chiesa and Pio la Torre, and sought to check the mafia’s growing sense of 
invincibility.4 These early forms of antimafia activism, however, were met with swift 
elimination by Cosa Nostra, which effectively quelled out of fear any widespread civilian 
activism that may have arose in the wake of these early protests against the mafia. 
Through the murdering of early activists, Cosa Nostra clearly demonstrated its 
commitment to eliminating any opposition threatening its power. Not all Sicilians were 
ready to continue the trend of acquiescence and acceptance to status quo power structures 
and the state-mafia system, however. Magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino 
arose on the antimafia scene in a commanding way in the early 1980s in the wake of 
these murders, determined to lead a widespread fight against the mafia that would destroy 
Cosa Nostra for good.  
 Falcone and Borsellino advocated for a new strategy to combat the mafia. 
Recognizing that past antimafia attempts had failed because state authorities were 
isolated and alone in their challenge of Cosa Nostra, these magistrates aptly realized that 
a successful fight against the mafia would require broad participation and involvement 
from Sicilians—not simply at the magistrate level.5 Falcone and Borsellino, therefore, 
effectively laid the framework for a grassroots, civilian-based antimafia movement to 
                                                 
4
 Jamieson, 2-3.  
5
 Jamieson, 26.  
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develop and flourish with their emotive calls to action that rallied ordinary Sicilians to 
overturn decades of fear and acquiescence and fight against the mafia in their daily lives. 
Civilian involvement began in the early 1980s, as a result, but would not culminate into 
the widespread movement of today for several more years—a testament to the extent to 
which Cosa Nostra had become engrained within Sicily.  
 How Falcone and Borsellino interpreted the mafia phenomenon in the 1980s 
directly affected how ordinary Sicilians came to understand the factors that were 
responsible for allowing Cosa Nostra to achieve the unprecedented level of power they 
saw openly and unremorsefully expressed in the streets and against antimafia activists. 
Through working with pentiti, or mafia penitents, Falcone and Borsellino learned 
intimate details about Cosa Nostra and its relations with the Italian state.6 During the 
1980s, therefore, these magistrates—in line with the thinking of past antimafia activists, 
as well—believed Cosa Nostra fundamentally to represent a political problem. Falcone 
and Borsellino believed the Italian state and its historical dependence on the mafia was 
directly responsible for the unchecked power of the mafia Sicilians witnessed in the 
1980s.7 Based on these sentiments, the magistrates spearheaded a new antimafia effort 
that encouraged civilians to join in protesting the state to enact legislative reforms that 
would end a symbiotic relationship that had existed for over a century.  
 The antimafia movement in its nascent form, therefore, focused on targeting the 
state for reforms in order to dismantle Cosa Nostra and its influence over the island’s 
economy, politics, and culture. Pressure at the civilian and magistrate level began 
encouraging the state to reevaluate its historical ties to the mafia, as the full extent and 
                                                 
6
 Jamieson, 3.  
7
 Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, “Suggestions from the Antimafia Struggle in Sicily,” 
Anthropological Quarterly 75, no. 1 (2001): 156. 
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compromising nature of these ties were increasingly coming to light and could no longer 
be hidden from the now aware and scrutinizing public eye. This reevaluation manifested 
in important legislative reforms that broke with the state’s history of implicit grants of 
impunity to the mafia. Among the earliest of these reforms was the Rognoni-La Torre 
Law, which officially made it a crime to be a mafioso or to be associated with Cosa 
Nostra, no matter the extent of that involvement.8 Another important political 
development of the mid-1980s was harsher legislation dictating the condition of mafiosi 
prison sentencing. These important reforms paved the way for the Maxi Trial—the first 
Sicilian trial utilizing these new laws as a legal framework to fight the mafia. The Maxi 
Trial of 1986-7 represented the culmination of Falcone and Borsellino’s testimonial work 
with pentiti and culminated in the arrest of over 300 mafiosi.9  
 Cosa Nostra did not lie dormant in the wake of this rising antimafia tide, 
however. Despite fear of a mafia response, Falcone and Borsellino continued their work 
against mafiosi and encouraged the politicization and involvement of ordinary Sicilians in 
the antimafia cause. When it became glaringly apparent that Cosa Nostra could no longer 
depend on state allies to insulate the organization from judicial prosecution, the mafia 
retaliated by murdering the famous faces and rallying loci of the antimafia movement, 
publicly killing Falcone and Borsellino in 1992.10 While the civilian-based antimafia 
movement had its first seeds sown in the mid-1980s particularly outside of the courtroom 
that housed the Maxi Trial, civilian involvement in the antimafia cause had been 
somewhat limited thus far. By murdering the leaders of the antimafia movement, Cosa 
                                                 
8
 Jamieson, 3.  
9
 Jane C. Schneider and Peter T. Schneider, Reversible Destiny (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), 140. 
10
 Jamieson, xix-xx. 
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Nostra believed it had effectively suppressed any future antimafia activism.11 What was 
unanticipated by the mafia, however, was the extent to which ordinary citizens would be 
incensed and mobilized by the death of these antimafia martyrs. Therefore, 1992 marked 
a new phase of the antimafia movement, in which ordinary civilians in unprecedented 
numbers and commitment carried on the antimafia fight to which Falcone, Borsellino, 
and other early activists had devoted their lives.   
 Thus, in the wake of the magistrates’ deaths, the antimafia movement became 
increasingly more civilian-driven, with ordinary Sicilians furthering the antimafia cause 
in the best way they knew how: by continuing to push for political reforms and legislative 
initiatives to curb mafia power as Falcone and Borsellino had begun to do before their 
untimely deaths. Early antimafia organizations arising in the mid-1980s and early 1990s 
showcased this commitment to targeting the state by lobbying authorities and government 
leaders to adopt a harsher legal stance against the mafia. Also during this time, Sicilians 
pressured the state to remove from power corrupt politicians with known mafia ties.12 A 
new era of transparency, accountability, and legality was desired by Sicilians, and 
political reforms appeared to be the necessary medium through which to accomplish such 
a drastic change.  
 While the antimafia movement undoubtedly succeeded in prompting a rush of 
legislative reforms in this era that allowed Sicily to develop an overdue penal code 
against mafiosi, political reforms clearly were insufficient in eradicating Cosa Nostra.13 
Despite the fact that a new law intending to address organized crime was said to be 
                                                 
11
 Jamieson, xx.  
12
 Jamieson, 128-130. 
13
 Ernesto U. Savona, “The Mafia—What to Do Next?” (Conference, Palermo, Italy, December 10-12, 
1992), 15. 
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enacted every three weeks in the early 1990s, the mafia still reigned over Sicily with its 
power and influence largely unchallenged.14 This was because the mafia—as it had 
succeeded in doing several times since its origin in 1860—responded to the unfavorable 
political climate of the 1980s-early 1990s by channeling its activities into more elusive 
and less visible markets such as heroin trafficking and illegal immigration.15 Most 
importantly, however, Cosa Nostra remained because it represented much more than a 
political problem, and merely attending to political ends would never be enough to curb 
this powerful criminal organization.  
 After the early 1990s, when it was clear that political reforms could only go so far 
in checking mafia power, Cosa Nostra became widely perceived as a cultural problem 
requiring work at the societal level to fully challenge and dismantle. Thus, beginning in 
the mid-1990s the antimafia movement evolved from targeting the state to society, 
engaging in community work among Sicilians in order to address the factors that have 
allowed mafia power to perpetuate over 150 years. The hope behind these efforts is to 
encourage legality, law and order, and denouncement of the mafia among ordinary 
Sicilians whose involvement is an imperative component of this new phase of the 
antimafia fight. Only by engaging in cultural work will the movement be able to address 
the apathy and fear that continues to contribute to mafia power and influence. It is clear, 
therefore, that the antimafia movement has changed significantly over time, from 
perceiving the mafia as a political to a cultural problem, and focusing not on the state but 
                                                 
14
 Savona, “The Mafia—What to Do Next?” 94.  
15
 Alessandra Stanley, “Palemo Shows Off as a Cleaned-Up Mafia Capital,” The New York Times, 
December 13, 2000, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E5D6133FF930A25751C1A9669C8B63. 
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rather Sicilians, and specifically the youth, as the agents that will carry Sicily towards a 
future no longer dictated by Cosa Nostra.  
 The important ways in which the antimafia movement has changed since its 
origins are hard to discern from current scholarly literature on the subject, however. 
Indeed, the breadth of research about the movement in its nascent form stands in stark 
contrast to the lack of contemporary examinations of antimafia efforts in Sicily. The 
reason for disproportional attention from scholars during different time periods does not 
reflect the movement’s strength or weakness in the 1980s versus the contemporary 
period. Rather, the changing aims and strategies of the contemporary movement simply 
have not attracted the international media spotlight to the extent that the movement did 
when it first arose unpredictably out of the destruction and ruins of 1980s Sicily. 
 Contrary to assumptions that could be derived from the lack of research on the 
contemporary movement, the antimafia movement has not lost strength or influence, but 
has rather changed the way it operates in important ways deserving of attention. This 
thesis seeks to fill this gap in scholarly literature about the movement by attending to the 
following questions: What is the current nature of the antimafia movement compared to 
its nascent form in the 1980s? With these new changes in mind, how does defining the 
antimafia movement as counter-hegemonic reveal the complex aims of the movement 
and the difficulties it faces in producing widespread cultural change in Sicily? 
 The complexity of these questions has required me to evolve my focus and 
redirect my attention to different aspects of scholarly literature that will allow me to fully 
uncover the intricacies of the antimafia movement and what it seeks to accomplish. My 
focus centered first on social movement theory (SMT), which offered important insight 
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on the conditions that can bring about a civilian-based movement and the hindrances that 
commonly stand in the way of movements working to accomplish broad cultural changes. 
I next examined important subsections of social movement theory, including political 
opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and framing theories.  While this was a 
necessary theoretical framework from which to start, as these ideas shed light on how a 
movement appeals to the masses, mobilizes support, and maintains constituents, social 
movement theory failed to explain why the antimafia movement has changed over time, 
and specifically why it was considered prudent to switch from targeting the state to 
society in the mid-1990s.  
What follows in Chapter One, therefore, is an analysis of Antonio Gramsci’s main 
theoretical ideas about hegemony and civil society. The Italian Marxist’s notions will be 
explicated, as his ideas offer a compelling framework from which to analyze what a 
social movement must do in order to enact widespread cultural change in a society that 
has long been under the control of a dominant group and ideology. Social movement 
theory proved insufficient because its focus on the state hindered an understanding of 
why a social movement might also need to work amongst society. Gramsci provides a 
sound theoretical framework from which to analyze the antimafia movement, as he 
describes what a movement must do in order to challenge hegemonic forces deeply 
entrenched within a region’s economy, politics, and culture. Because Gramsci notes the 
importance of working within but also outside the state when attempting to bring about 
widespread cultural change, Gramsci explains what social movement theory could not.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Gramsci, Hegemony, and Civil Society 
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who made his most significant 
contributions to political theory during the 1920s-30s. Writing in Italy during the time of 
fascism, Gramsci sought to understand and explain why a socialist revolution failed to 
come to fruition in his home country.16 Incarcerated because of his beliefs, Gramsci was 
forced to document much of his political thinking on scraps of paper while in his prison 
cell. His ideas about how a society could enact widespread cultural change would later be 
compiled in his Prison Notebooks.17 Because Gramsci explored how the proletariat could 
generate a “cultural revolution” to overthrow the bourgeoisie,18 Gramsci’s theories offer 
insight into why a social movement—socialist or otherwise—might change from 
targeting the state to targeting society when trying to accomplish a broad revolution. 
Gramsci’s ideas differed from other Marxist theorists of his time in a notable way; in 
attempting to launch a cultural revolution, Gramsci recognized that tackling the state is 
not enough to produce widespread cultural change. Rather, Gramsci believed that a 
movement must also work amongst society if a revolution is to be successful. In order to 
understand Gramsci’s rationale for why targeting the state is insufficient, it is imperative 
to examine the Marxist’s concept of hegemony. 
HEGEMONY:  
 As Gramsci described, hegemony is the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on societal life by the dominant 
                                                 
16
 Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 120-
1.  
17
 Roger S. Gottlieb, An Anthology of Western Marxism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 112.  
18
 Chantal Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 179. 
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fundamental group.”19 Gramsci believed hegemony to manifest in both physical and 
ideological domination,20 consequently resulting in “not only united economic and 
political objectives but also intellectual and moral unity.”21 At the time when Gramsci 
was writing what would become the Prison Notebooks, he conceptualized the locus of 
hegemony creating such uniformity to be the Italian state. The widespread infiltration that 
hegemony necessitates led Gramsci to devote time to explaining how other actors besides 
the state are necessary in order to ensure that domination is spread so widely that it 
infiltrated all levels of society.22 Simply put, the state requires the active involvement of 
other external actors in order to achieve hegemony. Gramsci deemed these multifaceted 
outlets outside the state to be “hegemonic apparatuses” that contributed to and helped 
enforce state hegemony.23 Instead of a single locus of hegemonic power, therefore, there 
exists a hegemonic or “historical bloc,” whose different components work in tandem to 
achieve the level of domination needed for hegemony to be achieved.24 Gramsci’s 
hegemonic bloc consisted of several actors, including institutions such as political parties, 
the Catholic Church, civil society, and a last category he deemed “traditional 
intellectuals.”25 The strength of the hegemonic bloc, therefore, was dependent on the 
active involvement of these non-state actors, as dominant ideology continually was 
reproduced through these varied mediums in order to create and entrench hegemony.26 
                                                 
19
 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12. 
20
 Gottlieb, 112.   
21
 Mouffe, 181.  
22
 Mouffe, 5.  
23
 Mouffe, 5, 187.  
24
 David L. Levy and Daniel Egan, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict 
and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations,” Journal of Management Studies 40, no. 3 
(2003): 4.  
25
 Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 143. 
26
 Hoare and Smith, 12.  
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 It is important to delineate how Gramsci conceptualized the latter two 
components of the hegemonic bloc—civil society and traditional intellectuals—as these 
elements are not self-explanatory and an understanding of their nature and function is of 
paramount importance to grasping the complexity of the bloc and the vital role that each 
actor plays within it. Gramsci’s understanding of civil society is particularly important, as 
his way of conceptualizing this notion differs considerably from more modern, neoliberal 
scholars who predominantly consider civil society to be a “third sector” operating outside 
of state and market influences.27 Gramsci believed such positioning to be idealistic and 
highly improbable—especially in Italy. Indeed, Gramsci suggested that civil society, as 
the private sphere where individuals operate, is a vital medium the hegemonic state seeks 
to control in order to ensure that hegemonic “ideology is produced and diffused” 
throughout society.28 Quite to the contrary of neoliberal theorists, therefore, Gramsci 
suggested civil society was the “hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group, or the arena 
where hegemony is reproduced and legitimized, thereby helping to enforce pre-existing 
power structures.29 Based on this definition, it is easy to understand why Gramsci 
considered civil society to be an instrumental component of the hegemonic bloc. 
 It is also important to explicate Gramsci’s notion of “traditional intellectuals” as 
another crucial pillar within the hegemonic bloc. Gramsci qualified that, while every 
individual possessed the potential to act as an intellectual, not all carry out this function.30 
In order to be an intellectual, one must “participate in a particular conception of the 
                                                 
27
 Neera Chandhoke, “The Limits of Global Civil Society,” in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary 
Kaldor, eds. The Global Civil Society Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University, 2002), 36. 
28
 Gottlieb, 118; Mouffe, 187. 
29
 Mouffe, 30.  
30
 Hoare and Smith, 9.  
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world”31 by perpetuating the ideology propelled by the dominant ruling group.32 
Traditional intellectuals have a dual role in ensuring the effective functioning of the bloc, 
therefore, as they show individuals how to conceive of their function within the dominant 
system and also work to ensure that hegemonic ideology is accepted among the masses.33  
In order to attend to these tasks, traditional intellectuals must coerce the masses 
until they are in congruence with the dominant ideology. Traditional intellectuals work to 
create a society where hegemony is so deeply rooted that over time the masses consider 
such ideology natural to the extent that it comes to reflect the “collective will.”34 When 
the hegemonic system becomes developed to this extent, the masses grant “spontaneous 
consent” to the ruling group, and the system reproduces itself with little effort.35 
However, in instances where consent is not spontaneous, it is the responsibility of 
traditional intellectuals to patrol any deviation from the hegemonic ideology. The threat 
of non-consent may be enough to hold society to an ideology. However, in “moments of 
crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed,”36 and threats are 
insufficient, traditional intellectuals play a large role in obtaining consent through force. 
In this role, intellectuals function as an “apparatus of state coercive power” by punishing 
those who break the trend of granting “consent, either actively or passively.”37 
Traditional intellectuals are responsible, therefore, for spreading hegemony and the 
acceptance of such ideals until its entrenchment is universal and widespread and therefore 
hard to refute or dismantle. These intellectuals work to maintain a “culture of silence” in 
                                                 
31
 Gottlieb, 116.  
32
 Hoare and Smith, 12.  
33
 Mouffe, 185.  
34
 Mouffe, 40.  
35
 Mouffe, 191.  
36
 Gottlieb, 118.  
37
 Hoare and Smith, 12.  
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which the masses are “ignorant and lethargic” to hegemony, not protesting this state of 
affairs out of fear or ignorance about the power structures controlling them.38 These 
intellectuals are thus of vital importance, and represent a specific sector of the population 
that tends to the perpetuation of the hegemonic system. Traditional intellectuals are 
backed by institutions also serving the hegemonic bloc, and can be found in the capacities 
of school teachers, religious leaders, or the media, for instance.39  
IMPORTANCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS: 
 It is evident that hegemony is not just created and reproduced through the state. 
Rather, the state controls institutions, the economy, and societal actors in a way that 
ensures its dominance is reverberated throughout society, and that its ideology becomes 
entrenched to stabilize and maintain the system.40 Hegemony thus becomes solidified 
over time with the help of the components of the hegemonic bloc. The involvement of 
varied non-state actors ensures that hegemony becomes an all-encompassing system of 
dominance over the economy, politics, and culture. As a result, any alternatives outside 
the system are hard to conceptualize, as the components of the bloc work diligently to 
limit the expression and ability for alternatives to exist. The hegemonic bloc thus comes 
to control production and creates a subordinate group of the masses who make sense of 
their realities by contributing to the further production of the established system.41 In this 
way, the masses form a “collective mentality” under the hegemonic system, and develop 
“a typical way of perceiving and interpreting the world that provides orientations to 
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action” for these individuals, channeling their activities and behavior into ways that 
further perpetuate hegemony.42  
DISMANTLING A HEGEMONIC BLOC: 
 Taking Gramsci’s ideas into consideration, it would be logical to assume that the 
Marxist had little faith in society’s ability to generate a cultural revolution based on the 
strength of hegemonic forces working to limit any deviation from dominant ideology. 
While it is clear that the hegemonic bloc constantly works to maintain this system, it is 
important to note that overthrowing hegemony is difficult, but not impossible. Gramsci 
expressed the belief that hegemony could be dismantled by society under very specific 
conditions.  
 Hegemonic blocs are not impermeable.43 Due to the fact that solidification 
depends on a variety of actors working in congruence with one another constantly to 
maintain the system, fissures are a natural occurrence within the dominant bloc. Fissures 
can be understood as the natural breaks within a bloc that threaten its overall strength, 
and can be created “endogenously as well as from external shocks” to the hegemonic 
system.44  
 Internal fissures may develop within the hegemonic bloc as a result of the fact that 
the bloc’s strength depends on the consistent efforts of a variety of state and non-state 
actors working to perpetuate the hegemonic system. As the state depends on civil society, 
traditional intellectuals, and various institutions to reinforce its hegemony, it is possible 
that conflicts between the state and non-state actors can create fissures that threaten the 
stability of the hegemonic bloc.  
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 The hegemonic bloc is far from stable, as it is also liable to external challenges to 
its stability. Gramsci believed that an external source of fissures could be produced 
through the medium of civil society. This requires sufficient explanation, as it has already 
been noted above that Gramsci believed civil society to be a vital component of the 
hegemonic bloc. However, this is precisely where civil society derives its unique ability 
to challenge hegemony; because this medium is an important channel for the maintenance 
of hegemony, should civil society renege on this imperative function, the stability of the 
overall system is threatened. As Gramsci explained, civil society must be acutely aware 
of its importance in maintaining hegemony in order to recognize its ability to also destroy 
that system by no longer choosing to perpetuate it. Gramsci thus attributes civil society 
with the ability to “reclaim political society” as a space for power negotiations instead of 
a medium serving hegemonic ends.45 As Gramsci suggests, the moment civil society 
recognizes that it does not need to “produce the hegemony that will stabilize bourgeoisie 
domination” is the moment civil society recognizes its power to dismantle hegemony.  
Civil society therefore must become aware that it is “capable of creating a new 
history and collaborating in the formation of a new power, rather than to justify a power 
which has already been established.”46 This recognition of civil society’s duality may 
come about once natural fissures within the hegemonic bloc are made apparent, at which 
point civil society becomes attuned to its ability to widen those fissures by withdrawing 
its support of the hegemonic system. Civil society has the power, therefore, to either 
capitalize on preexisting internal fissures within the bloc, or create its own external 
fissures that jeopardize the hegemonic system by refusing to perpetuate hegemonic 
                                                 
45
 Mouffe, 41.  
46
 Mouffe, 36.  
Diefendorf 22 
ideology. Therefore, Gramsci’s ideas suggest that civil society can play a variety of roles 
and have varied relations with the state; while civil society can act as an enforcer of 
already established power structures,47 it also has the ability to serve as an important 
realm for power discussions and challenges—thereby representing the medium through 
which cultural revolution can be enacted.48 
 Only when civil society becomes aware of its unique spatiality within a 
hegemonic system—as both enforcer and potential challenger of hegemony—does it 
realize its ability to work “within and against the state” in order to dismantle this 
domination.49 Gramsci coined the duality of civil society as the “war of positioning.”50 
Through a war of positioning, by working at the state but also societal level as a result of 
civil society’s favorable location among these two entities, hegemony can be dismantled. 
The importance of engaging in a “war of positioning” is paramount, Gramsci believed, 
because to merely target the state for reform is not enough. This is because the state is not 
the only source of hegemony, as many non-state actors also work to perpetuate 
hegemonic domination and ideology.51 Thus, merely attending to the state is insufficient, 
as these external pillars can still work to maintain the bloc. Counter-hegemonic initiatives 
must also tackle society where these non-state actors exist and work, therefore, to limit 
the dominant group’s ability to retain a hegemonic bloc over the masses.52 When civil 
society becomes attuned to its ability to engage in a “war of positioning” to dismantle 
hegemony, it is said to become aware of its “counter-hegemonic potential.” 
                                                 
47
 Peter Mayo, “In And Against the State: Gramsci, War of Position, and Adult Education,” Journal of 
Critical Education Policy Studies 3, no. 2 (2005): 2.  
48
 Cohen and Arato, 144.  
49
 Mayo, 1-2. 
50
 Mouffe, 5.  
51
 Mouffe, 5.  
52
 Mouffe, 5.  
Diefendorf 23 
COUNTER-HEGEMONY: 
 In order to dismantle hegemony, civil society must create a counter-hegemonic 
movement. Counter-hegemonic movements must attend to two essential tasks to 
dismantle hegemony, the first of which involves dismantling the existing hegemonic 
ideology perpetuated by the dominant group and made strong by the hegemonic bloc. In 
order to dismantle hegemonic ideology, the individuals who perpetuate such—the 
traditional intellectuals—must be targeted. In an effort to do so, a counter-hegemonic 
movement must create its own group of intellectuals, the “new intellectuals,” who help to 
destroy the dominant ideology. New intellectuals therefore must “assimilate and conquer 
ideologically the traditional intellectuals” responsible for reproducing hegemony.  
 New intellectuals of a counter-hegemonic movement face a challenging task. 
Hegemony is characterized by the extent to which it pervades all levels of society and 
daily life. As previously stated, the longer hegemony goes unchallenged, the more it 
becomes entrenched, and the harder task new intellectuals are presented with as they 
attempt to deconstruct power structures and ideology that have long been acquiesced to 
or considered the norm. In order to challenge these often deep-rooted sentiments, new 
intellectuals must work amongst the masses to call into question how the masses 
conceptualize the world they live in, and the power structures that dictate their reality.53 It 
is imperative for new intellectuals to demonstrate to the masses that a given ideology or 
authority is in fact hegemonic, and moreover that their lack of action against such forces 
is perpetuating this domination.54   
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 An essential task before new intellectuals in dismantling hegemony, therefore, is 
the development of a “critical consciousness” among the masses. Gramsci notes the 
presence of two consciousnesses that exist within individuals, which stand in 
contradiction to one another.55 One consciousness, he maintains, is “inherited from the 
past and uncritically absorbed.”56 This consciousness is relevant, however, because it 
dictates an individual’s moral convictions and their “direction of will.”57 The detriment of 
this consciousness exists in the fact that these are inherited sentiments, which can have 
the effect of discouraging individuals from acting against or questioning them, merely 
encouraging them to continue to acquiesce to the status quo.58 The second consciousness 
is the way in which an individual views the world in theory—felt but not performed.59 A 
successful counter-hegemonic initiative must therefore encourage the contestation 
between these two consciousnesses, and advocate for individuals to no longer act 
contradictorily in “theory versus practice.”60 It is this contradiction among the masses 
that enables them to acquiesce to or unknowingly accept hegemony.  
New intellectuals directly challenge these contradictions by promoting “critical 
consciousnesses,” where they work to advance an acute awareness among the masses of 
how their double consciousnesses contribute to the hegemonic bloc. This critical 
awareness promotes an intellectual awakening that shakes one from a stupor of 
acquiescence, and encourages him to understand how hegemony has repressed him. This 
intellectual awakening grants individuals agency over their lives and allows them to 
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discover how to function within a new “intellectual-moral bloc”61 where they no longer 
need to acquiesce to the “intellectual and moral direction” imposed upon society by the 
hegemonic group.62 New intellectuals therefore demonstrate that hegemony need not 
reflect the “collective national-popular will” as it does not truly reflect the will and 
interest of the masses, but rather exclusively benefits the ruling group.63 This intellectual-
moral bloc directly creates fissures within the hegemonic bloc, as it is created by critical 
and aware masses who no longer passively acquiesce to advancing hegemony. As 
Gramsci describes, through the development of a critical consciousness, every individual 
is made into a “philosopher,” in that they critically evaluate the world and their role in 
it.64  
Paulo Freire optimistically suggested that “every human being, no matter how 
‘ignorant’ or submerged in the ‘culture of silence’ he or she may be, is capable of looking 
critically at the world in a dialogical encounter with others.”65 If new intellectuals can 
prompt this realization, the oppressed “can gradually perceive personal and social reality 
as well as the contradictions in it, become conscious of his or her perception of that 
reality, and deal critically with it.”66 This is a crucial step towards cultural change, 
because it is not until an individual comes to an understanding of the world that they can 
then work to change it.67 The difficulty in accomplishing “critical consciousness” in a 
society that has long been subjugated should not be underestimated, however. Hegemonic 
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forces entrenched over time have the effect of creating a mentality among the masses that 
discourages challenges against the hegemonic system, as individuals come to “confuse 
freedom with the maintenance of the status quo.”68 The strength of counter-hegemony, 
therefore, can be measured in its ability to overcome the “fear of freedom” among masses 
long suffering under an oppressive power structure.69 Because the oppressed have been 
victims under hegemony for so long, and only through counter-hegemonic activities are 
made to realize they were exploited under status-quo power systems, freeing themselves 
from this domination seems unnatural, unsafe, and difficult.70 Through developing 
critical consciousnesses among the masses, however, counter-hegemonic movements 
demonstrate that individuals need not fear, but rather should embrace and actively work 
towards the attainment of the benefits and agency this freedom from hegemony brings.  
Critical consciousness must occur throughout society; it is not enough solely for 
intellectuals to engage in this introspective process if cultural change is to be 
accomplished.71 Working within schools, Gramsci believed,72 is an important way to 
carry out the development of critical consciousnesses in society and overcome the 
“culture of silence” that perpetuates hegemony.73 Because schools can act as a medium 
for either the reproduction or challenge of hegemonic ideology, it is important that a 
counter-hegemonic movement reclaim these mediums in order to gain control over the 
varied sources that strengthen hegemony daily. The importance of schools in counter-
hegemonic movements is an idea that will be revisited and explicated in Chapter 4.74  
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It is important to note, however, that it is possible for the dominant group to 
perceive an ideological shift occurring, and attempt to stop any shift away from the 
hegemonic system so as to prevent its loss of control over the masses.75 A hegemonic 
bloc will work diligently to monitor and limit fissures, particularly those created by 
external forces. Specifically, the dominant group fearing a loss of power might attempt to 
prevent “critical consciousnesses” from being attained, as the dominant group benefits 
from a docile, consenting population that acquiesces to its power and does not realize that 
it is oppressed. Gramsci therefore accurately worried that hegemonic groups would have 
an interest in attempting to prevent counter-hegemonic initiatives.76 This is why the first 
task of counter-hegemonic movements is to weaken the ability of traditional intellectuals 
to carry out their role, because if the hegemonic bloc loses this agent of enforcement, its 
overall strength is fundamentally weakened.  
 Because this introspection and critical awareness among the masses is dependent 
on their ability to perceive alternatives to the hegemonic system, the second role of a 
counter-hegemonic movement is to produce and spread a new, counter-hegemonic 
ideology to take place of the old that new intellectuals work to deconstruct. As Gramsci 
recognized, introspection among individuals only takes place in the arena of contesting 
“political hegemonies,” when individuals are made to realize that there are viable 
alternatives to the hegemonic ideology in place, causing them to critically reconsider the 
ideology to which they wish to ascribe.77 New intellectuals, therefore, must further a new 
way of conceptualizing the world, and actively encourage citizens to adopt this 
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conception through a three-step process of constructing the counter-ideology, organizing 
the masses, and then persuading the masses in concordance with the new system.78  
Building a counter-hegemonic ideology requires a new category of intellectuals, 
called “organic intellectuals.” Gramsci believed that most intellectuals came from peasant 
backgrounds, and through their intellectualization ultimately left behind their class of 
origin, no longer “organically” a member of their original background.79 This disconnect 
between the informed and uninformed contributed to the perpetuation of hegemony, as 
the uninformed classes possessed no intellectuals who stayed amongst them to further 
their knowledge of their oppression and the need to challenge such.80 Therefore, Gramsci 
believed that a successful counter-hegemonic movement must breed its own “organic 
intellectuals” who stay within the movement and organize at the societal level, helping to 
further the “alternative ideological and cultural awareness.”81 Only when organic 
intellectuals work within the masses from which they arose will they be able to spread 
widely counter-hegemonic ideals and a new ideology.82  
 Organic intellectuals must assure that the masses are made to support the creation 
and uptake of counter-hegemonic ideology in society through actions and behaviors in 
their everyday lives.83 This newly created ideology must reflect the “collective will” of 
the masses and be compelling enough to act as the “organic cement” holding the masses 
together in their counter-hegemonic movement.84 In other words, this ideology must help 
individuals come to a larger understanding of the world in which they live, giving 
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meaning and solutions to their problems. If organic intellectuals can attend to this end— 
showing the masses a viable alternative to the hegemonic system—another divisive 
fissure within the hegemonic bloc can be generated that delegitimizes the belief that only 
through participating in the hegemonic system can individuals prosper. The ability of 
organic intellectuals to convince the masses of the viability of the alternative counter-
hegemonic system depends on the ability of the movement to develop counter-hegemonic 
institutions that support the new ideology. Just as the hegemonic bloc relies on non-state 
actors to solidify its strength, the counter-hegemonic system must develop a similar 
system of support that ensures its perpetuation. Various apparatuses must work to further 
the counter-hegemonic ideology if it is to become pervasive like hegemony once was. 
These apparatuses must enable the counter-hegemonic movement to offer an alternative 
medium for economic, social, and cultural production. The strength of the counter-
hegemonic movement, therefore, is dependent on its ability to convince the masses of the 
need to dismantle the hegemonic bloc, and making this pragmatic by proposing a 
legitimate substitute to living and working outside the hegemonic system. Through this 
practical alternative to the hegemonic system, counter-hegemony can become 
incorporated and entrenched through daily practices.  
 The above mentioned steps must take place if a counter-hegemonic movement is 
to succeed in bringing about cultural change. Locating the source of hegemonic 
domination, destroying hegemony through an ideological attack on traditional 
intellectuals, the creation of “critical consciousnesses,” and finally the development and 
production of a counter-hegemonic ideology can be viewed as the stepping stones that 
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precipitate a “transformation of civil society”85 that is fundamental in order for civil 
society to break from its potential of being a breeding ground for the perpetuation and 
reinforcement of hegemony. As civil society thus begins to “reclaim political society” as 
the terrain once dominated by a hegemonic group,86 cracks and ruptures are produced as 
a counter-hegemonic movement begins to deconstruct hegemonic ideology. To 
summarize, if hegemony is envisioned as a formidable wall made strong over time with 
the mortar of acquiescence, it is the counter-hegemonic movement, and specifically the 
organic intellectuals, who must slowly chip away at this wall. Opportunities for political 
activism are created in these fractures of hegemony, indeed the civilian politicization that 
the dominant group once sought to prevent. When the masses begin to reclaim this space 
as their own, organic intellectuals can encourage the further dismantling of hegemony 
until it is destroyed.  
The reclamation of “political space” and the conversion of civil society from a 
breeding ground of hegemony to a medium challenging the hegemonic system take 
significant time, however.87 Because counter-hegemonic movements involve many steps 
in order to successfully destroy deeply-rooted hegemony, it is logical why movements of 
this nature often are long in duration. Gramsci himself acknowledged that counter-
hegemonic movements take time to become fully developed and accepted widely among 
the masses—to completely dismantle the hegemonic wall and promote the “progressive 
disaggregation of a civilization and the construction of another” around the new 
ideology.88 Therefore, just as hegemony becomes slowly solidified over time, counter-
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hegemony must slowly work to disaggregate the various sources perpetuating this 
domination while simultaneously offering an alternative ideology that can be offered to 
the masses. 
 Chapter Two follows, which aims to relate Gramscian theories of hegemony and 
civil society to the case study at hand. It will be established that Cosa Nostra and the 
Italian state are two competing and linked “hegemons” that dominate the hegemonic bloc 
in Sicily. The symbiotic relationship between the mafia and state has perpetuated the 
solidification of this bloc over a period of nearly 150 years. Societal and institutional 
acquiescence to the mafia-state system has ensured its entrenchment that the antimafia 
movement has recently begun working to deconstruct beginning in the 1980s. It will be 
suggested that the antimafia movement, therefore, is counter-hegemonic in its aims and 
strategies as it seeks to dismantle a deeply-rooted hegemonic bloc that has long dictated 
Sicily’s politics, economy, and culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diefendorf 32 
CHAPTER 2: The State-Mafia Hegemonic Bloc  
 
 This chapter aims to establish Cosa Nostra as a vital part of the state’s hegemonic 
bloc within Sicily that has controlled the masses since the 1860s. By tracing the nature 
and evolution of the symbiotic relationship between Cosa Nostra and the Italian state, it 
will be demonstrated that these two institutions work in tandem with one another in such 
a way that has resulted in physical and ideological domination over Sicilians for nearly 
120 years. The hegemonic nature of this partnership will be proven by demonstrating the 
political, economic, and cultural manifestations of this relationship that receive 
strengthening through hegemonic apparatuses within Sicily such as the Catholic Church, 
civil society, political parties, and traditional intellectuals. Gramscian theory will be 
employed to highlight the hegemonic bloc that exists as a result of state-mafia relations, 
which brings attention to the need for a counter-hegemonic movement to dismantle this 
system of hegemony that will work to challenge the state as the locus from which 
hegemony radiates, as well as the varied apparatuses within society that reproduce 
hegemonic ideals and practices daily.  
REVISITING GRAMSCI: 
 Gramsci believed that the Italian state, with the help of institutions, civil society, 
the Catholic Church, and traditional intellectuals comprised the hegemonic bloc in 1930s 
Italy. The Marxist believed that the working class needed to dismantle this bloc in order 
to bring about cultural change in Italy. In Sicily, however, the Italian state never 
succeeded in establishing its dominance over the population following Italian unification 
in 1860. Consequently, the state has historically cooperated with Cosa Nostra to provide 
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essential services, enforce order, control violence, and extract electoral support in the 
region.  
 Thus, while Gramsci believed the Italian state to be the center from which 
hegemonic ideology and dominance radiated, in Sicily the Italian state has had to rely 
heavily on the mafia to strengthen its influence on the island. With these two powers 
working in conjunction with one another to enforce authority and control over the region, 
a hegemonic bloc in Sicily comprised of and made strong through the symbiotic 
relationship between the state and Cosa Nostra has developed that manifests in the 
physical and ideological domination over Sicilians. This represents a unique case study in 
hegemony, therefore, because while Gramsci explains that states rely on external 
institutions and non-state actors to enforce ideology and dominance over the masses, in 
the case of Sicily the state has had to rely on a criminal organization to control the masses 
and carry out its functions—setting the stage for important power contestations that have 
the potential to destabilize the hegemonic system upon which these powers both rely. 
UNDERSTANDING SICILY’S HISTORY: 
 Before the state and mafia can be understood as constituting a hegemonic bloc 
within Sicily, it is important to explain the origin and nature of this symbiotic relationship 
on the island. In 1860, the Italian state succeeded in joining Sicily with mainland Italy 
despite incredible opposition against unification.89 Sicilians—with their long history of 
foreign rule, domination, and subjugation—considered unification with the Italian state to 
be yet another instance of unwarranted foreign control.90 Sicilians believed themselves to 
possess no cultural, linguistic, or historical commonalities with mainland Italy, and thus 
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looked unfavorably upon unification with an unfamiliar entity.91 This popular opposition 
in Sicily never was addressed or quelled effectively by the Italian state, and consequently 
presented notable obstacles to effective state-building in the region.92 The Italian state’s 
inability to successfully establish its authority over the island had tremendous 
ramifications for Sicily’s future. In order to understand the implications that arose from 
ineffectual state-building in Sicily, it is imperative to visit the ideas of Charles Tilly who 
describes how a state should engage in state-building in order to establish its legitimacy 
and authority over a population, and the consequences that result if these steps are not 
carried to fruition. 
 It is useful to first delineate the notion of the “state” before proceeding with an 
analysis of Tilly, as his ideas on state-building are grounded within a particular 
conception of the state. While a wealth of definitions abound, this thesis will operate on 
two widely accepted and interlinked understandings of the state. Because the state is a 
complex entity composed of various parts, Skocpol’s definition is particularly helpful. 
She suggests that the state is “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations 
headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority.”93 In the following 
discussion of the Italian state, Skocpol’s definition will be beneficial in advancing the 
notion that the state is not a monolithic body, and that its various parts do not always 
work in congruence with one another. In addition, Max Weber’s definition of the state 
will also heavily be drawn upon in this thesis. Weber defines the state as “a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within 
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a given territory.” Based on this conception, Weber emphasizes the state as the only actor 
that has the “right” to utilize this control of force, as it is understood that this force is 
used to advance the public good.94 Combining these two conceptions, the state can be 
understood as a complex entity composed of a variety of apparatuses and agencies that, in 
theory, works in harmony in order to serve and protect public interests.95 Utilizing these 
understandings of the state, Tilly’s notions of state-building can now be explicated. 
 Charles Tilly offers a compelling theoretical framework from which to analyze 
how state-building must transpire in order for a state to establish its legitimacy and 
authority over a region. Tilly builds from the Weberian definition of the state, and 
outlines the following four roles an effective state must carry out: “war making to 
eliminate outside competitors, state making to eliminate rivals within the territory, 
protection, and extraction.”96 The state’s ability to perform these four functions, Tilly 
maintains, dictates its ability to constantly enforce and maintain a monopoly of 
violence—indeed, a fundamental determinant of state authority.97 If a state proves 
capable at performing one of these roles, its ability to perform the others is greatly 
enhanced.98 Conversely, failing to perform one or all of these roles jeopardizes state 
authority and legitimacy.  
 The state-making process is thus a formative time in which a state must establish 
its monopoly of violence and force, or otherwise risk empowering and encouraging other 
actors who desire to carry out these roles. Tilly suggests that the way in which state-
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building is carried out in terms of the pacification of competitors is a determinant of 
whether the state attains a “territorial monopoly of legitimate violence,” or whether 
organized crime and illegality are fostered.99 War-making is seen as a fundamental step to 
effective state-making and attainment of a monopoly of violence,100 but this study will 
focus more on attempts to quell internal as opposed to external threats to state power, as 
it was challenge from local actors in Sicily during state-building that posed the greatest 
threat to the Italian state’s ability to solidify its power.  
Because control of territory and resources is vital to a state’s ability to establish 
and centralize its authority, and a state’s legitimacy ultimately depends on the approval of 
its citizens,101 states have to decide whether to utilize or challenge the existence of local, 
external actors who have already established authority and control in a particular 
region.102 States that construct a monopoly of violence without the help of external 
authorities are best able to centralize and streamline their own authority without 
challenge from these outside actors. This ideal scenario is not always possible, however. 
Tilly describes that it is common for a variety of actors to possess claims to violence in 
the early years of state-building.103  Through state-building efforts, however, all non-state 
actors who possess claims to violence should be delegitimized, while the state must in 
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turn elevate itself in the minds of the citizenry as the sole possessor of a legitimate 
monopoly of force working in the interest of the public good.104  
The eradication of rival actors that successful state-building necessitates is not 
always an easy task.105 In circumstances where state-building transpires over previously 
incongruous and remote areas, rival actors initially may be utilized in order to bolster the 
state’s ability to rule indirectly over distant populations.106 This reliance on other actors 
for state-making need not be perpetual; it is a hard tradition to break from, however, 
unless the state can adopt other means to enforce its authority and power through 
alternative mediums that will not compromise the state’s attempts at monopolizing force. 
This can be done through state-backed institutions like a police force, for instance, that 
supplement state authority instead of challenging it.107 Therefore, if a state depends upon 
the assistance of local actors to construct state authority, the state  recognizes and 
promotes the existence of “a plurality of political actors” that effectively weaken the 
legitimacy of the state as the sole provider of protection and security.108 This allows Tilly 
to conclude that the existence of organized crime stems not from a lack of state presence, 
but rather the deliberate will of the state to attain assistance in and ease the process of 
state-making.109 Therefore, while challenges to state authority are highly probable during 
early phases of state-building, a state’s monopoly on violence in a region is dependent 
upon its ability to effectively respond to and dismiss such challenges going forward.110 
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The state’s capacity to provide protection in a territory is a necessary aspect of 
state-building that conditions its ability to attain a legitimate monopoly on violence. 
States have a dual role in providing and selling protection to the citizenry. Thus, effective 
and capable states are often deemed as possessing a "protection racket," or the ability to 
control violence through security measures that can then be sold to others.111 In order for 
a state to possess a protection racket, it “requires a monopoly of the means of coercion,” 
for it cannot hope to extract support and legitimacy from the citizenry if other actors are 
competing for the ability to carry out the role of providing protection.112 Therefore, it 
becomes clear how intertwined state functions are; if the state fails at performing one of 
its four main roles, its ability to perform the others is severely diminished. The state must 
ensure that it establishes itself as a “legitimate form of protection racket” in a given 
region.113 Similarly to how the state must delegitimize other actors who possess claims to 
violence, an effective state must also destabilize alternative non-state actors who claim 
the ability to protect against such violence.  
 Finally, Tilly suggests that states must also be able to obtain extractions from their 
citizenry in order to effectively solidify their presence and authority in a region. The state 
must succeed in creating “compliant national populations” that recognize the state’s 
legitimacy and grant approval to its monopoly of violence.114 Compliant populations that 
acquiesce to state power demonstrate their approval through acquiescing to state 
extractions through instruments such as bureaucracy, conscription, and taxation.115  
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What happens, however, when a state fails at performing these four imperative 
roles that allow it to enforce its authority and legitimacy in a given territory? As Tilly 
proposes, organized crime groups develop “only in certain states and in particular 
historical circumstances.”116 Simply put, organized crime is encouraged when the state 
fails or proves ineffectual at performing and establishing its authority and legitimacy to 
carry out the four roles that Tilly outlines: war making, state making, protection, and 
extraction. Failure in performing these functions effectively encourages other actors to 
supplement state ineffectuality. It is pertinent to turn to the specific case at hand, applying 
Tilly’s theories to Sicily to demonstrate how early state failings on the island after 
unification in 1860 set the stage for dependence on rival actors in the form of Cosa 
Nostra in order to establish domination over the population.  
RELATING TILLY TO SICILY: 
In Sicily at the time of unification, particular conditions on the island posed 
significant difficulties to the Italian state as it attempted to “build a new state virtually 
from scratch.”117 Under the varied powers that controlled Sicily prior to 1860, it was 
customary for foreign rulers to involve and empower a variety of individuals in the 
stabilization of the empire in order to ensure the perpetuation of their indirect rule. As a 
result, many Sicilians at the time of unification were in positions of informal authority 
that allowed them to control affairs typically reserved to a state, such as extracting taxes 
and quelling unrest.118 As Tilly suggests, it is not uncommon for a variety of local actors 
to exist prior to state-building, but if the Italian state was to effectively establish its 
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authority and legitimacy in Sicily, it would have to delegitimize these local actors while 
asserting its sovereign ability to rule and control the population.  
Coupled with Sicily’s history of foreign domination and indirect rule that had 
empowered local non-state actors on the island, feudalism also presented difficulties for 
state-building. This system of subjugation and unequal land control and distribution was 
characteristic throughout Sicily’s history of domination by French Normans, Spaniards, 
Austrians, and finally Bourbons.119 Feudalism ensured unequal access to land and 
disparate opportunities for wealth and resources, which therefore encouraged Sicilians to 
depend on familial networks to obtain necessary resources for survival that otherwise 
could not be easily acquired.120 Feudalism helped promote systems of “mutual aid” and 
reliance on others for basic needs, which is recognized as having provided fertile ground 
for patronage politics to flourish that would become an engrained feature of Sicilian 
politics and culture for the next 150 years.121  
Under unification, when the Italian state sought to improve Sicily’s 
“backwardness” and consolidate state rule, feudalism came to an end, but the framework 
for informal networks and illegality was already established.122 Moreover, the need to 
parcel up and redistribute land and property required heavy-handed involvement the 
nascent state in Sicily did not have the time or resources to oversee. This redistribution of 
land and resources in the wake of feudalism encouraged the involvement of local actors 
who eased the pace of privatization by granting property rights and resources through 
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corrupt dealings or entrenched practices instead of the state.123 These local actors 
possessed claims to violence as well as claims to the authority to act in typically state-
dominated roles. Many of these local actors were wealthy Sicilians who had also been 
empowered and utilized by foreign rulers prior to unification. The Italian state’s failure to 
delegitimize these actors sowed the seeds for a history of state ineffectuality marked by a 
plurality of actors in Sicily working in competition with one another to provide necessary 
services to the population.124  
Moreover, as previously noted, a significant amount of unrest and discontentment 
plagued Sicily in unification years, as many Sicilians resented being incorporated with 
mainland Italy with whom they believed to possess no communal ties. This resistance did 
not stop after unification, but rather gained steam, culminating in an anti-government 
protest in 1866 in Palermo.125 Discontentment and resistance to state domination was so 
severe that the Italian state declared martial law twice in Sicily before 1870, but this 
action had little effect amongst a population that already distrusted and resented the 
Italian state’s right to rule.126 Prior to and in the years following unification, therefore, 
Sicilians frequently showcased their dislike of being hastily integrated into Italy.127 While 
manifestations of state power came to Sicily in the 1880s in the form of institutions such 
as national banks and courts, these were essentially facades of state legitimacy that 
suggested the Italian state had streamlined its authority and power in the region more so 
than it actually had succeeded in doing at this time.128 Uneven development, patronage 
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networks left from feudalism, and inadequate political representation in Sicily were 
testaments to the extent to which state-building was not fully completed. Sicily’s hasty 
incorporation into mainland Italy during the late 1880s, therefore, would continue to have 
devastating repercussions on Sicily’s economy, politics, and culture through the present 
day.  
Due to the varied problems the Italian state faced in state-building, it was prudent 
to turn to local actors in Sicily for assistance in overcoming and mitigating these 
hindrances.129 “Starved for credibility,” the Italian state began to look to Cosa Nostra as 
an organization that would help in state-building and overcoming obstacles such as 
linguistic and cultural barriers, popular opposition, underdevelopment, and the incredible 
unrest and chaos on the island.130 Therefore, during these formative state-building years, 
local actors were utilized by the state instead of delegitimized. During the years after 
unification in particular, the mafia arose as a capable criminal organization that gained 
prominence by offering protection to Sicilians against bandits that engaged in theft of 
land, property, and livestock.131 As Blok explains, banditry was so widespread during the 
late 1800s that it “constrained those who had property to buy protection.”132 While 
bandits were looked down upon as a sign of southern Italy’s “backwardness,” Cosa 
Nostra in contrast was coveted as an organization that could help carry out state functions 
including enforcing order, controlling violence, and offering protection to Sicilians in the 
absence of a strong state in the region.133 With state backing, Cosa Nostra quickly 
                                                 
129
 Dickie, 63.  
130
 Dickie, 63.  
131
 Schneider and Schneider, Reversible Destiny, 30-1.  
132
 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence (Malden: Polity Press, 2001), 4. 
133
 Louise I. Shelley, “Review: Mafia and the Italian State: The Historical Roots of the Current Crisis,” 
Sociological Forum 9, no. 4 (1994): 667. 
Diefendorf 43 
developed a protection racket over the island, where Sicilians paid a pizzo tribute to the 
mafia in exchange for protection from banditry.134 Therefore, the absence of an effective 
and legitimate state presence in Sicily provided the mafia with a lucrative void in which 
to fill as “entrepreneurs of violence,” allowing the criminal organization to gain 
commanding power in the years after unification through capitalizing on pervasive 
violence and disorder.135 In short, the late 1800s saw the beginnings of a long tradition of 
Cosa Nostra solidifying “a dense interweaving with the state.”136  
During unification before the Italian state entered into a dependent relationship 
with Cosa Nostra, “the ruling class was thus only dominant, not hegemonic” as a result 
of its inability to foster respect for its authority and power among Sicilians who resented 
being ruled from outside actors.137 As noted, local and regional sentiments inhibited the 
ability of the state to develop a pervasive ideology to control the masses. However, when 
the state began its contractual relationship with the mafia in the late 1800s, dominance 
turned into hegemonic control over the masses, as Cosa Nostra over the following 
decades would come to enforce its authority to the degree that it came to control and 
dominate Sicily’s economy, politics, and society. 
During the early years of the state-mafia partnership, some disapproving state 
authorities voiced their hope that mafia collaboration would be “on a short-term basis,” 
carried out only until the Italian state could “take the violence out of Sicilian society” 
itself.138 The nature of this hegemonic relationship would only strengthen over time, 
however, with mafiosi gaining commanding political positions within the government 
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and extracting impunity from the state in exchange for its services rendered in Sicily.139  
As a result of state support, therefore, by 1890 mafiosi had solidified “powerful political 
connections and an international reach.”140 As Cosa Nostra proved incredibly efficient 
and adept at providing protection and enforcing order—more effective than the nascent 
state was able to be in this region—the state had little reason to reevaluate this 
relationship. The Italian state’s reliance on mafiosi, therefore, and failure to delegitimize 
these actors early on ensured the beginnings of a long-term, symbiotic relationship that 
would continue well beyond the period of unification.  
The Italian state had a second opportunity following World War II to engage in 
state-building in Sicily, but failed at solidifying its authority and delegitimizing Cosa 
Nostra as a provider of protection and security just as it had in the years after unification. 
Similarly to unification, the turmoil and instability of the time encouraged the state to 
again recognize, legitimize, and depend on a plurality of actors in the form of Cosa 
Nostra to help control the region. It was precisely the political, social, and economic 
shakeup of the postwar years that offered the state a prime opportunity to extend its 
legitimacy—an opportunity that instead was capitalized on by the mafia.141 As Catanzaro 
aptly concludes, “instability has always been the essential dynamic of Mafia power.”142  
The instability ushered in through WWII came about as a result of Allied 
involvement in the region and the political shakeup the war produced. Allied attacks on 
Sicily greatly dismantled infrastructure and forced the relocation of thousands of Sicilians 
who were targeted as Axis allies, despite the unacknowledged fact that most Sicilians 
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favored the Allied effort.143 In addition, because WWII brought the overthrow—and 
subsequent death—of Mussolini, Sicily’s political structure and state leadership was 
dismantled during this time, as well. During occupation at the conclusion of the war, 
Allies organized through the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory 
(AMGOT) sought to rebuild Sicily and Italy as a whole, engaging in state-building efforts 
to establish a new political order in the wake of fascism.144 The challenge was too great 
and the needs too immediate, however, for the Italian state who historically had never 
been powerful in the region. Cosa Nostra again aptly recognized the weakness of the 
political system during this time, and was able to capitalize on state ineffectuality during 
rebuilding by providing security and protection to citizens that the state could not.  
The mafia’s resilience was greatly enhanced by AMGOT, which encouraged an 
intimate relationship between the mafia and state through recognizing Cosa Nostra’s 
unique ability to offer services to a population under threat of noncompliance.145 The 
Allies effectively undid what little antimafia progress had been made under Mussolini, 
who inconsistently advanced a hardened stance against the mafia as evident by the 
hundreds of mafiosi arrests he ordered during his reign. Mussolini’s antimafia stance 
sprang from his resentment of mafiosi as non-state actors operating in state roles, who 
compromised the state’s efforts to become a totalitarian and all-pervasive power.146 In the 
wake of the war, however, this commitment fell by the wayside as rebuilding and 
restructuring took priority, and Cosa Nostra offered its services in order to bring stability 
to the chaotic region. Thus, while Calhoun suggests that the role of a state is to “pacify 
                                                 
143
 Schneider and Schneider, Reversible Destiny, 14-15.  
144
 Dickie, 196.  
145
 Joshua Hammer, “In Sicily, Defying the Mafia,” Smithsonian, October 2010,   
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/In-Sicily-Defying-the-Mafia.html, 2.  
146
 Dickie, 144-7; Shelley, “Review,” 668. 
Diefendorf 46 
life within its territory,” this responsibility and authority was granted to non-state actors 
in the form of mafiosi in the wake of WWII.147 Delegating state responsibilities to Cosa 
Nostra was considered favorable because it meant a lesser role for Allied troops whose 
time commitment to the region was never expected to be anything more than temporary, 
until local authorities (or competing actors) could take control of affairs for themselves.  
In addition, the vast destruction of Sicilian cities resulting from Allied bombing 
created the need for construction and economic revitalization—a need that the mafia 
rushed in to fill, and indeed was encouraged to fill through the ease in which mafia 
interests attained state-issued business contracts during this time.148 “The Sack of 
Palermo” of the 1950s-80s refers to the mafia’s total control of construction in the 
postwar period—a period of corrupt contracts and political favors that enveloped Palermo 
in concrete and illegality.149  
While Tilly notes that it is common during stages of state-building for a plurality 
of actors to operate in state functions, unfortunately this continued to be the reality in 
Sicily as the Italian state never consolidated a monopoly of violence in the postwar years 
or at any other time in Sicily’s history.150 During unification and again in the post-WWII 
years, the Italian state failed to differentiate itself as the sole legitimate possessor of a 
monopoly of violence by failing to delegitimize Cosa Nostra’s claims to violence in the 
region, setting the stage for a long history of state dependence and acquiescence to the 
mafia.  
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ESTABLISHING THE PRAGMATISM OF STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS: 
The reasons why the Italian state found it prudent to delegate responsibility and 
state functions to Cosa Nostra in the periods of unification and WWII stem from the 
many similarities between the criminal organization and the state. Because Cosa Nostra 
and the Italian state both seek to provide similar services, simply through dissimilar 
means, it is logical that the state has historically relied on the mafia as a result of the 
mafia’s proven ability to carry out imperative functions. This is the theory of instrumental 
rationalism, where organized crime succeeds because it “provides what the state is unable 
to provide—jobs, protection, goods and services.”151  
On a basic note, the principle motive driving the actions of both states and 
organized crime is the same. Both entities work towards the pursuit of power and profit, 
which often manifests in a desire to establish control over the economy and lucrative 
industries.152 This shared motivator also leads to another similarity, where both states and 
organized crime seek to enforce order and control violence. In order to quell disorder and 
enforce legality, the state utilizes mediums such as the army and police to patrol any 
deviation from law and order. 153 Therefore, the state is seen as enforcing an impersonal 
rule of law that seeks to protect all civilians universally and equally. The state ideally 
ensures, therefore, that “everyone is equal before the law, or that the state should serve 
the interests of all its citizens rather than the friends and family of whoever happens to 
wield power.”154 Consequently, states bear the burden of proving their impersonality in 
order to attain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.  
                                                 
151
 Allum and Siebert, 2.  
152
 Dickie, 22.  
153
 Allum and Siebert, 17.  
154
 Dickie, 293.  
Diefendorf 48 
In contrast, Cosa Nostra relies on intimidation and violence as tools for 
pacification, lacking the legitimate mediums that the state possesses to carry out these 
functions.155 Therefore, unlike the state, organized crime enforces rule of law personally 
on the basis of who supports and submits to the organization’s authority. Cosa Nostra 
does not need to offer its services universally or in an unbiased manner because the 
organization does not depend on mandates or grants of legitimacy from citizens to 
support its right to rule. Rather, the mafia relies on coercion and violence to extract 
compliance, enacting harsh forms of retribution if necessary as a result of its ability to 
disregard civilian approval. While both states and organized crime groups are driven by 
the desire to control a territory, therefore, these entities do so through different means. 
Both state and mafia also attempt to establish protection rackets over the 
population, providing and selling security to the masses. The definition of a racketeer is 
“someone who creates a threat then charges for its reduction.”156 Based on this 
understanding, it is clear to surmise how both state and mafia can be considered 
protection racketeers; as Tilly suggests, the state sells protection on the basis of real 
threats from external actors, for instance, but can also create threats in order to solidify its 
role and authority as a security provider, such as creating the perceived threat of war.157 
Cosa Nostra also engages in racketeering through creating fear about social conditions—
such as banditry in the 1860s—and subsequently coercing civilians into paying protection 
tributes out of threat of force.158 Therefore, state and mafia both attempt to possess a 
protection racket over Sicilians, but the state does so by taxation through legal and 
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legitimate mediums to support the army and defense, whereas the mafia does so in the 
form of pizzo extracted through fear and violence if necessary.159 Thus, because both the 
mafia and state perform essentially the same functions and have the same aims, according 
to instrumental rationalism it is logical that the state would delegate its functions to the 
mafia if Cosa Nostra proved more adept and effectual at providing protection, enforcing 
order, and controlling violence in a territory.  
EVOLUTION OF STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS: 
Once a state becomes reliant on organized crime in order to carry out certain 
functions and enforce its authority and legitimacy, it is incredibly difficult to break this 
relationship of dependence and mutual benefit.160 Peter Lupsha describes three 
evolutionary phases that explain how organized crime groups can come to possess 
intimate relations with a state. The more phases state-organized crime partnerships 
proceed through, the more entrenched mutual reliance becomes, and the harder these ties 
of dependence are to sever. The “predatory stage” marks the first phase, in which a 
criminal group establishes itself within a territory and creates its own practices and 
methods for gaining control, such as how Cosa Nostra offered protection from banditry 
and thievery in the 1860s for a fee.161 Once organized crime establishes its presence in a 
market, the “parasitical” phase follows, when organized crime begins to pervade “legal 
businesses and local and regional politics.”162 Cosa Nostra entered into this phase when it 
began to dominate legitimate industries such as sulfur and citrus, and started “acting as an 
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instrument of local government” as early as 1876 through attaining placement within 
political institutions and governing bodies in Sicily.163 Political appointments became an 
early practice of rewarding the mafia’s support of state functions on the island. Finally, 
after establishing this level of prominence and infiltration, organized crime then moves to 
the third phase, entering into a “symbiotic” relationship with the state, where organized 
crime becomes “fully integrated into the political and economic structure of a region.”164 
This is the phase that represents state-mafia relations today, and has reflected the state of 
relations between these two powers since the years following WWII. From the postwar 
years through the contemporary period, the mafia has become fully emerged in Sicily’s 
politics and economy through legal grants of impunity, political alliances with powerful 
politicians, and relations with authorities in charge of controlling business contracts and 
licenses.165  
Because Cosa Nostra and the state have existed in this “symbiotic phase” for 
decades, therefore, the mafia is in a position of formidable influence where it is able to 
place demands upon and extract support from the state relatively easily as a result of the 
mutual dependence between these two entities. Shelley refers to states that enter into 
“symbiotic relationships” with organized crime groups as “criminalized states,” which 
have the effect of encouraging criminal groups through their favorable treatment and 
policies.166 Even in circumstances where the citizenry becomes committed to dismantling 
and eradicating these intimate ties to crime, it is difficult for a state to withdraw from this 
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relationship.167 This is because mutual extractions are relied upon by both entities to the 
extent that dependence becomes entrenched through daily transactions. The fact that there 
exists a symbiotic relationship between Cosa Nostra and the Italian state is reflective of 
the challenge the antimafia movement faces in bringing an end to this deeply historical 
alliance. 
ESTABLISHING STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS AS A HEGEMONIC BLOC: 
The Italian state and Cosa Nostra entered into a hegemonic partnership in the 
years following unification, creating a hegemonic bloc that would work to perpetuate the 
strength of the state-mafia system and the ability of Cosa Nostra to act as a fundamental 
pillar of state authority without receiving challenge. These two powers worked in 
congruence with one another until total dominance over the economy, politics, and 
culture of Sicily was achieved. By 1890, a controversial report by policeman Ermanno 
Sangiorgi attested to the hegemonic power of the mafia, illustrating the “brutality and 
labyrinthine complexity of mafia influence at every level of Sicilian society.168  
According to Gramsci, a hegemonic bloc must meet two criteria: 1) the bloc must 
manifest in total physical and ideological domination over the masses to the extent that its 
power infiltrates all levels of society and discourages any challenge to the hegemonic 
system, and 2) external “hegemonic apparatuses” within society continually must work to 
reproduce and maintain this system. It will be demonstrated that the state-mafia system 
attends to both these ends, and thus constitutes a hegemonic bloc that has controlled the 
masses in Sicily since the 1860s.  
                                                 
167
 Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 470.  
168
 Dickie, 91-3.  
Diefendorf 52 
The state-mafia system fulfills Gramsci’s condition of total physical and 
ideological domination over the masses, and therefore can be conceptualized as 
representing a hegemonic bloc. Physical support of the state-mafia system manifests in 
the form of the mandatory pizzo tribute, which suggests that to do business in Sicily, one 
must respect and go through the state-mafia system.169 Through the pizzo, the mafia has 
found a method of indirectly controlling businesses that it does not own. The physical 
domination over the masses by Cosa Nostra is also evident in the direct ownership the 
mafia possesses over many industries and markets in Sicily. This control over restaurants, 
drug trafficking, garbage disposal, and agricultural production, for instance, reinforces 
the idea that Sicilians have no other choice but to participate in the hegemonic system. 
When support is not granted, the mafia has historically responded with a host of 
strategies to extract consent. In the absence of spontaneous consent, threats of violence 
are utilized; if threats prove insufficient, the mafia polices any deviation from the state-
mafia bloc through a variety of demonstrations of physical violence, including but not 
limited to: “poisoning guard dogs, burning cars, vandalizing citrus fruit trees…sending 
threatening letters with skulls drawn on them, placing bombs in offices, damaging 
machinery on building sites, and a great deal of hanging around.”170 Non-consent is 
therefore constantly curbed so as to discourage and limit any deviation from granting 
physical support to the state-mafia system.  
The state-mafia system also produces ideological domination over the masses, 
further indicative of the fact that this relationship manifests in a hegemonic bloc that 
reigns over Sicilians. The hegemonic bloc advances the ideology that Cosa Nostra exists 
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neither as an oppressive criminal organization on the island nor as an essential 
collaborator upon which the state depends. Cosa Nostra supplements weak and 
ineffectual state authority on the island, therefore, by creating a culture of fear and apathy 
in order to discourage denouncement of the illegal tactics the mafia uses in order to 
provide security, enforce order, and control violence in Sicily. Threats of and actual 
demonstrations of violence are again imperative in maintaining ideological domination 
over the masses. Through this coercion, the mafia limits the desirability of civilian 
denouncement against pervasive illegality and criminality that Cosa Nostra embodies. As 
Saviano describes, the general thinking under the hegemonic system discourages 
deviation: “Among the many reasons for keeping quiet, for pretending nothing happened, 
for going home and living as before, are the fear of intimidation and, even more, 
futility—one killer arrested was just one out of many.”171 As a result, acquiescence to 
power structures in place since the 1860s is strongly, and forcibly, encouraged.  
Through physical and ideological domination over Sicilians, the state-mafia bloc 
limits the expression of any alternatives outside the hegemonic system. Cosa Nostra, 
through violence if necessary, ensures that Sicilians believe that playing by the rules of 
the system is the only way to live and work. The benefits derived from the hegemonic 
system, including protection and the guarantee of safety against mafia violence, 
encourages Sicilians to make sense of their realities by participating in and furthering the 
system through their everyday actions. This is why total domination over the masses is 
imperative to the state-mafia bloc: the stability of this symbiotic relationship depends 
upon keeping the masses ignorant about the extent of state-mafia relations so they do not 
realize that this system ultimately only serves the two hegemons, while effectively 
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oppressing society as a whole by limiting how they conduct their lives and conceive of 
the realities in which they function. Consequently, this hegemonic bloc ensures that 
Sicilians’ “perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the 
reality of the oppression…they have no consciousness of themselves as persons or as 
members of an oppressed class.”172 Cosa Nostra and the state represent a hegemonic bloc 
in Sicily as a result of the physical and ideological domination it imposes over Sicilians, 
and the all-encompassing system it develops where individuals do not perceive another 
alternative to the hegemonic system and therefore contribute to its perpetuation believing 
it to be a normal state of affairs.  
HEGEMONIC APPARATUSES AT WORK  IN SICILY: 
 True to the nature of a hegemonic bloc, the state-mafia system relies upon 
“hegemonic apparatuses” within society that work to maintain and entrench hegemonic 
ideology within the Sicilian mentality. As Gramsci theorized in 1930s Italy, the Catholic 
Church, civil society, institutions like political parties, and traditional intellectuals all 
participated in solidifying the hegemonic system in Sicily. Through examination, it is 
evident that the same apparatuses work in Sicily to perpetuate the hegemonic bloc and 
solidify the state-mafia system.  
Historically, the Catholic Church largely has acted as a hegemonic apparatus in 
Sicily, furthering the hegemonic ideology of the state-mafia system that denied the 
existence of the mafia and its involvement with the Italian state. While the Church 
arguably has taken steps to renege on this acquiescence and support in recent years,173 
and it would be inaccurate to conclude the Church as a whole has historically supported 
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the mafia,174 it is indisputable that many elements of the Church have possessed a 
convoluted relationship with Cosa Nostra for much of Sicily’s history. Indeed, Pope John 
Paul II was the first pope to state the word “mafia” in a public address, and this did not 
occur until 1981—despite the fact that Cosa Nostra was a dominant organization on the 
island since the late 1800s.175 This reference, therefore, can be viewed as rather 
anomalous in an otherwise complex history of the Church’s relationship with Cosa 
Nostra, where most church affiliates remained silent about the mafia issue for decades.  
The reason for this silence can be attributed to the fact that at various times in 
Sicily’s history, and particularly in the 1950s, the Church benefitted from state-mafia 
hegemony because the mafia proved adept at delivering electoral support to the Church’s 
favored political party—the Christian Democratic Party. The Church supported this party 
because it was considered to be the only viable party against socialism.176 The fact that 
the Church and mafia had “common ideological ground in their hatred of socialism,” 
therefore, provided fertile ground for the development of a relationship of mutual 
benefit.177  
Because most Sicilians are practicing Catholics and consider the Church to be a 
moral authority on the island, frequent denials of the existence of Cosa Nostra radiating 
from prominent Church officials helped keep Sicilians in the dark about the nature of 
state-mafia relations for many decades—a lack of awareness that effectively stifled any 
attempts to challenge this relationship.178 In the 1960s, Ernesto Cardinal Ruffini—at the 
                                                 
174
 Jamieson, 135. 
175
 Jamieson, 137. 
176
 Dickie, 203.  
177
 Dickie, 140.  
178
 Enzo Lo Dato, “Palermo’s Cultural Revolution and the Renewal Project of the City Administration,” 
Trends in Organized Crime 5, no. 3 (2000): 14.  
Diefendorf 56 
time the preeminent official of the Church in Sicily—contributed to solidifying the 
hegemonic bloc by suggesting to his followers that “the mafia exists only in the minds of 
those who wish Sicily ill.”179  
Examining the intertwining of religious and political hegemonic apparatuses 
within Sicily sheds light on the role the Christian Democratic Party (DC) as a powerful 
political organization in Italy also played in supporting the hegemonic bloc prior to the 
1980s. At the same time Ruffini was publicly advancing the hegemonic mentality that 
denied the existence of the mafia, Ruffini held an intimate relationship with Salvo 
Lima—a DC politician with indisputable mafia connections in the 1950s. Indeed, Cosa 
Nostra considered Lima to be such a strong ally that mafiosi ordered his murder in the 
wake of the Maxi Trial after he failed to protect the organization from judicial 
prosecution.180 Refusals to acknowledge Cosa Nostra as a formidable problem requiring 
attention were a “great help to the illegal organization known as the mafia when people 
thought it did not exist,” as this allowed the hegemonic bloc to continue to solidify 
without challenge or protest.181 Denials of the existence of the mafia as “no more than a 
suspicion, a theory, a point of view,” were highly characteristic of the Sicilian mentality 
up until the 1980s-90s as a result of the work of hegemonic apparatuses like the Church 
and the DC.182 Therefore, despite recent mafia denouncements, the Catholic Church as a 
result of its relationship with the Christian Democratic Party historically has acted as a 
“hegemonic apparatus” helping to solidify the mafia-state system in Sicily.  
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The state-mafia hegemonic bloc has also received support from the diligent work 
of “traditional intellectuals” working in a variety of capacities in Sicily. Traditional 
intellectuals exist in a variety of capacities and occupations—a further testament to the 
strength of the hegemonic bloc that receives strength from multifaceted mediums in 
society. Local and national politicians who denied the existence of while simultaneously 
allying with and benefiting from Cosa Nostra are one such example. The mayor of 
Palermo—the Sicilian city most pervaded by the mafia—perpetuated hegemonic 
ideology in the late 1960s by claiming that the early Antimafia Commission was 
unnecessary and had overstated “the mafia phenomenon which was, he claimed, 
‘nonexistent.’”183 The questionable stance of many politicians was further elucidated 
when those who would refuse to acknowledge Cosa Nostra as an oppressive force in 
Sicily could be found participating in funeral marches for mafia members while 
maintaining their reasoning for doing such was grounded in the fact that said mafiosi was 
“just a friend,” and not a fundamental political ally.184 Mafiosi, as well, have been a more 
obvious form of traditional intellectuals, who work to further perpetuate the system by 
upholding the code of omertá—helping to keep Sicilians largely in the dark about the 
oppressive effects of and the extent of state-mafia relations through their silence and 
conspicuousness.  
Schoolteachers historically perpetuated the hegemonic bloc and a “culture of 
silence”185 in Sicily, as well, preventing education from becoming a medium for 
challenging the creation of acquiescent masses by refusing to teach about Cosa Nostra in 
the classrooms. The agendas of these educators were dictated by the Italian state’s 
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Ministry of Education, which worked hard to keep mafia topics out of the classrooms 
until the 1980s.186 Indeed, before changing mentalities of the mid-1980s demanded 
educational reforms, the mafia was left out of history textbooks, and was not a subject 
breached by educators out of an understandable fear of foreseeable repercussions.187  
In addition, many media reporters can also be viewed as traditional intellectuals 
who contributed to the hegemonic bloc by selectively publishing news pieces in 
deference to Cosa Nostra. The Giornale di Sicilia, for instance, was historically 
manipulated by mafiosi interests who attempted to dictate its agenda, publishing stories 
of the questionable credibility of pentiti as well as tainting the image of several prominent 
antimafia activists—actions that suggested to many that Giornale di Sicilia was “the 
newspaper of the mafia.”188 While several media sources deserve credit for deviating 
from this trend, such as La Repubblica, the mafia worked diligently to patrol sentiment 
not supportive of hegemony, firing or even killing those who sought to use the press as a 
medium for expression and challenge against the state-mafia bloc.189 It is worth noting 
that even today, with Prime Minister Berlusconi in control of  many media networks in 
Italy, it is hard for Sicilians to come across the truth through these outlets and learn of the 
current nature of mafia power and antimafia efforts.  
Traditional intellectuals, no matter their positioning in society, help to create a 
culture that discourages an informed citizenry and promotes acquiescence to the 
hegemonic system by limiting the ability of alternative systems to be conceived. By 
aiding the mafia’s desire to “peddle falsehoods for a century and a half” about its true 
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nature and relationship with the state, traditional intellectuals in conjunction with other 
hegemonic apparatuses in society have thereby helped entrench the state-mafia system 
deeply within Sicilian society and culture.190 Therefore, by patrolling any deviation from 
hegemonic ideology, hegemony has become embedded within daily practices to the 
extent that such ideals and practices became self-producing and natural. The fear of force 
and violence against deviation effectively curbed any expression that went against the 
state-mafia hegemonic bloc until the 1980s. 
 Gramsci suggests that another variable indicative of the strength of a hegemonic 
bloc is the extent to which a hegemonic system results in the existence of “double 
consciousnesses” within the minds of the masses. The pervasiveness of the state-mafia 
hegemonic system is reflected in the “double-consciousnesses” present among many 
citizens during the height of the mafia’s symbiotic relationship with the Italian state. The 
diligent work of non-state actors to reinforce and constantly reproduce hegemony led to 
the inability of the masses to see how their actions and apathy were furthering hegemony, 
domination, and the lack of control Sicilians possessed over their own lives. By 
examining cultural manifestations of hegemonic domination present in the 1980s, the 
strength of the state-mafia bloc will be made clear. These examples will also highlight the 
imperativeness of a counter-hegemonic movement that would work to deconstruct the 
detrimental effects the state-mafia system produced in Sicilian society. 
The cultural manifestations of hegemonic domination were evident particularly in 
the violence and chaos of the 1980s, when “as many as 1,000 people were murdered,” 
often very publicly in the streets of Sicily in broad daylight, and few eyewitnesses would 
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come forward to denounce the mafiosi perpetrators.191 In addition, this domination is 
reflected by the fact that nearly 80% of businesses in Sicily paid the pizzo tribute to the 
mafia until antimafia efforts in the late 1990s began to discourage this form of mafia 
submission.192 The state-mafia hegemonic system ensured that business owners “have 
had to accept the oppressive presence of mafioso business partners,” with Cosa Nostra’s 
success at extortion becoming “so widespread that no town or village is spared.”193 Many 
Sicilian business owners thereby demonstrated their symbolic support of the mafia, either 
because they believed it to be natural and conceived of no other alternative in order to 
ensure the protection of their business and interests, or did so out of legitimate fear of 
mafia repercussions.  
Furthermore, domination by the mafia over the minds of Sicilians became 
apparent when Falcone and Borsellino initially had limited success in incensing and 
mobilizing ordinary Sicilians to participate in the antimafia cause through denouncing 
known mafiosi and pervasive criminality. The “double consciousnesses” within many 
Sicilians in the 1980s that the hegemonic system had fostered were apparent in the fact 
that many verbally claimed to be opposed to Cosa Nostra, but would not participate in 
the antimafia fight in any tangible way. This conflict between actions in “theory and 
practice” directly perpetuated hegemony.  
 Gramsci suggests that a hegemonic bloc exists to the extent that the bloc is able to 
“enforce invisible, intangible, and subtle forms of power, through educational, cultural, 
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and religious systems and institutions.”194 The state-mafia system constitutes a 
hegemonic bloc, therefore, because state-mafia relations have historically manifested in 
the form of the bloc’s control and influence over society, creating norms and acceptable 
behaviors that discourage deviation from the system, over politics by working to enforce 
the mentality that state-mafia alliances are a natural occurrence, and over economic 
production by extracting monetary submission from businesses and by dominating many 
legal and illegal markets and industries alike. This total physical and ideological 
domination that pervades all aspects of life, therefore, which is continually reinforced by 
“hegemonic apparatuses” in Sicily reflects the existence of the hegemonic bloc created by 
the symbiotic relationship between the state and Cosa Nostra. 
 While there are many similarities between the aims and function of Cosa Nostra 
and the Italian state that has allowed for the development of a symbiotic relationship 
between these two hegemons, it is important to note that these same similarities are also 
responsible for creating a tenuous relationship culminating in potential “endogenous 
fissures” that can compromise the stability of the hegemonic bloc.195 Because Cosa 
Nostra is more effective at performing functions normally reserved to the state, Cosa 
Nostra jeopardizes the authority and legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the masses.196 
The historical dependence of the state on the mafia, therefore, can create a fissure in the 
sense that it prompts the masses to lose confidence in the ability of the state, setting the 
stage for the state to perhaps question this symbiotic relationship if it begins losing 
vestiges of its power and legitimacy that the mafia was supposed to reinforce.  
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Cosa Nostra has proven particularly adept at addressing societal problems like 
unemployment and poverty that the Italian state historically has inefficiently mitigated. 
Because the mafia has been able to guarantee basic necessities to Sicilians, this paints a 
picture of state ineffectuality, where citizens turn to the mafia at the expense of the state, 
believing the mafia to be “more efficient and even ‘fairer’ than the state.”197 As 
Borsellino explained, “if the mafia pays, you, finds and keeps you in work, helps you win 
contracts, get promotion or run your business, then you won’t reject it” because the mafia 
ensures things the state cannot.198 Moreover, because the mafia unabashedly has 
historically demonstrated its power through violence, the masses came to fear and thus 
respect Cosa Nostra, as they began to realize that real and retributive power in Sicily 
stemmed from the mafia and not the state. Consequently, Sicilians historically have been 
more likely to turn to the mafia for their needs out of fear and based on the recognition 
that mafiosi have a greater ability than a weak state to coerce individuals into compliance 
and enact punishment for defiance.199 Cosa Nostra therefore represents a medium that 
bypasses state authority and institutions, where mafiosi exist as “powerful alternate 
authorities which are giving a social basis to political order and disorder” in Sicily.200  
Thus, while similarities between the mafia and state represented the reason the 
Italian state found it prudent to delegate its functions to Cosa Nostra in the first place, 
these similarities also create a potentially fragile relationship between these two 
hegemons, particularly because the mafia detracts legitimacy from and encourages 
circumvention of legal state institutions that exist to bolster state authority. As a result, 
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citizens have preferred to go through Cosa Nostra to obtain what they need, and instead 
do not trust in the power of the police or court systems for instance to mitigate their 
problems. These are among the many repercussions of ineffective state-building post-
unification in Sicily; while this symbiotic relationship was initially enacted to help 
solidify authority and order on the island, the mafia’s efficacy over the years has 
weakened the state in the eyes of Sicilians, thereby compromising the state’s influence 
and legitimacy as a service provider and possessor of a legitimate monopoly of violence 
to act in the interest of the public good. Tensions between the state and mafia will be 
further explicated in Chapter Three. What is imperative to note, however, is that despite 
the tenuous nature of state-mafia relations, these interlinked hegemons depend on each 
other in a substantial way, helping to continually reinforce the hegemonic system and 
rendering any challenging to this deeply-rooted bloc very difficult. 
 Chapter Three follows, which attempts to fully delineate the history of the 
antimafia movement. Now that the symbiotic relationship between Cosa Nostra and the 
Italian state has been established as a hegemonic bloc reinforced by various apparatuses 
within Sicilian society, Gramscian theory can be utilized in order to understand what 
must be done to challenge this system of affairs on the island, and why the early 1980s 
presented an opportunity for a challenge of the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. In order to 
dismantle a hegemonic bloc, Gramsci states that a counter-hegemonic movement is 
needed. Chapter Three, therefore traces the early history of the antimafia movement to 
show its counter-hegemonic nature. During the 1980s-early 1990s in the midst of a mafia 
war, new intellectuals arose within Sicily that began attending to the first phase of 
counter-hegemony: dismantling hegemonic ideology by calling attention to state-mafia 
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relations and how Sicilians were oppressed by the hegemonic bloc that manifested in 
physical and ideological dominance over the island. This chapter will show how the 
movement in its nascent form targeted the state to initiate reforms that would end its 
accommodative practices towards Cosa Nostra. Gramscian theory will help to offer an 
understanding of why simply targeting the state was not enough to dismantle hegemony, 
however, as various hegemonic apparatuses within society contributed to the perpetuation 
of the state-mafia system. Therefore, Chapter Three will highlight the antimafia strides 
made during the 1980s-early 1990s, but also will show why political reforms were 
insufficient at delivering Sicily from Cosa Nostra, and why the movement realized the 
need to work at the societal level in the mid-1990s.  
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CHAPTER 3: The History of the Antimafia Movement 
 
 As Chapter 2 established, the Italian state historically delegated imperative state 
functions to Cosa Nostra, a criminal organization that helped bolster state authority in 
Sicily by controlling violence and enforcing order. During the early years following 
unification, this nascent partnership went unchallenged by Sicilians, as the amount of 
chaos and disorder in the region made it difficult to see clearly the oppressive power 
structures developing. Moreover, the fact that Cosa Nostra offered vital services during 
this time made its presence harder to question and discourage; protecting Sicilians against 
widespread banditry and thievery as well as distributing land brought order and safety to 
many who could not guarantee such things for themselves in a region dominated by 
instability. Thus, denial, acquiescence, and passive support throughout Sicilian society 
manifested in approval of early state-mafia relations. 
 When acquiescence was not “spontaneously” granted through consent to this 
structure of rule, the mafia obtained compliance through violence and force. Sicilians 
learned early on, therefore, that resistance was futile and acquiescence to status quo 
power structures was a mechanism of survival. Moreover, acquiescence was reinforced 
through the benefits granted to those who consented to state-mafia hegemony. When 
hegemonic apparatuses such as the Catholic Church, political parties, and traditional 
intellectuals began reinforcing the state-mafia system, challenges to hegemony became 
even more infeasible. This culminated in the solidification of a pervasive physical and 
ideological domination over the masses in Sicily, allowing the Italian state and Cosa 
Nostra to solidify a mutually-dependent relationship that served their respective needs for 
power and authority.  
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If Sicilians began protesting against this state of affairs, and recognized Cosa 
Nostra for what it really was—an oppressive and criminal organization—the hegemonic 
bloc would crumble, and the Italian state would lose any semblances of authority and 
legitimacy it was able to derive as a result of its partnership with the mafia in this region. 
Therefore, the stability of the hegemonic bloc depended on Sicilians’ ignorance of the 
state-mafia system so they would not recognize their ability to challenge this hegemony. 
As Gramsci states, civil society represents a medium that can either reinforce or 
challenge hegemony. However, as the state-mafia system succeeded in ensuring Sicilians 
did not realize how their actions perpetuated hegemony, this prevented the understanding 
of how relinquishing this approval would deal a divisive blow to state-mafia relations. 
Thus, the ideology the state, mafia, and hegemonic apparatuses worked to spread during 
from the 1860s onward was a denial of the existence of Cosa Nostra as the pillar of state 
legitimacy and efficacy in Sicily. This ideology became so entrenched in the Sicilian 
mentality that any challenges to the system were effectively stifled before attracting any 
widespread support. Because Sicilians could not challenge a system that hegemonic 
forces ensured they did not become aware of, state-mafia hegemony became an everyday 
part of life.  The Italian state and Cosa Nostra, with the help of hegemonic apparatuses, 
worked diligently to maintain this symbiotic relationship for over a century.  
As Gramsci suggests, in order to dismantle a hegemonic bloc, civil society must 
recognize its counter-hegemonic potential, producing a widespread movement that 
attends to two essential tasks. Counter-hegemonic movements must 1) dismantle 
hegemonic ideology by capitalizing upon existing, while also creating their own, fissures 
within the hegemonic bloc, and then the movement can 2) offer a new, counter-
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hegemonic ideology to the masses that provides a new way of conceptualizing their 
realities and delivers them agency in a new realm outside the hegemonic system. I will 
propose that in the 1980s-early 1990s, the antimafia movement was able to attend to the 
first step of counter-hegemony, creating new and organic intellectuals that dismantled 
hegemonic ideology to which Sicilians long acquiesced. The way in which to do this was 
through legislative and political reforms that would force the Italian state to end its 
accommodative history with Cosa Nostra, while also providing for a penal framework 
from which to fight the mafia.  
 This chapter, therefore, will focus on the unique conditions in 1980s Sicily in 
order to understand what factors jeopardized tenuous fissures in the state-mafia 
hegemonic bloc—allowing civil society to begin working to finally dismantle a 
hegemonic system that had reigned dominant in Sicily for nearly 120 years. This chapter 
will describe how “new intellectuals” capitalized on state-mafia fissures in order to create 
an opportunity for Sicilian civil society to recognize its ability to “reclaim political 
society” by challenging instead of reproducing state-mafia hegemony.  
Antimafia efforts and ensuing state and mafia responses will be broken down into 
two different time periods, describing activism from the 1980s-early 1990s compared to 
efforts after 1992. It is important to differentiate between these two different periods 
because the nature of the movement changed fundamentally following the deaths of 
magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992. It will be demonstrated that 
during the 1980s-early 1990s, the antimafia fight was largely magistrate-driven with 
limited civilian involvement, composed of efforts that were state-centric and politically 
motivated. The importance of the year 1992 will be stressed, as this was the formative 
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year in which the widespread, civilian-dominated antimafia movement was finally born. 
Political reforms were still the primary goal of the movement during this time, until the 
mid-1990s when it became clear that Cosa Nostra represented much more than a political 
problem. 
Political work targeting the state from the 1980s-mid 1990s was an imperative 
first step of counter-hegemony before the second phase of counter-hegemony—working 
amongst society through cultural work to offer a new, counter-hegemonic ideology to the 
masses—could be carried out. This second step came about only after political reforms 
proved insufficient in fully uprooting hegemony; in the mid-1990s, the state had initiated 
important political reforms and had developed a full penal legislation capable of attacking 
Cosa Nostra’s perceived impunity, yet the mafia still reigned dominant over the island. 
This suggested that Cosa Nostra represented much more than solely a political problem. 
Therefore, the antimafia movement beginning in the mid-1990s recognized the need for 
cultural work amongst society to create a new counter-hegemonic mentality.201 
Gramscian theory offers an understanding of the prudence of changing focus from state 
to society, as it is not enough to target a hegemonic state when apparatuses throughout 
society work diligently to ensure the daily reproduction of the hegemonic system. The 
second phase of the counter-hegemonic movement that materialized in the mid-1990s—
working culturally to advance a new counter-hegemonic mentality among Sicilians—will 
be the focus of Chapter 4.  
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STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS IN THE 1970s-80s: 
  As described in Chapter Two, the reason the Italian state found it prudent to enter 
into a partnership with Cosa Nostra in the 1860s was a result of the similarities in aims 
and purposes between these two hegemons. Simply put, the mafia was capable at 
performing the same functions that the state was inefficient at carrying out in Sicily. 
These similarities, however, also had the potential to create natural fissures within the 
hegemonic bloc. The state and mafia continued their symbiotic relationship for decades 
without disruption, relying on one another for things that they could not guarantee 
themselves. State-mafia relations resembled something of a balancing act, consequently, 
where both hegemons remained content to the extent that they possessed a certain amount 
of power and authority derived from the partnership. This tenuous relationship began to 
change, however, from the 1960s-80s when Cosa Nostra began to acquire unprecedented 
wealth and jeopardized the balance of power between the state and mafia by failing to 
uphold its end of the hegemonic bargain.  
 By nature of this relationship, where power is shared between Cosa Nostra and 
the state, and each depends upon the other for specific functions, it is evident that the 
hegemonic bloc is far from a stable entity.202 Moreover, the methods for state and mafia 
power, including “extortion, threatening, and protection will always produce turbulence” 
because these are lucrative realms in which at any given time a plurality of actors seek to 
dominate.203 Natural fissures within the hegemonic bloc thus result from the tenuous hold 
that the state and mafia possess over these instruments of power that they both seek to 
dominate, merely in different ways. It is a relationship that has persisted for over a 
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century, to be sure, but not without contestation and renegotiation in order to stabilize the 
bloc and limit the spread of cracks within it over time. 
 During several periods in Sicily’s modern history, the state and mafia have had to 
renegotiate the terms of their relationship in order to maintain the hegemonic bloc. For 
instance, under fascism, Mussolini began eliminating mafiosi whom he accurately 
perceived to be a threat to state power.204 While it seemed for a time, therefore, that the 
state fundamentally might reconsider its relationship with Cosa Nostra, in the 1950s 
following WWII the relationship was solidified once more. Emerging strong and 
prosperous in the wake of WWII, when mafiosi received political appointments and 
virtually all construction contracts during rebuilding, Cosa Nostra was increasingly relied 
on by the state which again failed to engage in effective state-building after this 
tumultuous period. Moreover, the mafia acquired considerable strength during this time 
from the emergence of the Christian Democratic political party that was intent on 
fostering close ties with Cosa Nostra in order to maintain electoral domination in 
Sicily.205 Exchanging electoral guarantees for promises of public works and construction 
contracts, Cosa Nostra helped ensure the continuation of its symbiotic relationship with 
the state.206 Thus, during fascism and in the postwar years following WWII, the state had 
to renegotiate the terms of its symbiotic relationship with the mafia, recognizing the 
mafia’s growing power and ability to dictate the direction of the hegemonic bloc upon 
which they both depended, but this renegotiation never culminated in the state’s 
withdrawal from its partnership with Cosa Nostra. 
                                                 
204
 Jamieson, 14.  
205
 Shelley, “Review,” 669.  
206
 Jamieson, 14, 16.  
Diefendorf 71 
 Such renegotiations between state and mafia were possible during Sicily’s history 
because there was not yet pressure from a counter-hegemonic source acting to put strain 
on these fissures. As Johnson and Soeters succinctly surmise, each entity had an interest 
in maintaining the hegemonic bloc because this “matted coexistence resulted from the 
symbiotic interdependent relationship fostered between both ‘sovereignties.’” Due to the 
mutually beneficial nature of this relationship, “each force would therefore only attack its 
political competitor as a response to an initial attack,” not wanting to threaten an 
otherwise lucrative affiliation.207 The nature of a hegemon, however, is the desire for and 
attainment of total physical and ideological domination over the masses. Thus, it can be 
inferred that the moment this tenuous balancing act between these two competing, yet 
‘interdependent’ hegemons is thrown into question, compromising cracks will appear 
within the bloc. 
 As a result of the Italian state’s historical reliance on Cosa Nostra, the criminal 
organization began to possess inflated notions of its impunity. Especially with the state’s 
dependence on the mafia for electoral support, Cosa Nostra rightly recognized itself to be 
a fundamental pillar supporting the state’s authority in Sicily. As Lupsha describes, when 
states and organized crime groups enter into symbiotic relations, it is easy for criminal 
groups to begin placing heavier demands upon the state and extracting what it desires to 
gain more power. While power contestations had been mitigated between these two 
hegemons in the past, a fundamental change occurred in the 1970s that threatened the 
tenuous fissures between the Italian state and Cosa Nostra. The mafia’s entrance into the 
drug trafficking industry in the 1970s represented a significant event that forced the state 
to begin re-evaluating its symbiotic relationship with the criminal organization.  
                                                 
207
 Johnson and Soeters, 169.  
Diefendorf 72 
 Through entering the drug market in the 1970s, Cosa Nostra families gained 
unprecedented wealth as they began ushering heroin shipments from South America 
through Europe and the United States.208 The mafia already controlled a number of 
lucrative businesses and industries in Sicily, such as citrus and sulfur, but heroin 
represented a new venture with incredible monetary benefits and global markets.209 
Consequently, during the 1970s “the mafia was at the height of its power, boundlessly 
rich, and so certain of its status that it acted with impunity.”210  
While the drug market brought considerable monetary gains, it also brought about 
violent intra-organizational power contestations that began to threaten Cosa Nostra’s 
loose, hierarchical structure.211 The mafia is characterized by a number of regional 
families falling within a pyramidal structure, with one family and head capo, or boss, 
always reigning supreme. During the 1970s, the head family was the Corleonesi from 
Corleone, who quickly earned a reputation for unprecedented brutality and 
“overwhelming violence” to secure their hold on power in the face of increasing inter-
familial conflict.212 While mafiosi families compose a collective entity and benefit from 
one another’s successes, factions and contestations between families have been a 
common characteristic of Cosa Nostra’s history. These frequent conflicts reached a 
climax first in the 1960s during the “First Mafia War.”213 In the 1970s, violence 
culminated in a Second Mafia War, reflective not only of the unresolved tensions from 
the first war, but more importantly the strong desire among families to dominate the 
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boundlessly-rich Cosa Nostra empire.214 Because the Corleonesi believed they had 
benefitted unequally from drug profits, the family sought to end this inequality through 
violence that would unequivocally demonstrate its ability to dominate the mafia 
empire.215  
  Mafia wars are known for their violent and brutal tactics. As Roberto Saviano has 
described, during mafia wars “the hint of kinship or physical resemblance is all it takes to 
become a target…what matters is to concentrate as much pain, tragedy, and terror as 
possible” against rival factions.216 The Second Mafia War was different than the first in 
several notable respects, however. For one, the stakes in controlling the Cosa Nostra 
organization increased the determination of competing families to emerge victorious from 
the battle. Moreover, because entrance into the drug market and the mafia’s growing 
riches gave Cosa Nostra inflated perceptions of its impunity in relation to the state, the 
mafia in the 1980s abandoned some of its old tactics that had long been responsible for 
helping to alleviate the tenuous fissures between the state and mafia.  
 Prior to the 1980s, Cosa Nostra had taken deliberate strides to avoid 
unnecessarily implicating ordinary Sicilians in mafia conflicts. While intra-mafia 
conflicts had occurred before the 1980s, civilians were rarely affected and violence was 
contained within family factions. Moreover, the mafia rarely used violence against the 
state in order to extract more from this symbiotic relationship, not wanting to disrupt this 
lucrative relationship.217 The largely isolated nature of mafia violence allowed the state to 
turn a blind eye to Cosa Nostra conflicts over the years, therefore, because this 
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aggression did not jeopardize the security of Sicilians or rule of law on the island. In the 
1980s, however, these tactics governing mafia violence were abandoned;218 the war 
became more brutal and increasingly public, with the goal being total domination at any 
cost. As violence spilled into the streets, it became apparent that the state was beginning 
to lose remaining vestiges of its authority in Sicily. 
 The Italian state first found it prudent to enter into a contractual relationship with 
Cosa Nostra because the mafia proved adept at enforcing order and offering security to 
Sicilians post-unification. However, the Second Mafia War demonstrated that mafiosi 
cared more about solidifying their power than fulfilling these functions upon which the 
state depended. With the mafia not performing its intended role, it became clear that this 
symbiotic relationship increasingly was benefitting only one hegemon. This symbiotic 
relationship rapidly was transforming into a parasitic partnership, therefore, where the 
mafia served to benefit from the declining power of the state.  
The primary factor that most significantly threatened fissures between the state 
and mafia was the fact that the state failed to protect the security and lives of ordinary 
Sicilians in the 1980s amidst increasingly violent power contestations. As Chandhoke 
describes, “the basic function of every state is to maintain law and order.”219 However, 
because the state historically relied on the mafia for this function, the Italian state had 
never developed its own ability to act in this regard. When the mafia failed to perform the 
functions of maintaining order and controlling violence, Sicilians began to fall victim to 
the mafia’s haphazard tactics. The state’s influence in the region declined as Cosa 
Nostra’s grew, and it became clear which hegemon reigned dominant as violence erupted 
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and the Italian state proved powerless to stop it. It is clear, therefore, that a deep, natural 
fissure was widening between the state and mafia. Because both these hegemons desired 
power and profit, when the mafia began to profit more from this relationship than the 
state, the state feared the total loss of its authority in the face of Cosa Nostra’s desire for 
supremacy.   
 The state’s fear of losing authority to its competing yet supplementary hegemon 
seemed a very real possibility in the 1970s-80s. In an interview with a retired Guardia di 
Finanza, or Sicilian Customs Officer, he painfully recalled this period of unchecked 
illegality and disbelief in the state’s authority in Sicily. Because it was well-known 
throughout the island that state power in Sicily was fallacious, he commonly would be 
laughed at and even spit upon in public areas while wearing his uniform.220 This is 
particularly significant because Guardia di Finanza represents the state body responsible 
for regulated and patrolling drug trafficking; the disrespect this officer faced, therefore, is 
reflective of general sentiments in the 1980s that acknowledged the growing power of 
Cosa Nostra as a result of the heroin industry and the state’s relative ineffectuality in 
doing anything to prevent this progression of events.221 During the mafia war, therefore, 
more so than at any other point in Sicily’s history, many state authorities realized they 
were beginning to lose completely their historical ability to dictate the terms of state 
relations with Cosa Nostra.  
 Believing it could prevent the state from withdrawing from the symbiotic 
relationship that had allowed Cosa Nostra to become so powerful in the first place, the 
mafia began demonstrating its determination to wage war against anyone that threatened 
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the organization’s growing power and influence. As a result, the 1980s claimed the lives 
of several “eminent corpses,” as no attempt was made to contain mafia violence within 
the organization.222 These murders left a bitter taste in the mouths of once apathetic 
Sicilians, as the mafia’s disregard for law and order began to jeopardize the lives of 
Sicilians who had no involvement or stake in Cosa Nostra.223 Moreover, beginning in the 
1970s and early 1980s mafiosi showcased their disregard for the rights of Sicilians and 
legality through the public murdering of political allies who broke the trend of 
accommodative state policies towards Cosa Nostra. This was exemplified in the murder 
of General Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, the Sicilian whom the Italian state hired as “high 
commissioner against the mafia” in Sicily.224 His murder would be one of several 
assassinations that highlighted a changing tide in Cosa Nostra that no longer respected 
the Italian state’s right to direct mafia operating procedures or curb the organization’s 
expression of its power.225 
 It was in this climate of increasingly public brutality that individuals within the 
state began devoting their lives to Cosa Nostra prosecution, fighting against the impunity 
the mafia believed itself to possess as a result of its long relationship with the state. It is 
important to revisit Skocpol’s definition of the state, however, as she states that by nature 
the state is not a monolithic entity, and is rather composed of a variety of offices and 
institutions that contribute to its power.226 During the 1980s, magistrates Falcone and 
Borsellino highlighted the divergent nature of the various apparatuses of the Italian state 
with their decision to stand apart from other recalcitrant state actors by using their 
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political positioning to wage a significant attack against Cosa Nostra. These magistrates 
recognized that they “could not stand back and accept open warfare” on Sicilian territory 
and turn a blind eye as the mafia made a mockery of the state on the island—the same 
state whose authority these magistrates were supposed to represent and uphold.227 
 Falcone and Borsellino refused to remain passive as they watched the mafia 
showcase its resolve to brutally “attack the symbols and representatives of the state.”228 
In a sense, Cosa Nostra had “declared an open war on the state with a long spate of 
assassinations” which suggested that the state would lose all credibility if its authority 
was not reaffirmed quickly.229 While the state and mafia were able to frequently 
renegotiate their symbiotic relationship since the 1860s, and were thus able to mitigate 
pressures that threatened the fissures between the two hegemons, the true success of the 
hegemonic bloc over time was the absence of any counter-hegemonic force putting 
pressure on and attempting to widen this fissure. In the 1980s, with the Italian state losing 
all ability to restrain Cosa Nostra, key magistrates within the state therefore began 
putting pressure on these noticeable fissures in hopes of encouraging ordinary Sicilians to 
take up the fight to dismantle the hegemonic system. 
THE ROLE OF THE ANTIMAFIA MOVEMENT: Widening the Fissures 
 As Gramsci explained, natural fissures are present within a hegemonic bloc, either 
created over time or as a natural development of insufficiently being able to completely 
dominate a society and its institutions ideologically and physically. The role of a counter-
hegemonic movement is to capitalize on existing—while simultaneously creating new 
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fissures that threaten the hegemonic bloc. It will be demonstrated that Falcone and 
Borsellino, by capitalizing on the tenuous relations between the state and mafia, but also 
by creating their own fissures threatening the stability of the state as a whole by breaking 
away from the state’s trend of dependence on the mafia, launched a counter-hegemonic 
attack against Cosa Nostra. This movement, by drawing attention to the vulnerability of 
the state-mafia system, encouraged Sicilians to reclaim “political space” away from the 
hegemonic bloc and begin attending to the first task of counter-hegemony: dismantling 
hegemonic ideology that had dominated Sicilians since the late 1800s. 
As state actors, Falcone and Borsellino’s decision to break from an 
accommodative state is indicative of the fissures between Cosa Nostra and the state, 
where not all state authorities wished to continue relations with the mafia after seeing the 
dangerous implications of the mafia’s ability to compromise law and order in the 1980s. 
The mafia war can be seen as not only creating fissures between the state and mafia, but 
also within the Italian state itself. Falcone and Borsellino were able to capitalize on a 
classic political opportunity structure created from national legal reforms in the late 
1970s, which granted magistrates greater independence and authority from the state to 
carry out their own investigations.230 This allowed these new intellectuals to break from 
other state authorities who were “never likely to have the animus required to tackle 
organized crime,” and instead launch their own attack against Cosa Nostra despite the 
presence of a largely obstinate state body.231 As a former Customs Officer described, the 
maneuverability of magistrates is one of the greatest attributes of the Italian Constitution. 
Because the Constitution grants magistrates with their own power independent of party 
                                                 
230
 Dickie, 270.  
231
 Dickie, 270. 
Diefendorf 79 
affiliation, and are thereby theoretically impartial and not influenced by external actors, 
these judges have had more flexibility than other state actors to pursue a hard stance 
against the mafia.232 These early leaders utilized this unique political positioning within 
the state to play upon and create fissures within the state-mafia system in a way that 
began mobilizing Sicilians to recognize their opportunity to dismantle the hegemonic 
bloc that had long seemed impregnable.  
 According to Gramsci, a counter-hegemonic movement must produce “new 
intellectuals” that will combat the power and efforts of traditional intellectuals working to 
reproduce hegemonic ideology.  While Falcone and Borsellino undoubtedly stimulated 
the widespread antimafia movement of today, it is important to recognize that “new 
intellectuals” within Sicily first appeared on the island decades before these magistrates 
began attacking state-mafia relations. The inability of these early activists to challenge 
the state-mafia system prior to the 1980s is telling of the extent to which state-mafia 
hegemony had become entrenched by the mid-1900s, but also reflects the need for 
counter-hegemonic initiatives if Cosa Nostra were to be successfully challenged.  
ACKNOWLEDGING PRIOR EFFORTS: The Antimafia’s New Intellectuals Prior 
to the 1980s 
Particularly in the 1950s—when state-mafia relations illustrated by electoral 
manipulation and judicial clemency became harder to conceal—authorities and civilians 
displeased with this state of affairs and domination began to protest against the state-
mafia system. These early efforts were carried out by individual, isolated activists in a 
time period that was not yet ready to turn against a trend of decades of acquiescence to 
state-mafia hegemony. For example, in the 1960s a young man named Giuseppe 
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“Peppino” Impastato, who lived “within one of the most mafia-saturated” towns outside 
of Palermo, began using his independent radio show to protest and denounce Cosa 
Nostra.233 Despite the fact that a powerful mafia boss lived merely i cento passi (a 
hundred steps) away from his home, he continued his public attack against hegemonic 
forces and encouraged awareness among his neighbors who had historically denied the 
existence of Cosa Nostra among them. Peppino’s own father was a mafioso, and 
membership in the organization was common in his familial tree; through his public 
denunciations, demonstrations, and incendiary articles Peppino described the mafia to be 
a “mountain of shit,” not something to be worshipped or supported.234 Through this bold 
rhetoric, Peppino hoped to rally other Sicilians under similar circumstances who were 
raised to either deny the existence of the mafia or to join in the system’s perpetuation.235 
Because of his lack of support among local Sicilians under the trance of hegemony who 
feared disrupting the state-mafia system, however, Peppino stood alone and was easily 
silenced by Cosa Nostra through his brutal murder.  
In addition, important antimafia events occurred at the state level in the late 
1950s-60s which attested to budding antimafia sentiment in Sicily. The first Antimafia 
Commission came about at this time, created in the hopes of coming to a larger 
understanding of the mafia phenomenon and how to address it. The early commission 
mostly represented a “study body,” however, with little clout, as it primarily aimed to 
gather more information about Cosa Nostra and the unique political problems it 
presented.236 It is equally important to note that several prominent authorities worked in 
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Sicily prior to 1980 to address the mafia problem, such as General dalla Chiesa and Pio 
La Torre, to name only a few.237 These early activists represented “solitary heroes” who 
stood alone in a sea of Sicilians that failed to join behind these individuals either out of 
fear or because the strength of the hegemonic state-mafia bloc had succeeded in creating 
the mentality that Cosa Nostra was not a real phenomenon, let alone a problem requiring 
addressing.   
The early commission and the courageous efforts of these authorities prior to the 
1980s were largely ineffectual due to fundamental misunderstandings about the mafia 
and an insufficient penal framework from which to launch a substantial attack. This is 
apparent in the fact that the Antimafia Commission in the 1960s-70s found it prudent to 
forcibly relocate known mafiosi outside of Sicily, reflecting the commission’s lack of 
knowledge about the larger underlying political issues that perpetuated Cosa Nostra 
power during this time.238 The most substantial reason that these early antimafia efforts 
failed to challenge hegemonic ideology, however, was a result of limited knowledge 
about how the hegemonic system operated and achieved its strength. While these new 
intellectuals attempted to begin to “publish links between mafia crimes and political 
patronage,” at this time little was known of the nature and extent of state-mafia ties.239 
Consequently, these new intellectuals knew not how to effectively capitalize on the 
state’s fear of losing power and influence to Cosa Nostra.  
In addition, in the 1950s-60s when these early antimafia efforts occurred, little 
was known about the apparatuses that worked to reinforce hegemony in Sicilian society. 
The strength of new intellectuals is contingent upon their ability to call attention to the 
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actors working to reinforce hegemony in order to dismantle their influence over the 
masses. Because knowledge of these hegemonic forces and state-mafia relations would 
not become apparent until Falcone and Borsellino began working with mafia pentiti in 
the early 1980s, the efforts of these early new intellectuals—while important to pay 
tribute to—did not bring about the desired challenge to state-mafia relations. 
 Working with pentiti, magistrates Falcone and Borsellino were able to acquire an 
unprecedented wealth of information about Cosa Nostra, its structure, operating 
procedures, and relations with the Italian state. These committed magistrates arose as the 
prominent faces of the antimafia fight from an “antimafia pool,” a group of four 
magistrates headed by magistrate Antonino Caponnetto.240 These magistrates shared 
information amongst one another in the hopes of creating “an organic and complete 
picture of the mafia problem,” dedicated to uncovering the truth about Cosa Nostra and 
the varied sources of its strength. 241 
A major reason Cosa Nostra perpetuated for decades and succeeded in remaining 
highly elusive was the code of omertá. This code held mafiosi to strict expectations of 
secrecy, imposing brutal and harsh repercussions on members who failed to stay silent 
about the organization and its tactics. Omertá—along with promises of immunity from 
the state beginning in the 1950s when state-mafia political ties were strong—kept 
authorities in the dark about Cosa Nostra since its origins in the 1860s and rendered 
earlier efforts to repress the organization largely ineffectual.242  
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By creating a witness protection program and rewards for pentiti, magistrates 
encouraged mafiosi to come forward and renounce omertá.243 This cooperation with state 
authorities began in the early 1980s. One pentito in particular, Tommasso Buscetta, 
provided Falcone with incriminating information against mafiosi that had infiltrated 
powerful political positions within Sicily, as well as prominent politicians who had 
dependent relationships with Cosa Nostra.244 Therefore, pentiti like Buscetta were able to 
provide new intellectuals of the 1980s with knowledge about state-mafia hegemony that 
allowed Falcone and Borsellino to understand how state-mafia domination had come to 
pervade all levels of society.   
 During the early 1980s, Falcone and Borsellino also learned through mafiosi 
testimonies the nature of non-state actors that historically functioned as hegemonic 
apparatuses within Sicily, such as the Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic 
Church. With this knowledge, these new intellectuals were better able to target the 
traditional intellectuals and members of the hegemonic bloc in order to limit the continual 
reproduction of hegemonic ideology and practices. Falcone and Borsellino were effective 
at beginning to capitalize on state-mafia fissures, therefore, because they came to possess 
intimate knowledge of the functioning of the hegemonic bloc, and thus knew how to 
direct their energies to best dismantle hegemony. As Roberto Saviano explains, pentiti 
are of vital importance to the fight against the mafia, because without their testimonies, 
the truth—facts, details, and mechanisms—is only discovered ten, twenty years later, as 
if a man were to understand how his vital organs worked only after he is dead.”245 Before 
pentiti testimonies, it was not known that the mafia represented a collective system, 
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whose power and influence was reproduced daily through a variety of apparatuses within 
society that acted as “organs” sustaining the state-mafia system. Pentiti thereby provided 
evidence of the organs crucial in supporting the state-mafia bloc in society—the 
apparatuses that would need to be tackled in order to dismantle hegemony in Sicily. A 
counter-hegemonic movement was born, and with critical knowledge of the functioning 
of the hegemonic bloc, Falcone and Borsellino worked to ensure that state-mafia fissures 
would not be able to be smoothed over as they had for nearly 120 years.  
THE EARLY NATURE OF THE ANTIMAFIA FIGHT: 1980s-Early 1990s Sicily 
 From pentiti testimonies, Falcone and Borsellino came to conceptualize Cosa 
Nostra as a fundamentally political problem, believing that the mafia was “only 
interested in its own power, and is affected only when the sole other real power that can 
threaten it, the state, takes action.”246 After learning intimate and previously unknown 
details of state-mafia ties, these magistrates held the Italian state responsible for the 
unchecked power of Cosa Nostra they saw openly and unashamedly demonstrated in 
Sicily in the 1980s. As a result, the magistrates believed in the need for legislative 
reforms that would end Cosa Nostra’s domination over Sicily by forcing the state to 
withdraw from symbiotic alliances with the mafia.  
Falcone and Borsellino hoped to rally Sicilians to cultivate their potential to 
dismantle hegemony by publicizing discoveries of state-mafia ties that were brought 
about through pentiti testimonies. The magistrates encouraged Sicilians to pressure the 
recalcitrant Italian state to withdraw from its ties to Cosa Nostra and adopt antimafia 
reforms that would weaken the criminal organization. One early way Falcone 
demonstrated to the public that the mafia was a real criminal organization with 
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formidable international power was through publishing reports about mafiosi linked to 
heroin trafficking and extortion in Sicily.247 By providing irrefutable evidence that Cosa 
Nostra existed as an oppressive force within Sicilian society, Falcone encouraged 
Sicilians to question power structures on the island and overturn the mentality that the 
mafia merely represented a suspicion or myth. As Falcone’s former friend and fellow 
magistrate, Ignazio De Francisci said, “Falcone was like Christopher Columbus. He was 
the one who opened the way for everyone else. He broke new ground.”248 This task was 
significant, however, as Sicilians in the 1980s “seemed to have accepted with resignation 
the idea of not mounting any resistance and even adapting to the situation, especially 
when failure to do so would have created problems of survival.”249 Through their emotive 
calls to action, these magistrates encouraged Sicilians to overturn decades of 
acquiescence by showing how hegemonic ideology that had long denied the existence of 
state-mafia relations had oppressed Sicilians into passivity to and ignorance of their 
realities.  
Falcone and Borsellino employed a variety of strategies in the hopes of educating 
Sicilians about the hegemonic state-mafia system that oppressed them. By suggesting 
how state apparatuses and institutions within society were compromised as a result of 
their affiliations with Cosa Nostra, these new intellectuals attempted to show Sicilians 
that it was up to them to demand more from the government and to not accept this state of 
affairs. They promoted awareness of Cosa Nostra and its political ties to the state through 
public speeches and court trials of the need to destroy the hegemonic system that was 
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responsible for compromising their safety. In a number of regional courtroom trials 
throughout the 1980s, state-mafia relations became indisputable, as politicians like the 
former mayor of Palermo Vito Ciancimino were among those imprisoned for their role in 
perpetuating mafia power.250 Outside the courtroom, these magistrates drew from real 
events from the 1980s—such as the death of state authorities like Judge Chinnici and 
dalla Chiesa—as evidence of the state’s inability to provide security to its citizens 
because of its historical delegation to the mafia.251 Moreover, in a speech to Sicilians in 
Agrigento in 1988, Borsellino brought attention to state-mafia alliances by suggesting 
that this relationship of accommodation was responsible for the state’s refusal to 
sufficiently support the antimafia efforts of the 1980s, which had led to the state’s lack of 
protection of authorities who consequently became antimafia martyrs as a result of their 
lack of support.252 Falcone and Borsellino hoped to dismantle the pervasive idea state that 
state-mafia alliances were natural and acceptable, therefore, calling on Sicilians to expect 
and demand more from their state.  
Falcone and Borsellino also advanced a counter-hegemonic movement by 
working to raise awareness about the various hegemonic apparatuses within society that 
were responsible for perpetuating state-mafia power. These apparatuses included the 
Catholic Church and political parties, but most importantly Sicilians themselves. 
Borsellino preferred going into schools to raise awareness about the apparatuses in 
Sicilian society working to advance state-mafia hegemony.253 He also had aspirations to 
utilize television as a medium to promote awareness of Sicilians’ oppression under the 
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hegemonic system, creating a show where he would guest-star as a lecturer and 
knowledgeable authority on state-mafia ties. Borsellino was killed before this ambition 
could come to fruition, however.254 Nonetheless, these magistrates succeeded in drawing 
attention to the institutions in Sicily that reinforced hegemonic ideology, while also 
raising awareness about how Sicilians furthered the hegemonic bloc by their grants of 
acquiescence to status quo power structures on the island—something that individuals 
under the trance of hegemony could not properly conceive of prior to this time. 
The already tenuous relationship between the two hegemonic powers of state and 
mafia, therefore, was capitalized upon by Sicily’s “new intellectuals” who pushed for a 
restructuring of power and for reclamation of state authority in order to delegitimize the 
mafia.255 Most importantly, these individuals sought to reaffirm the state’s authority in 
the eyes of the citizenry by showing the extent to which the magistracy—as an element of 
the state—was devoted to prosecuting mafiosi and bolstering the ability of the state to 
protect its citizens and uphold justice.  
 A major reason Falcone and Borsellino succeeded in extracting legislative 
concessions from the state in the early 1980s was because the state realized during the 
“mafia war” and Cosa Nostra’s subsequent, relentless attack against state authorities that 
something needed to be done to check the mafia’s growing sense of indestructibility. It 
was clear that the state was no longer able to carry out its most basic function—
protecting civilians—as a result of the mafia’s growing power. Falcone and Borsellino 
framed the necessity of state reform in a way that resounded with the state’s fears of its 
perceived loss of hegemony to Cosa Nostra, which was a very possible reality in the 
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brutality and chaos of the 1970s-80s when it became clear just how powerless the state 
had become in Sicily. Putting pressure on this fissure that the state already recognized 
and feared, magistrates succeeded in encouraging the adoption of a stricter penal code 
against mafiosi—thereby representing a break from decades of state grants of impunity 
towards Cosa Nostra.  
EARLY STATE RESPONSE: Early Legislative Reforms of the 1980s 
 Falcone and Borsellino had succeeded in linking the detrimental mafia power of 
the 1980s to the Italian state and its historical trend of accommodation and leniency 
towards Cosa Nostra. The state had little option but to adopt much needed reforms in this 
time, as the most vocal and prominent calls to action radiated from within the state itself, 
in the form of magistrates Falcone and Borsellino. Increasingly, however, civilians also 
began asserting pressure on the state to reevaluate its dependence on the mafia. Thus, in 
the 1980s the Italian state could not afford to lose any more credibility among Sicilians 
by failing to make important political concessions that were widely demanded. This 
growing pressure for reform made it difficult for the state to ignore what it realized 
during the mafia war—that the symbiotic relationship upon which the state had long 
depended was now only benefiting one hegemon. Thus, because of the work of these new 
intellectuals and growing civilian discontentment against the hegemonic bloc, “after 130 
years, the Italian state had finally declared to Sicilian mafia to be an organized and deadly 
challenge to its own right to rule.”256 The implications of such a declaration only become 
evident when one considers that state authorities long played a hand in perpetuating 
hegemonic ideology that refused to acknowledge the existence of Cosa Nostra in the 
Sicilian landscape, let alone the organization’s role as a critical state ally. 
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The most significant manifestations of the state’s reevaluation of Cosa Nostra 
were the legislative reforms of the 1980s. The need for antimafia legislation became 
glaringly apparent not only due to the ease in which mafiosi had infiltrated and corrupted 
political offices, but also due to the “judicial jungle” and “lack of coordination between 
local and national authorities”257 that made it nearly impossible to effectively and quickly 
prosecute mafia-related criminals even after their elusive identities were revealed. The 
ineffectuality of Sicily’s criminal legislation was a major roadblock to the first stringent 
antimafia efforts of the Antimafia Commission in the 1960s-70s. Because of the 
clandestine nature of Cosa Nostra, where hierarchical levels of authority made it 
impossible to discern who controlled the infinite number of puppet strings within the 
mafia empire, magistrates and other prosecuting authorities faced a formidable challenge 
in arresting mafia criminals. If the state was serious about taking a harder stance against 
the mafia—and pressure from magistrates and civilians allowed the state little 
alternative—new laws were needed to criminalize Cosa Nostra.  
 One of these crucial early reforms was the Rognoni-La Torre Law, which 
officially made it illegal to be a member of Cosa Nostra, no matter how small that 
involvement. The importance of this law cannot be overemphasized, as this marked the 
first time in which the mafia was finally recognized as a criminal organization.258 This 
law also ensured harsher and longer prison sentencing for mafiosi. Previously, even in the 
rare instance that an important mafioso was imprisoned, cushy sentencing and lax 
treatment ensured that incarcerated mafiosi could still operate with considerable 
influence, issuing orders and initiating lucrative business deals from behind bars. For 
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example, in the 1970s before such legislative reforms came about, prominent mafia boss 
and eventual pentito Tommasso Buscetta “spent his entire imprisonment in the hospital 
wing where he was able to receive friends, family, and lawyers and telephone all over the 
world.”259 The Rognoni-La Torre Law, however, which guaranteed a minimum sentence 
of 3 years for convicted mafiosi, represented a crucial step towards a harder antimafia 
stance at the state level. Also of importance was the fact that this law allowed for state 
seizure of mafia property.260 This suggested the recognition of the need to end symbolic 
manifestations of Cosa Nostra’s power—where sprawling multi-million dollar estates 
served to enforce not only the dominance the mafia had over the Sicilian landscape, but 
also the success and respect that was afforded to any member of Cosa Nostra.   
 These early legislative reforms against organized crime finally provided 
magistrates Falcone and Borsellino with the legal framework from which to launch an 
unprecedented judicial attack against Cosa Nostra that showcased the wealth of 
incriminating information the magistrates had gained through working with pentiti. With 
mafiosi membership illegalized and Cosa Nostra finally recognized as a criminal 
organization, Falcone and Borsellino had the penal code they needed to utilize pentiti 
testimonies compiled over several years to weaken the mafia through the court system. 
Falcone and Borsellino launched their attack in 1986-7 in the form of the Maxi Trial, 
which led to over 300 mafiosi arrests and seemed to suggest a changing tide in Sicily’s 
future.261 Demonstrating to Sicilians that notable state authorities would no longer deny 
the existence of Cosa Nostra or acquiesce to its domination, the seeds of a civilian-based 
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movement against the mafia were cultivated in the soil outside of the newly constructed, 
bomb-proof courthouse in Palermo.  
POLITICAL SOLUTONS: Attending to the First Track of the Antimafia “Train” 
 The Italian state irrefutably adopted important reforms in the 1980s as a result 
from the pressure new intellectuals and Sicilians began to place upon fissures separating 
these hegemons. It is important to note, however, that because Falcone and Borsellino 
conceptualized Cosa Nostra as a political problem, this directly influenced how the state 
began re-evaluating its relationship with the mafia. In the 1980s, the Italian state focused 
exclusively on political reforms that could be enacted to weaken Cosa Nostra.  
By examining events occurring in Sicily’s capital during this time, it is clear the 
extent to which a select number of political authorities began to reevaluate Cosa Nostra, 
but also the extent to which their antimafia efforts centered on political solutions to 
combating the mafia problem. Leoluca Orlando, Palermo’s antimafia mayor during the 
1980s-early 1990s, demonstrated his resolve to fighting the mafia in numerous ways that 
broke from a history of corrupt Palermo politicians who fostered and depended on ties 
with Cosa Nostra. While Orlando advocated for and initiated a handful of important 
cultural efforts during this time to fight mafia hegemony, including renaming city streets 
and parks to honor fallen antimafia heroes,262 antimafia efforts in Palermo prior to 1992 
were largely politically-based and state-centric. This focus on the political solutions to 
address Cosa Nostra that were championed until the mid-1990s was the general 
sentiment among antimafia activists during this time. Orlando’s primary focus during the 
late 1980s centered on removing mafia influence from politics, and also working to end 
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mafia-infiltration of government and public works.263 Therefore, while there were 
important cultural projects initiated during this time that should not be ignored, it is 
indisputable that antimafia activists and political authorities alike in the 1980s and early 
1990s focused predominantly on political solutions and pressuring the state to break from 
its accommodative history with Cosa Nostra.  
The full realization of the importance of cultural reforms would not come to 
fruition until the mid-1990s, and indeed could not have been realized until political 
reforms were initiated. This state-centric focus of the early antimafia movement, 
therefore, was a necessary stepping stone to the socially-centered focus the movement 
came to harbor in subsequent years. Similarly to a metaphor Mayor Orlando made in a 
speech to the Sicilian public, the antimafia movement can be described as a train 
dependent on two separate tracks in order to move forward.264 One train track represented 
a state-focused approach, initiating legislative and political reforms needed to address 
state relations with the mafia.265 The other track, which could only be fully developed 
after the first, represented societal work to change Sicilian mentalities. This second track, 
whose construction began in the late 1980s, would not be focused on fully until the mid-
1990s when it became clear that a single track of political reforms was not enough to 
make the train “go forward” towards a future no longer determined by Cosa Nostra.266 
It is also imperative to note that—despite these important concessions in the 
1980s that represented a notable break from the state’s history of leniency towards the 
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mafia—the Italian state did not come to a decisive “turning point” when it fully withdrew 
from its relationship with Cosa Nostra.267 While things looked hopeful based on the 
legislative reforms in the 1980s, the most promising and dedicated antimafia efforts were 
initiated by the “virtuous minority” of primarily magistrates and law enforcers, whose 
efforts were supported by another “virtuous minority” of “politicians, administrators, 
journalists, and members of the public.”268 The majority, therefore—within the state and 
also society—“remained ambivalent.”269 Thus, the state did adopt important antimafia 
platforms during the 1980s, but this should not be mistaken for widespread support of 
and steadfast dedication to the antimafia movement. The movement, in the face of 
uncertain state support, would consequently need to be fought primarily by civil society.  
CIVILIAN RESPONSE PRE-1992:  
  The first demonstration of changing mentalities among Sicilians was evident in 
the public funeral for antimafia martyr General dalla Chiesa, which produced a visible 
“wave of emotion” among attendees.270 With the help of new intellectuals, Sicilians were 
becoming attuned to their oppression under the state-mafia system, coming to realize that 
respectable authorities who committed themselves to the fight against Cosa Nostra 
should not face isolation and threats against their lives merely for challenging state-mafia 
hegemony. The start of a society that was beginning to question power structures in 
Sicily was apparent by the fact that funeral attendees voiced “their suspicions that the 
politicians were complicit in what had happened,” where dalla Chiesa easily was 
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eliminated as a threat to mafia power due to lack of state protection.271 Therefore, 
Sicilians began to appreciate that the state was complicit in many mafia-related events 
that occurred, and they voiced their concern that the state should have done more to 
protect one of their own—and anyone brave enough to challenge Cosa Nostra.  
However, because these beliefs in the interweaving of state-mafia actions and 
interests were mere “suspicions” among Sicilians at this time attests to the counter-
hegemonic work that remained to be done before state-mafia hegemony would be 
uprooted and Sicilians would come to realize the full manifestations of the state’s 120 
year relationship with Cosa Nostra. Nonetheless, civilian response at dalla Chiesa’s 
funeral reflects the beginning of civil society’s recognition of its ability to “reclaim 
political society” away from the state-mafia system, choosing to challenge instead of 
reproduce hegemony through their interest in actively understanding and questioning the 
power structures that shaped and determined their realities.  
 Falcone and Borsellino worked diligently to take advantage of this changing 
sentiment prompted by an environment of growing mafia violence. These new 
intellectuals worked tirelessly to mobilize Sicilians to join in the antimafia fight before 
and especially during the Maxi Trial, therefore, fearing that this sudden discontentment in 
society might lose its steam if the mafia was able to rebound from this judicial assault and 
demonstrations against its violent attacks on state authorities.272 While civilian outrage 
was undoubtedly present in the streets outside dalla Chiesa’s funeral and again outside 
the Palermo courthouse in 1986-7, the scope of civilian involvement was limited during 
this time compared to what it would become following 1992. Civil society, therefore, had 
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not yet fully realized its potential to dismantle the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. This can 
be attributed to the strength of mafia hegemony that worked to discourage any challenge 
that went against the hegemonic system and did not manifest in ‘spontaneous consent’ to 
Cosa Nostra and the state. Civilian response can be broken down into two periods, 
therefore: initial efforts encouraged by Falcone and Borsellino that came to fruition prior 
to 1992, and the increasingly dedicated civilian-led antimafia movement after 1992.  
The nature of early civilian responses to the growing antimafia fight can be 
characterized as politically-motivated. As previously mentioned, Falcone and Borsellino 
as state actors advocated for a movement that was state-centric: addressing the Italian 
state to extract legislative concessions to dismantle state-mafia ties. Thus, civilian efforts 
in the late 1980s primarily manifested in attacks against the state calling for an end to 
state-mafia alliances now that the true nature of this symbiotic relationship had come to 
light through events like the Maxi Trial. It was during this time that many of Sicily’s 
most powerful antimafia organizations were established, and these organizations began 
by working to challenge the state and its role in perpetuating Cosa Nostra influence over 
the island. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, civilians also worked to pressure the state to 
remove corrupt and mafia-associated politicians from power.   
The Association of Women against the Mafia in Palermo was a formidable female 
organization during the early 1980s whose efforts exemplify the antimafia’s early focus 
on the need for political reforms to destroy Cosa Nostra power.273 The Association of 
Women represented “the first permanent antimafia association in Italy.”274 This group 
lobbied the state to ensure the adoption of the Rognoni-La Torre Law, but also provided 
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financial support to women of mafia victims who took mafia-related cases to court.275 
This association, therefore, hoped to end the trend that those brave enough to stand 
against the mafia had to stand alone.276 By putting pressure on the Italian state to 
withdraw from its contractual relations with the state, early antimafia organizations also 
helped to bring about Law No. 56 in 1990, which enacted harsh retribution against 
“businesses, public administration, and state employees found working in collaboration 
with the mafia.”277 While these early efforts accomplished much, the real face of the 
civilian-led antimafia movement in operation today did not develop until 1992.   
MAFIA RESPONSE:  
 It was not like Cosa Nostra to lay dormant as the state and civil society launched 
an attack against its empire that left some of the mafia’s most powerful bosses behind 
bars, with their once elusive identities now broadcasted across international media 
networks. During the 1980s and particularly in the wake of the Maxi Trial—when the 
Italian state publicly reevaluated its accommodating relationship with the mafia in 
important ways—Cosa Nostra was very publicly suffering from “the worst defeat in the 
entire history of the world’s most famous criminal organization.”278 The mafia believed it 
could depend on allies within the state solidified over decades to thwart this judiciary 
offense to its power, as it had been able to do since the late 1800s.279 When prominent 
mafia allies failed to protect top mafia bosses from prosecution, the mafia was 
determined to demonstrate its strength, independent of state support. Salvatore Lima, a 
member of the Christian Democratic Party and long-time mafia ally was murdered as a 
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result of his failure to insulate Cosa Nostra from judicial attack.280 Thus the state-mafia 
war waged heavy, as the mafia continued to murder its enemies within the state, killing 
those who “believed in the power of the state against the power of the mafia”—exactly 
what Cosa Nostra needed to stand up against to protect its long-unchallenged influence in 
Sicily.281  
As Falcone and Borsellino spearheaded state antimafia efforts and continued to 
acquire more information and incriminating testimonies from pentiti, the mafia believed 
itself to possess two more enemies in need of immediate attention.282 For years, Cosa 
Nostra had engaged in smear campaigns against the magistrates, hoping to discredit their 
influence and incriminating knowledge.283 Hegemonic apparatuses like the media 
controlled by mafia bosses were instrumental in these attempts to strengthen the ideology 
that suggested Cosa Nostra was not a real phenomenon that dictated Sicily’s politics, 
economy, and culture. While these campaigns undoubtedly discouraged many Sicilians 
from joining the antimafia fight, it did not dissuade the magistrates from continuing their 
lonely battle.284 Thus, in 1992 the mafia responded with the brutal executions of Falcone 
and Borsellino. Members of the international community felt that Sicily consequently had 
lost its antimafia fight for good, with its two most effective and vocal activists executed. 
These brutal murders led many prominent and once hopeful Sicilian authorities to 
surmise “it’s the end, it’s all over now.”285 What was not expected, however, was the 
amount to which civil society would react in the wake of these murders, determined to 
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collectively organize in an antimafia movement that would challenge Cosa Nostra’s 
perceived impunity.286  
National symbols for the antimafia cause, Sicilians now elevated Falcone and 
Borsellino to the ranks of martyrs, worshipping their efforts and channeling their anger at 
this injustice in the form of stronger and more organized antimafia efforts at the civilian 
level.287 Remembering the now immortalized words of these men, Sicilians banded 
together in increasing numbers to strengthen the power and influence of the antimafia 
movement.288  
THE IMPORTANCE OF 1992: 
 Ordinary Sicilians were not enticed in large numbers to join in the antimafia 
movement until after the deaths of Falcone and Borsellino.289 This can be explained in 
Gramscian terms; while these new intellectuals worked diligently to incense Sicilians to 
fight Cosa Nostra in their daily lives, the primary role of new intellectuals is to tackle the 
presence and influence of traditional intellectuals. It is not their function to work amongst 
society to ensure the adoption of a counter-hegemonic ideology. This step in dismantling 
hegemony must be carried out by “organic intellectuals”—individuals who stay within 
the level of society from which they arose, helping to perpetuate a new way of 
conceptualizing the world for the masses that discourages their acquiescence to the 
hegemonic system in place. Thus, Falcone and Borsellino undoubtedly spearheaded the 
antimafia movement that began in the 1980s, but their efforts prior to the 1992 only 
solicited a limited response because organic intellectuals—ordinary Sicilians 
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themselves—would need to carry on the antimafia fight if Sicilians were to be recruited 
in large numbers to the movement. 
 The imperative need for organic intellectuals to provide the fodder for a broad-
based, civilian-driven antimafia movement can be explained further by Paulo Freire. 
Freire suggests that calls to action against oppressive ruling groups must radiate from 
individuals within society, intimately connected and affected by hegemony just as the 
masses, because “no pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the 
oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models 
from among the oppressors.”290 While Falcone and Borsellino in their role as new 
intellectuals worked to dismantle hegemonic ideology, they did not mobilize the masses 
in large numbers to join the movement in the 1980s because they were state actors, and 
by nature of this position—despite their involvement in Sicilian communities and 
genuine antimafia commitments—were fundamentally disconnected from the Sicilians 
masses most prominently suffering under hegemony’s daily repercussions. 
An indisputable change came in 1992, however, that forever changed the face of 
the antimafia movement. Widespread rage against the magistrates’ murders culminated in 
a far-reaching commitment to end Cosa Nostra among the Sicilian masses, creating a 
plethora of organic intellectuals who hoped to prompt a widespread recognition of 
Sicily’s oppression under Cosa Nostra. Witnessing other individuals from similar societal 
backgrounds courageously fight against hegemonic forces helped rouse the masses 
towards counter-hegemony following the violent year of 1992. These organic 
intellectuals succeeded in rallying ordinary Sicilians because “those who recognize, or 
begin to recognize, themselves as oppressed must be among the developers of this [new] 
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pedagogy” in order to encourage the realization that the masses possess the ability to 
dismantle hegemony.291 While the composition of the antimafia movement changed 
during this time, its focus did not. Following 1992, the state remained as the primary 
target of these increasing antimafia efforts. Sicilians had first been made to recognize the 
state-mafia hegemonic system by Falcone and Borsellino, and in their honor, civilians 
carried on the antimafia fight in the best way they knew. 
Antimafia organizations still worked to solve the mafia phenomenon through 
political solutions, employing unique strategies to continue to capitalize on the fissures 
within the state-mafia hegemonic bloc.  In the wake of the deaths of Falcone and 
Borsellino, public memorials and street demonstrations were a common tactic used to 
coax otherwise apathetic and acquiescent Sicilians into pressuring the state to reform.292 
Most importantly, perhaps, is the “moral support” the antimafia movement offered to the 
politicians and authorities willing to denounce state-mafia relationships293—a powerful 
statement of encouragement that helped to ensure antimafia heroes would never again 
have to stand alone like they had in the past. Falcone fearfully predicted the need for 
collective action to defeat the mafia: “You are killed generally because you are alone or 
else because you have gotten into a game that is too big. You are often killed because you 
don’t have the necessary alliances, because you are without support.”294 By generating a 
widespread movement in the wake of 1992, the antimafia movement had the support it 
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needed to ensure it could not be quickly eliminated or swiftly “cancelled out like a 
foreign body.”295  
Another important way in which the antimafia movement helped create a climate 
of pressure for state reforms was through effective protesting to dismantle political 
alliances and systems that were known to have mafia ties. The end of blurred boundaries 
between state and mafia could be permitted no longer, Sicilians believed, if Cosa Nostra 
were to be eradicated. As a result, many corrupt politicians in power were implicated as a 
result of their relations with mafiosi, including then Prime Minister Andreotti.296 While 
never fully convicted, the infamous mafiosi turned pentiti, Tommasso Buscetta, testified 
to the extent to which the prime minister had political ties and associations with Cosa 
Nostra during his time in office.  
Women’s groups continued to have a dominant presence on the antimafia stage 
following 1992, as well, and adopted innovative ways of challenging state-mafia 
hegemony. The Association of Women continued to remain prominent, and in 1992 
launched a public protest and hunger strike in the heart of Palermo. The female activists 
proclaimed “we are fasting because we are hungry for justice.”297 This association 
continued to push for political reforms, demanding that the state remove from office 
corrupt politicians with known mafia affiliations. Furthermore, these female activists 
called upon the state to play a larger role in investigating the deaths of Falcone and 
Borsellino in order to discern which state authorities were responsible for failing to 
protect these martyrs from their tragic end.298 Even women not necessarily linked to an 
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antimafia organization took direction from organizations like The Association of Women, 
gaining the courage to speak out at the funerals of loved ones murdered by Cosa Nostra. 
Rosario Schifani, the wife of one of Falcone’s bodyguards (who died with Falcone in 
1992), shook the crowd at her husband’s funeral with her demands for justice to be 
served. Schifani directed her speech towards mafiosi whom she knew were in attendance, 
as she proclaimed “they’re here, yes here, inside this church!”299 These incredible 
demonstrations of female courage in a bleak and violent period in Sicily’s history were 
responsible for encouraging several mafiosi to become pentiti, roused by these emotive 
calls to destroy Cosa Nostra.300 
Another female-dominated antimafia organization arose following the murder of 
Falcone and Borsellino called “The Sheets Committee.” This loosely-based organization 
of twenty angered women (and later, six men), mobilized Sicilians into action by hanging 
sheets with messages from their urban dwellings in Palermo.301 The sheets were scrawled 
with words such as “Basta!” calling on the state to “stop” its alliance with Cosa Nostra 
and to end the injustice that had culminated in the murder of Falcone and Borsellino.302 
The Committee furthered its campaign of awareness through creating and selling t-shirts 
to Sicilians with antimafia slogans and even through creating antimafia commercials that 
aired on Sicilian television in the mid-1990s.303 In these varied ways, “The Sheets 
Committee” assisted in pressuring the state to sever its ties and political alliances with the 
mafia.304 
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Other notable antimafia groups began actively working during this time, as well. 
Libera, an antimafia organization established in 1995,305 successfully lobbied the state to 
initiative many of the important legislative reforms of the 1990s, particularly in terms of 
creating a new law that would allow organizations to reconvert former mafia property 
into space for community projects.306 As a result of Libera’s efforts at the state level, Law 
109/96 was passed, allowing for mafia property to be turned over to social cooperatives 
furthering antimafia ideals.307 
Along with launching an assault on corrupt politicians and pressuring the state for 
legislative reforms, the antimafia movement also elevated its own political candidates in 
an attempt to promote a new era of transparency and the end of state-mafia relations in 
Sicilian politics. La Rete was the political party of the antimafia that arose on the political 
scene in the 1990s.308 While La Rete was a young party, it succeeded in electing Orlando 
as Mayor of Palermo in 1993 by 70% of the popular vote.309  As a result, high 
expectations were put on the elections of 1994, where La Rete produced candidates at the 
local and national level. While strictly electoral considerations that likely contributed to 
La Rete’s defeat are important to note, such as the attractiveness of the new, more 
conservative party Forza Italia, this election nonetheless has been described as a “big 
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shame for Sicily”310 because of the electorate’s decision to vote into office candidates 
who had largely remained mum about the mafia issue throughout campaigning.311 The 
electoral failings of La Rete in 1994, despite incredible expectations placed on its success 
as a result of growing popular antimafia sentiment, demonstrated at least in part that 
political reforms had only addressed one aspect of Cosa Nostra’s power, and that the 
mafia still remained deeply embedded within the minds and fears of Sicilians. Despite 
this setback, in the early years of the 1990s the antimafia movement still succeeded in 
elevating antimafia-committed politicians to several local offices, especially female 
mayors from female-dominated antimafia organizations.312  
STATE RESPONSE FOLLOWING 1992: Still Politically-Focused 
 The power of the Sicilian legislator was greatly strengthened in the 1980s-90s as a 
result of the antimafia’s focus on the need for political reforms to dismantle Cosa Nostra. 
Over the course of ten years, 161 criminal-related laws were created in the hopes of 
addressing the problem of organized crime in Sicily.313 This rush of legislative reforms 
produced a new law on average every three weeks.314 These laws produced dramatic 
results in terms of criminal prosecution. Mafiosi arrests skyrocketed under this nascent 
legal framework from 874 in 1991 to 2,136 in 1994.315 The murder rate in Palermo also 
drastically decreased during this time under new penal legislation that provided harsh 
retribution for mafiosi whose affiliations with Cosa Nostra could be proven.316 
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 Inspired by increasing civilian pressure and the martyred magistrates, other state 
authorities stepped forward to carry the antimafia torch. Giovanni Spadolini, President of 
the Republic of Sicily, gave a stirring speech at a public memorial commemorating the 
judges’ deaths in Sicily’s capital.317 The extent to which Sicilians continued to believe the 
mafia to represent a political problem requiring political solutions is evident in examining 
the rhetoric Spadolini utilized in this pivotal speech. Spadolini’s public lecture was 
significant not only for its words, but for its symbolism; as President, Spadolini’s 
willingness to publicly denounce Cosa Nostra stood in stark contrast to decades of 
acquiescence to and cooperation with the mafia, and suggested a new era where perhaps 
more than just a “virtuous minority” would join the antimafia fight.318  
The goal of Spadolini’s speech was to “demonstrate the resolve of every Italian 
magistrate to carry out an ever more determined campaign to reinstate the rule of law and 
good order” on the island.319 One way this resolve manifested was through increased 
efforts with pentiti in order to further investigate the extent to which the mafia had 
infiltrated the state.320 Pressure from civil society during this time succeeded in producing 
an indisputable echo throughout state levels, therefore, to end the “ignorance and under-
estimation of the mafioso phenomenon” by politicians and state authorities.321 This 
newfound determination seemed to suggest a new era for Sicily. Spadolini recognized the 
state’s role in leading the antimafia fight through reform and close review of how its 
policies were perpetuating mafia power. As he surmised, “the fight against organized 
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crime is an emergency which involves the whole nation and calls for precise, calculated 
and also severe action on the part of the state.”322  
It is clear that Falcone and Borsellino had begun to profoundly affect the Sicilian 
mentality, as prior to the 1980s the recognition of the state’s need to end relations with 
Cosa Nostra would not have been made publicly, let alone voiced by a prominent state 
authority. As a result of mafia infiltration within the government and the historically 
symbiotic relationship between state and mafia, the boundaries between Cosa Nostra and 
the Italian state were incredibly muddled and difficult to discern, making it nearly 
“impossible to tell where the legitimate state leaves off and the mafia begins.”323 Thus, 
Spadolini suggested his commitment to respond to civilian pressure to remove corrupt 
politicians from power and to advance a new era of transparency and accountability in 
government.  
 From examining speeches that transpired at the first antimafia convention entitled 
“The Mafia—What to Do Next?” in the wake of 1992 further points to the success civil 
society had in prompting state authorities in a variety of capacities to become highly 
motivated to addressing the political problems that were responsible for continuing state-
mafia hegemony. This convention represented a collective gathering of numerous 
political authorities in Sicily who sought to address how to advance an antimafia platform 
when the movement’s most prominent leaders had died. These speeches highlight not 
only how civilian pressure was beginning to prompt a change in attitude at the state level, 
but also how political reforms were heavily referenced as the way to mitigate the Cosa 
Nostra problem during this time. As Italian politician Giorgio Napolitano (now the 
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President of the Italian Republic) voiced, “everyone must be aware of the need to halt and 
reverse the most negative and disturbing trends towards the degradation of political and 
civil life, towards the degeneration of the legal State.”324  
Another attendee, Adolfo Beria di Argentine continued this rhetoric by 
referencing the deplorable position to which the Italian state had been demoted as a result 
of its historical dependence on Cosa Nostra. Argentine suggested that “a state relegated 
to purely economic functions has not only failed to produce a culture of legality, but has 
favored the culture of partiality, of doing favors for a friend, of trading interesting, of 
ignoring the law—of promoting mafia-type crime.”325 The Italian state, by delegating to 
the mafia its roles of controlling law and order and monopolizing violence, therefore, had 
created a scenario in which the mafia was able to trample upon state authority in 1990s 
Sicily to the extent that the state could no longer protect the public good and act 
impersonally in the territory.326 The symbiotic relationship between mafia and state 
ensured that all state institutions in Sicily had “no authority, even of a moral nature, 
attached to them.”327 While this convention reflects the pronounced effect early antimafia 
efforts at the magistrate and civilian level had on calling the state to reevaluate relations 
with Cosa Nostra, it is important to note that no mention as of yet was made of the 
cultural problems that equally contributed to the power and influence of Cosa Nostra in 
1990s Sicily.   
The role of ordinary Sicilians in pressuring for reforms during the 1980s-90s 
should not be underestimated. While magistrates and notable political authorities were 
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instrumental in creating a climate of mafia intolerance within Sicilian politics, this time 
period saw the politicization and involvement of ordinary Sicilians who took to the 
streets demanding such reforms, demonstrating their stance against Cosa Nostra and 
against pervasive illegality. Spadolini himself praised Sicilians for their role in ushering 
in a new era for Sicily, stating that “we are witnessing a genuine mobilization of the 
public conscience, a revival of civic and moral values. It is a spontaneous movement, 
manifested in a thousand small initiatives.”328 Spadolini therefore accredited ordinary 
Sicilians with taking up the antimafia cause of their own accord. The antimafia 
movement would only continue to attract attention in the coming years. 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A TRANSFORMED SICILY: 
How much had really changed in the wake of state reforms brought about by 
pressure from new intellectuals and civil society? Examining events in Palermo at the end 
of the period of state reforms is telling of the need for a continued counter-hegemonic 
movement that would begin to work within society to challenge hegemonic domination at 
the cultural level.  
Palermo, the capital of Sicily and the locus of mafia power,329 hosted a United 
Nations conference in 2000 in an attempt to show its new face to the international 
community.330 To be sure, long-term Mayor Leoluca Orlando deserves substantial credit 
for revitalizing Palermo during the 1990s in the wake of the murders of Falcone and 
Borsellino. When the Italian state was forced to re-evaluate its relationship with Cosa 
Nostra in the 1990s, substantial monetary assistance flooded into Palermo, helping 
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Orlando to continue his “renaissance campaign” he had begun in the mid-1980s. This 
initiative involved a beautification campaign to erase the physical remnants of mafia 
power including old buildings, dirty streets, and dangerous neighborhoods that previously 
had contributed to the perpetuation of hegemonic ideology.331 However, while notable 
strides were made under the state reforms of the 1980s-90s, the mafia was far from gone.  
Rita Borsellino, sister of the immortalized magistrate, has worked to make sure 
that Sicilians and the international community do not forget that this is not the time for 
contentment or praise, as much work still remains to fully dismantle Cosa Nostra.332 
Speaking in the wake of the U.N. conference, as Palermo was being labeled as an “anti-
crime success story,” Borsellino dissuaded fellow Sicilians and conference attendees 
from becoming overly optimistic: “I don’t want people leaving this conference thinking 
that the mafia no longer exists. It just hides itself more.”333 Borsellino believed that the 
antimafia movement was beginning to work in the right direction at the turn of the 
millennium, “working from the grassroots to resist the mafia.” 334 The unavoidable 
reality, however, was that the antimafia movement had just begun to turn its attention to 
pervasive social and cultural problems responsible for perpetuating Cosa Nostra 
hegemony in the mid-1990s, a battle that would take decades to wage. Borsellino 
therefore stressed the need for more work at the cultural level after years of focusing 
solely on the political manifestations of the Cosa Nostra phenomenon. Through her 
public speeches, Borsellino sought to undermine the naïve assumptions voiced by many 
conference attendees that “we have taken the mafia out of people’s heads, and crushed its 
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hegemony.”335 While state reforms prompted by the antimafia movement may have taken 
Cosa Nostra in its most tangible and visible forms off of the streets, it was far from out of 
the minds or memories of Sicilians.  
At the turn of the century, the state had proven committed to withdrawing from its 
symbiotic relationship with Cosa Nostra in notable ways, but this in no way implies that 
the relationship was severed. The state-mafia hegemonic bloc continued well into the 
2000s, as it does today, because Cosa Nostra still has a powerful domination over 
Sicilian society and culture. At the turn of the century, therefore, at the same time as 
Palermo was being hailed for its “defeat of Cosa Nostra,” one had to look only through 
the façade of cleaner streets to find testament to the extent to which Cosa Nostra still 
dominated the landscape. While perhaps the most physical manifestations of its power 
had been removed, the mafia channeled its power into increasingly elusive and global 
markets and evolved its strategies to make its influence less visible to the untrained eye, 
but unquestionably still felt.  
Ordinary Sicilian citizens still very much felt Cosa Nostra’s hegemonic control, 
not yet believing an alternative system outside the state-hegemonic bloc to exist. At the 
turn of the century, 80% of businesses in Palermo still paid the pizzo, either out of fear or 
because they were so accustomed to perceive this act of subordination as natural.336 
Moreover, violence and murder were still tactics used against those few individuals brave 
enough to denounce the mafia in a public way. Murder rates had declined notably from 
the violence and brutality of the 1908s,337 but outspoken antimafia activists still had 
reason to fear mafia repercussions for their counter-hegemonic actions. In addition, the 
                                                 
335
 Stanley, 1.  
336
 Hammer, 3.  
337
 Stanley, 2.  
Diefendorf 111 
mafia continued to dominate incredibly lucrative, legal businesses ranging from garbage 
collection and construction to restaurants.338 This is not to mention the illegal channels 
that Cosa Nostra dominated, including drug trafficking and illegal immigration.339 The 
prevalence of drugs on the island and the increasing number of North African illegal 
immigrants at the turn of the century attested to the fact that, in many ways, the new 
millennium did not yet represent a “new dawn” for Sicily—an island that was still 
desperately trying to escape from under the oppressive shadow of Cosa Nostra.340 
THE LIMIT OF POLITICAL REFORMS:  
 In the wake of the legislative rush of the 1980s-90s, it was widely held that Sicily 
finally had a “complete penal legislation” that could effectively challenge Cosa Nostra.341 
Why, then, was the mafia still so powerful? The mafia’s continuing prominence can be 
explained in part by the fact that static legislation could only do so much, as Cosa Nostra 
was fluid and ever-changing in nature, possessing the ability to reinvent itself and its 
operations in order to capitalize on volatile markets and political climates.342 The laws, 
therefore, could not predict exactly which direction the mafia might take in the future to 
preserve their power and dominance.  
The most significant reason why the mafia remained powerful, however, was due 
to the fact that Cosa Nostra was a deeply cultural problem, as Rita Borsellino attested to 
in her speech in 2000. Hegemonic ideology was still not dismantled; in the late 1980s, in 
the hub of mafia and antimafia activity, wealthy Palermo citizens of the upper class 
pretended to be in “complete ignorance of the mafia,” refusing to acknowledge such 
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“unsavory aspects of Sicilian life.”343 Only attending to the political factors that 
perpetuated the mafia’s power would never fully challenge an organization whose right to 
rule over the island was deeply and historically entrenched within the minds of Sicilians. 
Hegemony was engrained through daily actions that went uncontested since the 1860s, 
and hegemonic apparatuses within society had long worked to promote the widespread 
uptake of an ideology that denied the existence of Cosa Nostra. Consequently, political 
reforms did not address this ideology that was a prominent feature in Sicily. Thus, 
beginning in the mid-1990s, it was realized that legislative mechanisms for curbing the 
mafia had gone as far as they could go,344 and that the next logical step was to attend to 
the second train track of the “antimafia train”; the antimafia movement needed to redirect 
its efforts to society, and work towards the development within Sicilian culture of a 
respect for and adherence to these newly created laws. In this way, the hegemonic 
ideology of Cosa Nostra’s historical right to dictate Sicily’s trajectory could be 
overturned fully, and a new way of conceptualizing the world could be offered to 
Sicilians through counter-hegemonic initiatives.345 True to Gramsci’s theories, the 
counter-hegemonic nature of the antimafia movement reared its head, in which to 
dismantle pervasive hegemony it became known that challenging the state-mafia 
hegemonic bloc did not “represent an enemy that is to be overcome once and for all with 
an extraordinary effort and campaign, but an enemy against which to wage a constant and 
ongoing daily struggle” using all means possible.346  
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Chapter Four will address how the antimafia movement today is waging this long 
battle. The changes in the movement that have come about since the mid-1990s will be 
analyzed, as it was at this time when the movement changed from targeting the state to 
targeting society as the agent that could bring Sicily towards a future without Cosa 
Nostra. As Chapter Three established how the antimafia movement first worked to 
deconstruct mafia ideology and hegemony by waging a war against traditional 
intellectuals and manipulating fissures within the state-mafia bloc, Chapter Four will 
show how the counter-hegemonic movement has now begun attending to the second step 
of counter-hegemony: offering a new ideology for the masses and a new way for Sicilians 
to conceptualize their realities outside of the hegemonic state-mafia system. The efforts 
and tactics of four different organizations in Sicily will be examined in order to highlight 
the contemporary nature of the antimafia movement that now works among Sicilian 
society to produce a counter-hegemonic ideology that encourages Sicilians to reclaim 
their identity, their island, and their future. 
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Chapter Four: The Antimafia Movement Today and its Counter-Hegemonic Nature 
 
THE MOVEMENT TODAY: 
 Chapter Three examined how the early antimafia movement was born in the 
1980s from natural fissures between the Italian state and Cosa Nostra that “new 
intellectuals” in the form of magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino 
capitalized on in order to create a political opportunity for Sicilians to “reclaim political 
society” by no longer acquiescing to the hegemonic ideology of the state-mafia system 
which historically worked to deny the existence of Cosa Nostra as a Sicilian phenomenon 
and essential state collaborator. These magistrates broke the trend of state compliance 
with mafia power, and were able to draw attention to fissures in the hegemonic bloc as a 
result of their work with mafia pentiti. After learning from pentiti that Cosa Nostra 
possessed formidable power as a result of state dependence and delegation to the criminal 
organization, Falcone and Borsellino believed it was imperative to target the state as the 
locus of hegemony that could dismantle the mafia through withdrawing from its historical 
relationship with the criminal organization. Thus, Falcone and Borsellino spearheaded the 
antimafia movement, and began rallying Sicilians around the need for political reforms 
that would end symbiotic ties between the state and mafia.  
 Targeting the state to issue political reforms represented the primary focus of the 
nascent antimafia movement, therefore, which would continue to be the focus until the 
mid-1990s even when civilians began to take charge of the movement after the deaths of 
Falcone and Borsellino. With this political focus during the early 1980s-mid 1990s, many 
prominent mafiosi had been arrested, Sicily had developed a capable penal code to 
addressing the unique judicial problem posed by Cosa Nostra, and Sicilians began to 
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have success with removing corrupt politicians from office and creating a political 
climate that demanded accountability and transparency in Sicilian politics. Despite these 
notable improvements, Cosa Nostra was still a commanding presence that continued to 
dictate the island’s politics and economy, and most importantly its culture.  
 Therefore, in the mid-1990s many Sicilians realized that targeting the state for 
political reforms was not enough to dismantle Cosa Nostra’s widespread influence. This 
can be explained in Gramscian terms; while the state was a locus of hegemony in Sicily, 
merely addressing this element of the hegemonic bloc failed to attend to the various 
hegemonic apparatuses in Sicily that worked to reproduce and entrench hegemonic 
ideology daily. Along with historical apparatuses such as the Catholic Church, political 
parties, and traditional intellectuals, Sicilian society represented a fundamental 
component of the state-mafia bloc. As Gramsci explained, civil society can either be a 
medium that reinforces or challenges hegemonic power structures. The ways in which 
Sicilian society reproduced hegemony were twofold: deliberately through paying the 
pizzo or supporting mafia-affiliated politicians, for instance, but also in numerous 
unintentional ways that had become so routine over time that many did not recognize the 
implications of these behaviors. Daily acquiescence, submission to the mafia system, 
denial of Cosa Nostra’s influence, and fear of speaking out against acts of criminality 
were responsible for solidifying hegemonic ideology that worked to discourage any 
challenges to the state-mafia system.   
 Through its focus on political reforms and the state, therefore, the antimafia had 
begun to attend to Gramsci’s first step of counter-hegemony: dismantling hegemonic 
ideology. This was accomplished by new intellectuals Falcone and Borsellino by creating 
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awareness of state-mafia relations and encouraging Sicilians to overturn the mentality 
that such state of affairs should be accepted or perceived as natural. As Gramsci reminds 
us, however, there are two fundamental tasks to which a counter-hegemonic movement 
must attend if a deeply-rooted hegemonic system is to be deconstructed. The second task 
of counter-hegemony involves offering a new counter-hegemonic ideology to the masses 
to take the place of dismantled hegemonic ideals. This occurred during the second phase 
of the antimafia movement that came about in the mid-1990s. During this time, when it 
was clear that political solutions would only curb mafia power to a certain extent, 
Sicilians came to consider Cosa Nostra to be a fundamentally cultural problem requiring 
cultural work that would grant Sicilians agency in recognizing how they could participate 
in a new reality outside the hegemonic system. By encouraging Sicilians to think 
critically about their world and the role they play in that reality, antimafia activists are 
now working to challenge mafia “dominance over the mental attitude and spirit of the 
people that guaranteed the mafia absolute control over the island.”347 From the mid-1990s 
through today, therefore, the antimafia movement has attended to the second phase of 
counter-hegemony by offering a new ideology to Sicilians that emphasizes respect for 
legality and honest work, as well as denouncing mafiosi, criminality, and corruption.348  
This chapter will explore the nature of the contemporary antimafia movement in 
order to demonstrate how la lotta contro la mafia has changed since its origins in the 
1980s. By exploring the activities and strategies of four different antimafia organizations 
operating in Sicily, it will be demonstrated that each group has changed its primary focus 
over time from the Italian state to Sicilian society as the medium through which a cultural 
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revolution can be brought to the island. Through an examination of these four 
organizations, it will be highlighted how each organization is attending to Gramsci’s 
phases of counter-hegemony. An organization can be said to be counter-hegemonic if it 
attends to the following tasks: works to dismantle hegemonic ideology by challenging its 
remaining manifestations in society, produces organic intellectuals that promote a new 
reality outside the state-mafia system, works to challenge double-consciousnesses within 
Sicilians that contribute to their perpetuation of hegemony, and promotes institutions and 
activities that provide Sicilians with practical ways to incorporate counter-hegemony into 
daily behavior. While these organizations have different approaches to answering the 
mafia problem, they all are working to cultivate in Sicilians a counter-hegemonic 
mentality that grants them the power to challenge the state-mafia system and recognize 
how living and working outside the hegemonic state-mafia system can be not only 
practical but also lucrative. Because Arci, Libera, Addiopizzo, and the Red Diaries all 
attend to these four criteria, each organization can be said to be waging a counter-
hegemonic attack against the state-mafia hegemonic system.  
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ANTIMAFIA FIGHT TODAY: 
 As Chapter Three suggested, while the state made significant strides towards 
withdrawing from its symbiotic relationship with Cosa Nostra in the 1980s-early 1990s, 
these efforts were predominantly championed by a “virtuous minority” of authorities and 
politicians committed to eradicating Cosa Nostra from the Sicilian landscape. 
Consequently, the majority of state officials and Sicilians “remained ambivalent” to state-
mafia hegemony, effectively supporting the continuation of an established system that 
had solidified its presence for over 120 years. Therefore, important progress that was 
Diefendorf 118 
made in adopting legislative reforms against the mafia in the 1980s can be largely 
attributed to select magistrates and cultural leaders in Sicily who heavily lobbied the state 
during this time. Now that the state is no longer the primary target of antimafia efforts, 
however, and the movement from the mid-1990s through the present day instead has 
turned its attention to Sicilian society, it is important to examine the role the state plays in 
the counter-hegemonic antimafia movement today. 
 Because political reforms were ushered in by a “virtuous minority” in the 1980s, 
it is worth examining whether this absence of widespread commitment to the antimafia 
movement at the state level has continued into today. One does not need to look far to 
find evidence attesting to the fact that the Italian state continues to have a muddled 
relationship with the antimafia movement; while several prominent authorities have 
demonstrated their support of the movement through favorable legislation and antimafia 
platforms, others continue to carry on Sicily’s historical trend of state accommodation 
towards the mafia through political alliances and concessions to Cosa Nostra. The nature 
of the state as “an amorphous complex of agencies” makes it difficult to evaluate the 
state’s involvement in the antimafia movement today as a whole;349 some aspects of the 
state, such as the magistracy, remain devout supporters of the movement, but this 
commitment does not radiate equally throughout the varied levels and institutions that 
compose the Italian state. There is evidence, therefore, to support both contradictory 
claims about the extent of the state’s involvement in the contemporary antimafia 
movement. 
 Indisputably, there is important evidence attesting to the Italian state’s resolve to 
aid the antimafia movement since the mid-1990s when the movement redirected its focus 
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from state to society. In 1996, the state adopted significant legislation that now allows 
antimafia organizations to acquire former mafia assets, reconverting these properties into 
socially-beneficial projects.350 In addition, the state now guarantees financial assistance 
and protection to mafia denouncers, helping to create a culture that praises and supports 
those brave enough to condemn Cosa Nostra351. These examples all serve to suggest that 
the Italian state has taken an active role in the contemporary phase of the antimafia 
movement and is seemingly committed to furthering la lotta contro la mafia through 
political methods. Moreover, the judiciary has demonstrated its commitment to utilize 
Sicily’s nascent penal code to fight Cosa Nostra, which has led to high-profile mafia 
arrests such as Bernardo Provenzano’s arrest in 2006.352 However, this antimafia 
commitment is spread unevenly throughout various levels and institutions of the state, 
and there is substantial evidence to suggest that the state is not nearly as active in the 
antimafia cause as activists might hope. 
 While the state has undoubtedly taken a harder stance against Cosa Nostra in 
recent years as a result of civilian pressure and the budding counter-hegemonic 
movement that brought state-mafia ties to light, the state has not withdrawn completely 
from its dependence on the mafia. This is evident when one examines recent legislation 
that has been issued under Prime Minister Berlusconi. In 2010, Berlusconi dismantled 
wiretapping laws that were a primary method for obtaining incriminating evidence 
against mafiosi in the 1980s.353 Moreover, Berlusconi has also showcased his wavering 
commitments as head of the Italian state through his favorable legislation towards 
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overseas banking accounts. Cosa Nostra—a transnational organization with interests and 
investments scattered globally—directly benefits from such legislation that grants 
clemency to mafiosi maintaining substantial accounts outside of the country.354  
In addition, other issues—such as national financial concerns—continue to trump 
antimafia commitments of the state.355 Some express concern that the Italian state is not 
ready to bear the financial responsibilities that a widespread fight against the mafia would 
require.356 This is exemplified in a recent bill that sought to generate income for the state 
by capping the number of days social organizations could engage in auctions over state-
seized mafia assets.357 Because antimafia organizations do not possess the same financial 
latitude of powerful mafiosi backed by a multi-billion dollar criminal organization, this 
legislation created the fear that mafia properties could quickly be repossessed by Cosa 
Nostra, therefore inhibiting the efforts of antimafia organizations working to reconvert 
these lands into spaces for counter-hegemonic projects.358 These examples suggest that 
the Italian state as a whole is not fully committed to severing ties with the mafia, 
particularly at the national level. These initiatives are cause for discouragement, as they 
have been equated to represent “gifts to the mafia from the Italian state,” reminiscent of 
the tremendous gift of power and accommodation that the state first gave Cosa Nostra 
following unification.359  
The state’s continued dependence on the mafia is perhaps best illustrated during 
elections, however. Historically, the Italian state and various political parties have 
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collaborated with Cosa Nostra in order to extract votes from the Sicilian population. This 
trend that started in the 1950s with the emergence of the Christian Democratic Party has 
continued into modern day; come election time, mafiosi can still be found working 
amongst the Sicilian population offering Euros or food in hopes of “buying” the votes of 
primarily apathetic, fearful, or impoverished Sicilians.360  
Based on this realization that the Italian state continues to be intimately connected 
to Cosa Nostra, some antimafia activists have questioned the state’s genuine commitment 
to the cause. Some skeptically wonder whether the state is simply motivated to adopt an 
antimafia platform when there are clear benefits that can be derived from such political 
maneuvering. For example, while the state has established a legal framework that 
provides mafia denouncers with financial support and personal bodyguard protection, 
denunciations are not thoroughly investigated,361 and consequently have become a 
medium for solving personal disputes and disagreements more than helping to bring 
mafiosi to justice.362 This suggests that pressure from international bodies like the 
European Union, for instance, might be instrumental in encouraging the state to take a 
harder stance against organized crime, and the state’s commitment to the fundamental 
ideals behind the movement might be suspect.  
 Thus, it is clear that the state and the antimafia movement possess a convoluted 
relationship, not unlike the unclear relationship the state has historically possessed with 
Cosa Nostra. The Italian state occupies an unclear and complex position within Sicily, as 
on occasion it has both supported and hindered the efforts of the antimafia movement and 
Cosa Nostra, respectively. The antimafia movement has sought to end the state’s “double 
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loyalty to the mafia’s laws and the procedures of democracies,” therefore.363 The fact that 
the state has never declared an unwavering commitment to the antimafia platform in the 
1980s or even today allows the Italian state to continue to operate in an indefinable 
spatial position, benefiting by existing in this gray area posited between civil society and 
the mafia and not having to formally commit definitively to supporting either side. The 
state’s irresolute support of the antimafia cause has manifested in an antimafia movement 
that now focuses almost exclusively on Sicilian society. Recognizing that the time for 
legislation and reforms has passed and the state has perhaps reformed as much as it ever 
will, the antimafia movement now focuses on society based on the belief that real change 
can best be delivered to Sicily through working with the ”minds and bodies” of ordinary 
Sicilians.364 The counter-hegemonic nature of the movement is apparent, therefore, as 
throughout its history the antimafia has had to engage in a “war of positioning,” working 
within and outside of the state in the face of uncertain state support of its initiatives and 
in recognition of the cultural manifestations of state-mafia hegemony that were 
responsible for fueling Cosa Nostra’s power well into the new millennium.  
THE MAFIA AND SOCIETY TODAY:  
 While much progress has been made in the antimafia fight since its origins in the 
1980s, it is interesting to examine what conditions are like in modern day Sicily, and 
what evidences of mafia power and state-mafia ties are still prevalent today.  
 As previously stated, one of the main ways the mafia has managed to maintain a 
relationship with Cosa Nostra is through elections. Not wanting to break a beneficial and 
historical trend of dependence, the Italian state still relies on the mafia in order to gain 
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electoral support needed for political victory. A former Customs Officer in Sicily attested 
to the continuation of this symbiotic relationship, describing how he was approached by a 
mafia affiliate attempting to buy his vote in the most recent national elections: 
 “Are you free?” the mafiosi inquired. 
 “No, I’m married,” the former Guardia di Finanza claims to have responded. 
 “No, I mean did you promise someone with a vote? If not, I will tell you who to 
vote for.”365 
The former Customs Officer claims that such occurrences are highly common, and that 
“70% of Sicilian votes are controlled by the mafia today.”366 As the Customs Officer 
explained, it is not uncommon for politicians to promise food or Euros in exchange for 
votes. While state-mafia ties have been relinquished in many notable ways, electoral 
manipulation thus remains an important way this symbiotic relationship has continued. A 
“culture of favors” pervades many levels of society, leading many Sicilians to feel 
indebted to giving their vote to mafiosi who provide them with security, income, and 
often employment. The Customs Officer expressed that “when this practice of 
exchanging favors changes, then the mafia will die.”367   
 Moreover, evidence of the extent to which mafia hegemony still permeates 
Sicilian society is apparent in an examination of business life in Sicily. When 
interviewing a prominent Sicilian businessman, he explained the extent to which his life 
has changed in the wake of his denunciation of Cosa Nostra and refusal to pay the pizzo. 
The man once owned a small bar in the small island of Ortigia. When he decided to 
denounce the mafia, young Sicilians from the neighborhood were paid off by mafiosi at 
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the price of fifty Euros to burn down his business. Sicilian youths burnt down this bar 
four times before the local businessman was forced to request state protection, rightfully 
fearing for his life after these unrelenting attacks.  
Under new legislation, the state is required to provide protection and financial 
assistance to mafia denouncers whose lives inevitably change as a result of their 
courageous actions. For this local man, denouncing brought the need for 24-hour 
bodyguard protection, financial support from the state, and a new business in the 
neighboring city of Siracusa. While his new business—a children’s clothing store—is 
doing fairly well, he admitted sadly that many Siracusans prefer doing business 
elsewhere, at a different business that is not known for its owner’s tendency to speak out 
against Cosa Nostra. Customers fear coming into his store, as an armed car is 
permanently stationed outside, and one must pass through two armed bodyguards before 
entering the storefront. Conversely, however, it is important to note that many consumers 
come to his store solely because they believe it to be a symbolic act that conveys their 
desire to participate in collective action against Cosa Nostra.  
 This business owner’s experiences have taught him that much cultural work still 
remains before mafia hegemony will fully be uprooted. He recalled that Sicily has not 
fully been able to move beyond its history characterized by “solitary heroes,” as the 
media was quick to make him into a hero for his actions—a hero who stood alone and 
whose actions failed to mobilize other local businessmen to do similarly. He described 
how many friends and local consumers claimed to stand behind him in his bravery, but 
that this support only manifested in hollow words. Many of his friends and once 
dedicated customers did not support his new business initiative, nor were they enticed by 
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his example to participate in antimafia efforts themselves. Double consciousnesses 
clearly are still a feature of modern Sicily, where many Sicilians act very different in 
theory and practice in regards to the mafia. Sicily has very recently entered into a time in 
which mafia denunciations are voiced and praised, and thus it is understandable that it 
will take more time for other citizens to feel comfortable participating in an act that was 
long met with brutal and often lethal repercussions. This unfortunate reality, however, 
means that many mafia denouncers still feel ill-supported and unprotected. The business 
owner admitted to feeling very “isolated,” just as Falcone claimed to feel in the years 
before his death. Instead of empowered, since his denunciation he feels “impotent” 
knowing he is not as supported in his actions as he hoped.368  
While Falcone urged for collective action and widespread antimafia support so 
activists would never feel alone, it is clear that a culture that truly values denunciation 
will take more time to come to fruition. As the businessman stated, “many people still 
don’t want an antimafia culture to become reality.”369 He believes that antimafia success 
“depends on whether Sicilians really want to change and if they really want a better 
future.”370 Noting that Italians harbor an incredible capacity for collective action when 
they are committed to a cause, he nonetheless questions just how widespread antimafia 
commitment remains in Sicily. Therefore, Sicilians must overturn their tendency to 
“accept a lot of bad things that transpire” if they are to realize their ability to move 
towards a future without Cosa Nostra.371 Again, this attests to the strength and 
pervasiveness of mafia hegemony that serves to create reluctance to denunciation, as this 
                                                 
368
 Interview with Bruno Piazzese, Siracusa Italy, November 26, 2010. 
369
 Interview with Bruno Piazzese. 
370
 Interview with Bruno Piazzese. 
371
 Interview with Bruno Piazzese. 
Diefendorf 126 
ideology became incorporated into daily mentalities due to the solidification of the 
hegemonic system for a period of nearly 140 years. Moreover, his need to live under 
constant protection highlights Cosa Nostra’s continued determination to maintain consent 
to the state-mafia system through threat or force. 
IMPLICATIONS: 
 While many antimafia organizations now operate within Sicily and devote 
themselves to fighting Cosa Nostra through cultural work, it is clear that hegemonic 
ideology still remains in the mentalities of many Sicilians, and counter-hegemonic ideals 
have not fully taken root among the population. The mark of a completed counter-
hegemonic movement is when counter-hegemonic ideals and practices are naturally 
reproducing and become incorporated without question into daily action and behavior—
when all Sicilians are integrated into the “process of permanent liberation” from the 
hegemonic system that long dominated them.372 This does not yet represent Sicily’s 
reality. Contemporary antimafia organizations face an incredible battle in advancing 
counter-hegemonic ideology for many reasons. Much of the international spotlight and 
attention to the antimafia cause has faded since 1992, and consequently may have lost 
some of its appeal and popularity within Sicily. The island was a focus of the 
international community at this time due to the extent of mafia atrocities and lethal 
attacks against the state. While 1992 may have represented the height of the mafia’s 
resolve to establish its supremacy through violence against the state, this signified the 
mere beginning of the widespread, civilian-driven antimafia movement in operation 
today. La lotta contro la mafia may no longer be a particularly salient focus of the 
international community today as it once was, but it is important to examine how 
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antimafia organizations have continued to carry on their counter-hegemonic fight, as the 
mafia-state system is far from dismantled and Sicilians still suffer under the effects of a 
hegemonic system and ideology deeply rooted in the island’s economy, politics, and 
culture.  
 Below is an analysis of the activities of four antimafia organizations I worked 
with in Sicily, Italy. Roughly thirty years since Sicilians first exhibited significant 
discontentment with Cosa Nostra outside of dalla Chiesa’s funeral, these organizations 
continue working diligently to advance a counter-hegemonic movement that will remove 
all traces of state-mafia hegemony and demonstrate to Sicilians how they can reclaim 
their lives and identities by fighting the hegemonic system through daily, ordinary 
actions. 
ARCI: 
 First established in 1957, Arci arose as a national anti-fascist organization 
committed to fighting ignorance and building a culturally-aware and active society. 
While Arci attends to many different societal problems, the organization’s activities in 
Sicily revolve around a two-fold mission: to fight Cosa Nostra, and to address societal 
ills and discrimination on the island. These missions are not antonymous, but rather are 
intimately linked. Arci has established a community-centric and counter-hegemonic 
approach to dismantling Cosa Nostra. The organization views Cosa Nostra as a deeply 
cultural problem, and believes the mafia has acquired formidable strength as a result of 
its ability to prey upon and manipulate society. While this mentality drives contemporary 
Arci operations in Sicily, the organization has not always championed primarily cultural 
activities.  
Diefendorf 128 
Reflective of the changing antimafia movement as a whole, in the early 1990s 
Arci first directed its antimafia efforts around more politically-focused initiatives. 1992 
marked the beginning of Arci’s heavy involvement in addressing the Cosa Nostra 
phenomenon—a focus that continues to dominate the organization’s activities in Sicily. 
During this year, Arci collaborated with other antimafia organizations in order to create 
conferences and meetings where Sicilians came together to discuss and debate various 
political solutions to combating Cosa Nostra in the wake of Faclone and Borsellino’s 
assassinations. However, continuing mafia power and influence within Sicily into the 
mid-1990s suggested that organizing conferences and lobbying the state for reforms were 
insufficient in prompting the widespread cultural change needed to fully uproot Cosa 
Nostra. The Arci Siracusa President explained that at these conferences in the early 
1990s, too much time was devoted to dwelling on fallen antimafia heroes, without 
effectively challenging these sentiments into productive activities. The organization 
recognized, therefore, the need for cultural work and reforms to “fight mafia culture.”373 
As the president described, Arci came to believe that “we must work with the people, 
with the younger generations, to address what happens when people don’t have chances, 
when they don’t believe in parties, government, and institutions, because otherwise 
people believe that the mafia boss is the only other solution.”374  
Thus, over time Arci has redirected its efforts from targeting the state for political 
reforms to targeting society through cultural work in order to dismantle state-mafia 
hegemony. The evolution of thought from the mafia as a political to a cultural problem is 
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evident in how Arci operates and attempts to address the Cosa Nostra problem through 
its two-pronged focus of developing cultural centers and work camps in Sicily.  
 In the wake of the sweeping legislative reforms of the 1990s, Arci attempts to 
dismantle remaining semblances of state-mafia hegemony that still permeate the island. 
As previously noted, hegemonic ideology long worked to deny the existence of Cosa 
Nostra so as to keep Sicilians ignorant of the mafia’s role in bolstering state authority in 
the region. One of the main ways Arci attempts to further an understanding of the 
detriments of the state-mafia system is through its “cultural centers” within different 
regions in Sicily. These centers are located strategically in areas of poverty, poor 
educational opportunities, and high unemployment. Knowing all too well that the mafia 
succeeds in “those areas where the moral judgment of public opinions may be 
ambivalent,”375 Arci attempts to establish centers of education and learning in at-risk 
areas that are suffering under conditions the mafia has proven adept at solving. Thus, 
Arci selects Sicilian regions where unemployment rates can be as high as 20% and 
dropping out post-secondary school is common, knowing that these are pervasive social 
problems upon which the mafia depends for its continued power and influence.376 Arci 
locates its centers where “future criminals are likely to be born,”377 and aims to target 
younger Sicilians from turning to the mafia as a solution to their multifaceted problems.  
The purpose of these centers, therefore, is to deconstruct hegemonic ideals by 
raising awareness among Sicilian communities about the true nature and history of the 
mafia, and how its activities have directly contributed to the societal issues under which 
Sicilians now suffer. Indeed, high dropout rates can be attributed to the mafia’s historical 
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control of school construction, which ensured that many educational buildings were 
poorly constructed and maintained and lacked necessary resources to encourage children 
to stay in school.378  
 In order to deconstruct hegemonic ideology in regions that have long depended 
upon the mafia for certain services, Arci works with youth and families at these cultural 
centers to educate Sicilians of the detriments of supporting Cosa Nostra, whether this 
support is deliberate or unintentional. Arci volunteers describe this to be a formidable 
task; one volunteer described a common mentality among many Sicilian mothers from 
impoverished regions who believe that Cosa Nostra is “good” because it provides their 
families with basic essentials like bread and money that the state cannot.379 Through these 
centers of education and awareness, Arci must work to dismantle deeply pervasive 
sentiments that mafia bosses are the most reliable medium through which to receive 
essential goods and services. Instead, Arci works to enforce the mentality that the state-
mafia partnership has directly contributed to the state’s current inability to efficiently 
provide for its citizens. The organization therefore operates on the understanding that “as 
long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their condition, they fatalistically 
‘accept’ their exploitation.”380 Arci works to link Sicilians’ exploitation with Cosa Nostra 
by working in areas the mafia commonly preys upon, where “the citizen is weak, when 
he thinks he has no choice, where the institutions are inactive.”381 Efforts are hindered, 
however, by a “culture of distrust” that has been fostered as a result of Sicilians 
historically not being able to rely on the state or institutions for the services they required. 
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These cultural centers, therefore, aim to provide Sicilians with a space where discussions 
of economic and social problems can be voiced, and where education about the truths of 
Cosa Nostra can be shared. Thanks to Arci, which operates these centers in a variety of 
regions throughout Sicily, Sicilians no longer need to be “alarmed by the lack of a 
neighborhood center where young people might congregate,” which was commonly cited 
as a problem in the 1990s that could continue to fuel mafia power if unaddressed.382  
 Arci cultural centers also serve a second counter-hegemonic aim, which involves 
producing organic intellectuals that reconstruct new conceptions of reality for Sicilians 
by providing them with ways to live and work outside the state-mafia system. Organic 
intellectuals are composed of Arci volunteers that arise from the same Sicilian 
communities where cultural centers are located. Arci also creates organic intellectuals 
within society through educational campaigns that encourage individuals to return to their 
homes and neighborhoods and share their knowledge of state-mafia relations and its 
oppressive ramifications. The organization hopes that Sicilians will promote Arci within 
their neighborhoods as a center that is dedicated in assisting these individuals in their 
efforts to “reclaim political society” and dismantle state-mafia hegemony. By creating 
cultural centers where Sicilians can voice their discontentment and come to 
understandings of their communal oppression, it is clear that Arci recognizes that “critical 
and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed 
at whatever the stage of their struggle for liberation” from hegemonic forces.383 Arci 
welcomes any and all into its centers, helping to cultivate the knowledge and awareness 
among Sicilians necessary before action against state-mafia hegemony can occur. It is 
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imperative that these conversations and realizations are brought about by organic 
intellectuals arising from similar communities and circumstances as the Sicilians they 
attempt to educate, as “the oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their 
redemption” from participating in the hegemonic system if counter-hegemonic ideals are 
to be demonstrated as practical and logical.384 
An instrumental task before these organic intellectuals is to provide Sicilians with 
an alternative way to live and prosper outside of Cosa Nostra. A frequently referenced 
hope in Sicily is that “no one would go with the Mafia if they had an alternative.”385 
Through its cultural centers, Arci hopes to test this hypothesis by demonstrating to 
Sicilians viable economic opportunities outside the mafia system. Arci does this by 
investing in the social capital of Sicilians through professional and occupational training 
at its cultural centers throughout the island. At the center in Siracusa, for instance, 
Sicilians are trained in repairing bicycles—a common means of transportation on the 
island. Imperative professional skills are also fostered through hands-on work and 
lectures; by fostering skills that Sicilians can derive a living from, Arci demonstrates how 
working in a legitimate and dignified job outside of the mafia system can be lucrative.  
Arci thereby challenges the mentality among many discontented Sicilians that 
“the mafia gave us work, and now the antimafia has taken this work away.”386 It is 
important for Arci to prove that the fight against the mafia does not need to imply 
declining economic opportunities for Sicilians. Through its cultural centers, Arci works 
to provide a place they can go to and rely upon instead of the mafia—not as a service 
provider, but simply by demonstrating to Sicilians that they can rely on themselves and 
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their own abilities instead of mafiosi. By “working with the hands, and not just the minds 
of Sicilians,” cultural centers attend to a two-fold task of dismantling hegemonic 
mentalities and putting Sicilians to work in legitimate occupations outside the realm of 
the mafia system.   
 Along with cultural centers, Arci also works through another medium in order to 
dismantle mafia hegemony and offer counter-hegemonic alternatives to Sicilians. Thanks 
to the early efforts of antimafia organizations, Law 109/96 ensured that antimafia 
organizations like Arci would have the opportunity to obtain confiscated mafia assets 
from the state in order to reconvert them into socially-beneficial properties.387 Many 
mafiosi possess vast, showy estates often sitting upon hundreds of acres of land. Mafia 
estates stand in sharp contrast to many urban neighborhoods of concrete that are plagued 
by unemployment and poverty. This tangible evidence of mafia power and influence is 
highly symbolic, and serves to perpetuate mafia hegemony by suggesting that Cosa 
Nostra is the only medium through which Sicilians can attain such a commanding 
amount of monetary success and respect. This fallacy is exactly what Arci tries to 
dismantle with their seizure of former mafia property. As Roberto Saviano explains, if 
mafia assets are not repossessed, “the villas continue to bear the mark of the bosses who 
built and lived in them. Even abandoned, they remain symbols of sovereignty.”388 The 
importance of Law 109/96 as a mechanism to defeat mafia power becomes clear, 
therefore. Through this legislative reform, Arci has acquired a substantial amount of 
mafia property that the organization has converted into “work camps” in various regions 
of Sicily. 
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 In 2006, Arci came in possession of a vast estate formerly owned by infamous 
mafia boss Bernardo Provenzano—the “reigning boss of bosses” of the post-millennial 
mafia.389 This property was in Corleone, a rural area outside of Palermo that has 
historically been a mafia-stronghold. Indeed, Corleone was selected as the Sicilian setting 
for The Godfather as a result of this notoriety. This exemplifies Arci’s determination to 
establish counter-hegemonic initiatives in at-risk areas; an important testament to the 
strength of the antimafia movement is whether organizations like Arci can prove adept at 
dismantling mafia hegemony in areas long under control by Cosa Nostra, where Sicilians 
did not believe there to be any alternative to the state-mafia system, and thus granted 
consent to these power structures believing them to represent the normal way of things in 
Sicily.  
These work camps not only dismantle hegemonic ideology, but also help 
conceptualize and forward a new ideology that encourages Sicilians to cultivate their 
ability to live outside the state-mafia system. This is a huge task to accomplish in areas 
like Corleone where Cosa Nostra has long succeeded in enforcing the mentality that 
granting consent to the state-mafia system guarantees the benefits of employment, 
income, and other essential services. Individuals come to work on the camps typically for 
a period of ten to fifteen days. During this time, education is a large component of the 
experience. After work each day, participants attend informative lectures, often led by 
prominent antimafia activists. These lectures, by tracing the history of the mafia and 
describing state-mafia relations over the years that still continue today, Arci volunteers 
help to create more organic intellectuals who return to their home communities after this 
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experience and share the knowledge they receive from participating in these cultural 
programs.  
Through these work camps, Arci also aims to demonstrate how a legitimate and 
respectable living can be made outside of the state-mafia system. On these repossessed 
lands, Sicilians are able to work in cooperatives, producing agricultural goods and 
learning that Cosa Nostra need not represent the only medium through which to find 
employment. The individuals who attend these camps are often—but not always—
mentally disabled individuals, troubled youth, and immigrants who otherwise have few 
opportunities for employment or education and consequently are often more vulnerable 
and likely to turn to Cosa Nostra. These work camps therefore “give people the 
opportunities to work and live without having to thank anybody,” encouraging them to 
cultivate their own skills, as Sicily’s history has been characterized by favors and 
depending upon others for success and opportunities for too long.390 Arci hopes to 
overturn this historical trend of feeling indebted to others for opportunities and services 
that have been difficult to attain outside of patronage networks and clientelism.  
At cultural centers and work camps alike, Arci forces Sicilians to grapple with 
their double-consciousnesses, requiring them to evaluate the ways in which they 
individually contribute to mafia power through their dependence or passive acquiescence 
to status quo power structures. The mafia’s persistent power can be attributed in part to 
the fact that many Sicilians continue to act differently in theory versus practice in regards 
to Cosa Nostra. Through education, Sicilians are made to see how acquiescence need not 
be granted to a hegemonic system that delivers them more harm than benefit. Arci hopes 
to encourage the development of critical consciousnesses, as it is when an individual is 
                                                 
390
 Interview with Arci Activist. 
Diefendorf 136 
made to evaluate their reality that “he or she comes to a new awareness of self, has a new 
sense of dignity, and is stirred by a new hope.”391  By deconstructing false notions of the 
benefits of the state-mafia system, Arci hopes to cultivate hope in Sicilians that their own 
actions can bring about a new future for Sicily no longer under the oppression of Cosa 
Nostra.  
 At Arci work camps, several goods are produced that can be sold at local markets 
for profit. Tomatoes, wine, olive oil, and flour are among the products bearing Arci’s 
name and mission statement that find their way to store shelves across Sicily. These 
products encourage Sicilians to be conscientious consumers by providing them with a 
sure way to avoid perpetuating mafia power by not having to purchase goods like 
tomatoes from companies that historically have been mafia-controlled. Through selling 
these products, most importantly, Arci is able to derive a profit that can then be 
reinvested into the camps. In addition, the sale of these products provides camp workers 
with a salary that proves that a living can be made outside of Cosa Nostra through honest 
and hard work. This also offers Sicilians with an easy way to contribute to furthering 
counter-hegemonic initiatives through daily activities like buying groceries at the market. 
 While Sicily has made notable progress towards a future that is no longer dictated 
by Cosa Nostra, the threats Arci activists face as a result of their antimafia initiatives 
attest to the amount of cultural work that still remains to be done in order to dismantle 
mafia hegemony at the societal level. These demonstrations of violence are also reflective 
of the mafia’s attempt to cling to its declining ability to obtain consent to the hegemonic 
system through threat and force. While Arci activities have not gone unchallenged by the 
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mafia, it is important to note that the ability of Cosa Nostra to quell activism with fear is 
becoming limited as antimafia organizations grow in number and prominence. 
In the first year of Arci’s work camp in Corelone, the mafia did not threaten 
workers and activists because the criminal organization did not yet fully appreciate what 
Arci was aiming to accomplish in the region. The camp merely seemed to be producing 
agricultural goods, not furthering an antimafia consciousness or awareness that would 
challenge the influence of mafia families living in the area. Nonetheless, within Arci’s 
first year in Corleone no local residents were willing to participate out of fear of 
retaliation by mafiosi who lived adjacent to the camp. However, over the years as Arci’s 
antimafia and counter-hegemonic goals became more well-known within Sicily, Arci has 
had to turn away participants as its popularity has grown considerably. Unfortunately, 
though, this growing recognition and popularity of Arci’s community work has resulted 
in violence and threats from mafiosi who still reside in Corleone and resent how mafia 
assets that once strengthened Cosa Nostra domination are now helping to weaken mafia 
influence. Cosa Nostra therefore began responding to this challenge by attempting to 
weaken Arci’s ability to carry out its counter-hegemonic aims.   
In 2008, the vineyards at the Corleone work camp were cut down to destroy the 
productivity and profitability of the antimafia property. Consequently, this camp was not 
able to produce wine—one of its most lucrative products—for over a year. The Arci 
program manager of the Corleone camp has faced personal attack, as well, including 
having his car incinerated. Violent retaliation by the mafia is not limited to work camps. 
One of Arci’s community centers has been a mafia target in recent years, as well, where 
angry mafiosi smashed the windows of the center as an indicator that Cosa Nostra was 
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not afraid of this challenge to its authority in the region. Within days, however, women 
and children within the community painted murals alongside the building and helped to 
repair the damage, attesting to the influence and respect these centers are beginning to 
have in at-risk communities. It is clear that Cosa Nostra still relies on the same scare 
tactics that the criminal organization relied on in the 1970s-80s to dissuade activists from 
challenging mafia power. What is different now, however, is that Sicily is progressing 
away from a history largely characterized by “solitary antimafia heroes,” and collective 
antimafia action has made it harder for Cosa Nostra to swiftly eliminate and silence 
enemies and activists as it once could. Therefore, unlike decades prior, antimafia 
activities now garner much attention and support and are not stifled by the mafia before 
they achieve any tangible results.  
  Because Arci is a volunteer-based organization, it is interesting to examine from 
what sources it obtains funding to carry out its admirable initiatives. While products from 
work camps result in some profit that can be reinvested back into the organization’s 
cultural projects, this income is not enough for Arci to carry out its varied goals. Arci is 
affiliated with the Leftist Party in Italy, and through this affiliation the organization 
attains modest funds from the government. Arci has petitioned the state on several 
occasions for funds to purchase the farming equipment necessary for its work camps, for 
instance. Arci has also received funding from the European Union which has helped to 
buy and repair necessary machinery. Local governments such as Corleone have also 
provided funds to Arci, recognizing the organization’s ability to raise awareness and 
antimafia sentiment through events and lectures. Thus, governmental funding is put 
towards furthering Arci initiatives already in place, and does not pay off Arci workers in 
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a way that could potentially compromise their initiatives. Nonetheless, Arci’s tendency to 
attract financial support from outside actors has caused some to critique the organization. 
In reality, however, many antimafia organizations must rely on some form of external 
financial support in order to carry out their cultural projects.  
Many Sicilians would prefer antimafia organizations like Arci to not have any 
party or state connections, as there is considerable distrust around political parties as a 
result of the historical role the Christian Democratic Party played in advancing state-
mafia hegemony. These anxieties are well-founded, as the state historically has occupied 
a muddled relationship with the mafia and the antimafia movement. Most importantly, 
these anxieties represent ramifications of state-mafia hegemony, where many now 
distrust the state and political parties as a result of their historical role in solidifying the 
state-mafia hegemonic bloc. It is also important to note however, that just like the state, 
antimafia organizations are not monolithic, and have different needs based on their 
unique approaches to the Cosa Nostra problem, which can culminate in the need for 
external financial assistance in order to successfully carry out their cultural activities. 
 Arci has changed from targeting the state to targeting society over time to bring 
cultural change to Sicily. Helping to advance the counter-hegemonic antimafia 
movement, through cultural centers and work camps Arci works to dismantle mafia 
hegemony, provide Sicilians with alternatives to living and working outside of the state-
mafia system, attack double-consciousnesses still present within many Sicilians, and 
create activities and centers that allow Sicilians to easily participate and help advance 
counter-hegemony through incorporating these activities into their daily lives.  
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LIBERA: 
 Libera is another antimafia organization operating within Sicily that was 
established by priest Don Ciotti in 1995.392 Libera has also changed how it views the 
Cosa Nostra problem over time. In line with the general thinking of the 1980s-90s, 
Libera was instrumental in petitioning and pressuring the state to enact certain legislative 
reforms in the 1990s that would require the state to take a larger role in fighting Cosa 
Nostra power in Sicily. Libera was heavily involved in ensuring the passage of Law 
109/96, which has helped community antimafia organizations challenge the mafia. This 
antimafia organization also was instrumental in lobbying the state to create a national 
holiday honoring fallen antimafia martyrs.393 The organization now views the mafia as a 
cultural problem, however, that requires more than political efforts to successfully 
address. Libera carries out counter-hegemonic cultural work through a dual focus of work 
in Sicilian schools and the development of work camps in Sicily. 
 Working within Sicilian schools is a crucial way Libera attempts to dismantle 
remaining hegemonic ideology within Sicilians. Libera’s founder Don Ciotti believed 
strongly in the importance of using education as a medium to dismantle mafia power. 
This is reminiscent of Gramsci’s notion that schools can be a vital medium for advancing 
counter-hegemonic ideals.394 Ciotti based his organization’s initiatives off of the words of 
Judge Chinnici—an antimafia martyr in the 1980s—who said to Sicilian youth before his 
death that “we can’t make it alone, we can’t make it without you.”395 While educational 
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efforts occurred prior to the mid-1990s, it was in 1995 that they most ardently picked up 
steam and received the funding and civilian support they needed to continue. The national 
Antimafia Commission finally required “education in legality” to enter school 
curriculums throughout Sicily in 1993.396 Libera became involved in these initiatives in 
1995; because Libera represents an umbrella organization of sorts that coordinates 
activities with a variety of other socially-conscious groups,397 Libera’s involvement in 
educational campaigns against the mafia ensured that by 1998 “620 schools had 
undertaken this type of programme and 1000 projects were underway, involving 8,000 
teachers and 800,000 students.”398  
Libera school lectures involve a handful of volunteers going into various schools 
in regions of Sicily under the effects of poor educational systems and poverty. These 
activists are college-educated, fairly young, and usually from the same communities in 
which they teach. At a school lecture I attended in Siracusa, the internet and projector 
screens were among the varied mediums employed to deconstruct hegemonic ideology. 
Video clips and YouTube segments were projected upon the classroom wall in an attempt 
to raise awareness about Sicily’s history under the mafia, the history of the antimafia, and 
the extent to which the mafia is still powerful today in hopes of showing why it is the 
imperative responsibility of every young Sicilian to denounce and fight the mafia. Each 
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activist spoke at the lecture, delivering his or her own interpretations of the mafia 
problem today and what still needed to be done, while also entertaining an array of 
questions from the young audience. This open question-and-answer format allowed 
young Sicilians to voice their concerns about the mafia phenomenon and its 
contemporary manifestations; in this way, Libera created a comfortable space where 
these young adults could recognize their ability to “reclaim political society,” working to 
challenge instead of reproduce mafia hegemony. By listening to testimonies and appeals 
from individuals who grew up under similar socioeconomic conditions and pressures as 
the students, the young audience saw visible proof that they too possessed an inherent 
ability to fight the mafia through simple daily actions and behaviors, such as remaining 
vigilant to evidence of corruption or criminality, and reporting any such activity to the 
police.  
While Libera activists do not claim to structure their school activities based on 
any particular pedagogy, the organization’s teaching methods possess many similarities 
to Freire’s ideas about the “pedagogy of the oppressed.”399 Libera works to create 
awareness around the suffering of Sicilians under the state-mafia hegemonic system, and 
utilizes organic intellectuals from the same communities in which the students live in 
order to help guide them into counter-hegemony by “fighting by their side to transform 
the objective reality which has made them ‘beings of another.’”400 Libera activist Davide 
described these lectures as “a risk,” because getting Sicilian youth to acknowledge their 
disempowerment under the oppressive state-mafia system and then mobilizing them to 
                                                 
399
 Freire, 35.  
400
 Freire, 31.  
Diefendorf 143 
recognize their ability to challenge hegemony can be incredibly difficult.401 Davide noted 
the importance of being passionate and pragmatic when encouraging the students to 
participate in counter-hegemonic initiatives.402 Practicality is crucial in order to overcome 
the “fear of freedom,” where individuals long under hegemonic forces are tentative to 
claim agency outside of a hegemonic system to which they had no choice but to 
acquiesce.403 In order to do overcome this fear, Libera strives to provide the students with 
real-life, everyday examples of when and how to fulfill their civic duties of furthering the 
antimafia cause and suggesting that a community stands behind them to support and 
encourage this action. It is clear that Libera operates on the realization that “it is always 
through action in depth that the culture of domination is culturally confronted.”404 Young 
Sicilians need to be shown how exactly to incorporate counter-hegemony into their lives 
and dismantle hegemonic forces, as these practices and ideals do not appear natural 
within a population that has long been subjected to a hegemonic system.  
 A central aspect of Libera’s school initiatives is to suggest that Sicilians have a 
civic responsibility to fight the mafia, urging them to overturn centuries of acquiescence 
and apathy to power structures they believed themselves to possess no ability to fight or 
challenge. Libera thus must work against the hegemonic ideology that long 
conceptualized the mafia as “not only invincible but indeed untouchable.”405 Libera also 
works to deconstruct the notion of sicilianismo. This historical fallacy, which suggests 
that the mafia exists in Sicily because Sicilians are inherently criminal-minded, has 
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manifested in further consent to state-mafia hegemony.406 At the lecture in Siracusa, a 
YouTube clip was shown of two comedians debating about why they are “Proud to be 
Sicilian,” thereby challenging the idea that Sicilians possess something rudimentary that 
has culminated in their suffering under Cosa Nostra.  
During the 1980s, Sicilian writer Leonardo Sciascia discouragingly voiced his 
disbelief in the capacity of ordinary Sicilians to organize for change. Sciascia 
consequently implied that Sicilians would be forever oppressed under the mafia 
phenomenon because “in any Sicilian, the residuals of mafia feeling are still present and 
alive, so that fighting the mafia is like fighting against myself…a split, a laceration.”407 In 
doing so, Sciascia voiced sentiments that had been continually expressed since Italian 
unification in 1860.408 At this time, two Italians, Franchetti and Sonnino wrote an early 
account of the state of Sicily meant to inform state authorities and northern Italians. In 
this account, the men suggested that Sicilians were akin to “the ‘savages’ of North 
America, incapable of civilization unless guided by outsiders,” where the “smell of 
rotting corpses” enveloped what would otherwise be a picturesque island.409 It also was 
widely held for many years that Sicilians possessed a natural disregard for legality and 
were naturally inclined to criminal tendencies.410 All of these individuals failed to 
appreciate the extent to which state-mafia hegemony had limited the ability of Sicilians to 
collectively organize and redirect their futures, not any inadequacy inherent to Sicilians. 
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Thus, Sicilians have had to overcome centuries of prominent individuals not believing in 
their ability to overturn apathy and actively work for change.411 
Consequently, Libera faces a significant battle in attempting to convince young 
Sicilians that the mafia does not represent an “irreversible destiny” of Sicily. Instead, the 
organization works to suggest that every Sicilian possesses the ability, and indeed the 
responsibility, to join in the fight against the mafia. Central to Libera’s ability to make 
these requests of the student exists in demonstrating to the young audience that the 
hardest antimafia efforts have already been accomplished. Thanks to courageous 
individuals like dalla Chiesa, Impastato, Falcone, and Borsellino—to name a few—
ordinary Sicilians no longer have to sacrifice their lives on behalf of the antimafia cause. 
In short, the groundwork has already been laid for future generations to continue the fight 
against Cosa Nostra. Libera therefore works to highlight the practicality of contributing 
to the antimafia movement, by showing that small efforts can be effortlessly incorporated 
into daily activities and behaviors without requiring any substantial sacrifices. 
Encouraging the students to remember the efforts of Falcone and Borsellino, Libera 
activists passed out a quote from Falcone that read “yes I am afraid, but we all should be 
more courageous.” Libera hopes to dismantle mafia hegemony to the point of no return, 
therefore, fearing that Sicily’s historical trend of largely not standing up to mafia power 
might relapse if future generations are not actively incorporated into the antimafia 
fight.412  
Libera encourages students to engage in critical and independent thinking in order 
to see the truths about Cosa Nostra and how the state-mafia hegemonic system has 
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exploited them. Libera activists persuade young Sicilians to look beyond the media and 
instead turn to investigative journalism outlets outside of Italy and literature by authors 
such as Roberto Saviano that offer a clearer understanding of the contemporary fight 
against Cosa Nostra. As a former Customs Officer suggested, “in Italy it is hard to find 
the truth, and the media makes it hard to find out how strong the mafia still is” because 
the major media networks are owned and controlled by Berlusconi.413 Libera pushes 
Sicilian youth to look past the confines around which they have grown up and been 
educated, and to look for truth about how Cosa Nostra does not benefit them, and 
historically has only served the ends of the mafia itself and the Italian state. Promoting a 
society that is critical in its thinking and attuned to its environment is instrumental in 
ensuring the widespread adoption of counter-hegemony in Sicily.   
By working in Sicilian schools, Libera hopes to create future generations of 
organic intellectuals who will work within their home communities, furthering 
understandings of the importance of the antimafia movement and the need to maintain a 
vigilant and intolerant culture against Cosa Nostra. One way the organization does this is 
by promoting its Facebook page, which helps to further an understanding of the group’s 
aims and efforts, while also creating a collective community that young Sicilians can 
join, recognizing that they have support and encouragement to carry forth counter-
hegemonic initiatives through daily efforts. In addition, the use of popular social media 
sites like Facebook and YouTube represents Libera’s attempt to “sell the antimafia 
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movement as ‘cool’” to younger generations, while simultaneously helping to 
deglamorize Cosa Nostra.414  
School initiatives that Libera promotes also attend to the counter-hegemonic task 
of dismantling double-consciousnesses in many Sicilians that contribute to the 
reproduction of the hegemonic state-mafia system. This is instrumental because 
individuals must be made to recognize that “they are perpetuating oppression in order to 
claim the ability to challenge this oppression.”415 Through working with Sicilian youth, 
Ciotti hopes to drive home the message that inaction is the same as participation in Cosa 
Nostra, suggesting that “the real mafia is the mafia of words, the ones said by those that 
do not actually act against organized crime, but limit their contribution to the cause to 
declarations of disdain.”416 The organization’s members, therefore, through question and 
answer sessions as well as lectures, encourages the students to think of how their 
passivity and acquiescence helps perpetuate mafia power. Consequently, a successful 
antimafia movement depends on active engagement and steadfast commitment. As 
founder Don Ciotti suggested, it is not enough to merely pass moral judgment upon the 
mafia; Sicilians must actively denounce and fight against all expression of illegality and 
criminality that they see. Davide, a Libera activist, noted that Sicily’s history under the 
state-mafia system has encouraged “blindness” among youth to organized crime and 
violence—something that must be curbed if the movement will succeed in stripping Cosa 
Nostra of its influence. By encouraging vigilance among Sicily’s youth, Libera thereby 
hopes to avoid the “backlash” of declining civilian awareness and participation in the 
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antimafia movement, which represents a possibility if “double consciousnesses” continue 
to pervade Sicilian mentalities.417 Defeating “double-consciousnesses,” and requiring 
Sicilians to fight the mafia with more than empty words, Libera works counter-
hegemonically to dismantle the influence the mafia has long possessed over the land.  
 Libera does not limit its cultural activities to educational work in schools, 
however. Simiarly to Arci, Libera advances counter-hegemonic antimafia efforts through 
a two-pronged approach, also establishing work camps to invest in and promote the 
integrity and capacity of Sicilians. By converting mafia property into counter-hegemonic 
spaces for education and work, Libera dismantles hegemonic ideology and attempts to 
show Sicilians “the whole history of the mafia in this region,” using these properties as 
“laboratories for legality.”418 Libera aims to ensure that “the locals don’t see the mafia 
anymore as the only institution they can trust,” furthering the same mentality that Arci 
promotes through its respective camps.419 The subdivision of Libera devoted to creating 
work camps, deemed Libera Terra, hopes to “create a different future for their children, 
in their own territory, a future free from the culture of violence and corruption.”420 A clip 
of Ciotti at his early work camps was shown at the Libera lecture in Siracusa, which 
referenced how early Libera Terra activists in the mid-1990s felt intense psychological 
pressure to give up out of fear, watching other activists and state authorities being killed 
for acting against Cosa Nostra. In showing this film segment, it was meant to suggest that 
to fight the mafia “today is much easier, and we are not as alone” as many of the early 
antimafia activists such as Falcone were. Moreover, by demonstrating to students the 
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varied ways in which Libera works, it was suggested that there are many ways in which 
Sicilians can participate in furthering the antimafia cause.  
Many of the products from Libera Terra’s work camps invoke the memory of past 
antimafia heroes, such as “Centopassi” wine that refers to Giuseppe Impastato and his 
fight against Cosa Nostra when prominent bosses lived a mere “hundred steps” away 
from his home.421 By invoking the spirit and memory of past intellectuals, Libera Terra 
promotes the development of organic intellectuals, while also helping to empower 
consumers by providing them with the means to purchase products that directly reject 
mafia hegemony. Moreover, Libera work camps pride themselves on manufacturing 
high-quality products, and thus a substantial profit is derived from the production of 
wine, especially. The profitability of wine products reinforces counter-hegemonic 
ideology by proving that lucrative opportunities exist outside of the mafia system.422 In 
addition, purchasing these counter-hegemonic goods “means to join and uphold those 
entrepreneurial activities that aim to foster a different kind of Sicily.”423 Therefore, by 
working on the camps or consuming socially-conscious products, Libera offers Sicilians 
ways to further counter-hegemonic efforts through simple and practical daily efforts, 
helping to prove that the “common man” can carry on the vision of a Sicily free from 
Cosa Nostra.424  
 Libera’s school lectures and work camps both tend to counter-hegemonic ends. 
This two-pronged approach to fighting Cosa Nostra allows Libera to continue to 
dismantle hegemonic ideology, create organic intellectuals that further an awareness of 
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the mafia and the need to actively fight against its presence, deconstruct double-
consciousnesses within Sicilians, and provide Sicilians with practical ways of 
participating in the counter-hegemonic movement.  
ADDIOPIZZO: 
 Another antimafia organization operating counter-hegemonically in Sicily is 
Addiopizzo. This represents a relatively young antimafia group, established by young 
Sicilian businessmen in 2004.425 When a group of Sicilian men began preparations for 
establishing their own bar, they became discomforted when they realized they needed to 
account for pizzo in their projected monthly expenditures.426 In Palermo at this time, and 
even today, many businesses still pay this symbolic tribute to the mafia. Resenting having 
to account for profit lost to extortion, the young businessmen launched their own 
antimafia organization in hopes of encouraging other businessmen to denounce the mafia 
and refuse to pay the pizzo, while simultaneously hoping to prompt a consumer 
revolution that would entice shoppers to purchase only from pizzo-free stores.427 
Addiopizzo, meaning “goodbye, pizzo,” was their organization.428 The organization, 
according to former Addiopizzo president Francesco Bertolino, drew inspiration from the 
earlier efforts of Libero Grassi, an ordinary Sicilian business owner who refused to pay 
the mafia pizzo.429 As a result of his deviation from the hegemonic system that Cosa 
Nostra patrolled with scrutiny and violent repercussions, Grassi died in the 1990s. Grassi 
was easily eliminated as a threat to the mafia because of his solitude, as other business 
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owners were too fearful to join or stand behind him.430 It is Addiopizzo’s goal to create a 
collective community of pizzo-denouncers so that no Sicilian needs to feel ill-supported 
in his or her fight against mafia hegemony as Grassi did. 
 Addiopizzo launched itself onto the antimafia scene in a provocative way. One 
night in Palermo, the young business partners plastered the city with stickers proclaiming 
“a population that pays pizzo is a population without dignity.”431 Framing the antimafia 
fight in moral terms, and making denunciation synonymous with dignity, had a particular 
sway over many, as this represented a tactic that was not used much prior to 
Addiopizzo.432 To many Sicilians, this rhetoric represented the “ultimate insult”433 and 
was mobilizing because it suggested that acquiescence to the mafia system essentially 
represented granting support to Cosa Nostra and its continued rule over the island. 
Silence against extortion, therefore, was depicted as “the guiltiest accomplice.”434 
Framing the fight against Cosa Nostra in this way was successful because it created an 
“us versus them” mentality, implying that Sicilians who failed to participate in “critical 
consumption” or denunciation against the mafia were carrying on an unfortunate and 
repugnant historical trend of compliance with Cosa Nostra. In addition, this incendiary 
rhetoric demonstrated how the seemingly insignificant, traditional “act of submission” to 
pizzo actually did much to reinforce mafia dominance and hegemony.435 Therefore, this 
framing technique worked to enforce the idea that the mafia was not a normal authority to 
which Sicilians should acquiesce. Addiopizzo worked to discourage acquiescence to the 
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state-mafia system, therefore, by labeling those who did not participate in “reclaiming 
political society” away from the hegemonic system as immoral and undignified.  
 By making pizzo submission synonymous with direct support of Cosa Nostra, 
Addiopizzo called upon Sicilians to face their “double-consciousnesses.” While many 
business owners in the 1990s may have denounced the mafia with words, a rare few were 
willing to physically stand up against Cosa Nostra—a violent organization that had 
repeatedly proven its resolve to wage war against anyone who did not grant consent to 
the state-mafia system. In addition, plastering the city with these provocative stickers 
helped to further the antimafia cause by encouraging the production of organic 
intellectuals who would think critically about how their own actions were perpetuating 
the hegemonic system, and mobilize others within their community to stand together in 
solidarity against Cosa Nostra. 
Addiopizzo’s success depends on its ability to convince Sicilians that an 
alternative to the hegemonic system exists. Therefore, Addiopizzo is counter-hegemonic 
in nature because it generates networks of support and solidarity for business owners that 
pledge to no longer submit to the mafia through the pizzo tribute. For instance, in the 
mid-2000s the organization put up billboards reading “contro l’estorsione non sei solo,” 
meaning “against extortion, you are not alone.”436 Through this message, Addiopizzo 
worked to create a feeling of community and collectivity around the fight against the 
mafia, ensuring that business owners and consumers would no longer have to stand alone 
in their courageous acts of denouncing. Addiopizzo suggests that business owners need 
not be fearful of denunciation, as they not only have support from fellow business 
owners, but also from new laws that guarantee protection for mafia denouncers. The 
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organization attempts to show Sicilians, therefore, that “the State is there and intends to 
help its citizens” who are committed to fighting Cosa Nostra through daily actions.437 
 Business owners in Sicily are enticed to join Addiopizzo and its counter-
hegemonic initiatives because the organization has proven its ability to guarantee 
lucrative benefits through affiliation with the organization and through pizzo 
denunciation. Many incentives await those who denounce Cosa Nostra; not only do 
businesses save a substantial amount of money that would normally be reserved for Cosa 
Nostra pizzo in the summer, Christmas, and Easter,438 but Addiopizzo also has a 
commanding number of affiliates who pledge to consume products exclusively from 
pizzo-free stores. Therefore, mafia denouncers no longer need to fear substantial financial 
repercussions from mafia denouncement as they once did.  
Today Addiopizzo is one of the foremost antimafia organizations in Sicily 
because it has succeeded in generating a consortium of hundreds of local businesses that 
stand in solidarity against Cosa Nostra. Moreover, Addiopizzo has also created an 
emporium where consumers can go to purchase necessities and gifts with the guarantee 
that none of the money derived from their purchases supports the mafia. Addiopizzo also 
engages in conscious-tourism ventures, leading educational antimafia tours in Palermo 
for curious visitors while also generating literature and advertisements about where to 
shop and stay without supporting Cosa Nostra. Addiopizzo has thus created positive 
publicity for businesses willing to denounce both inside and outside Sicily, which has 
helped secure these businesses with profits through promoting them to tourists and 
“dignified” Sicilians alike.  
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Through banding conscious businessmen together in emporiums and consumer 
networks, Addiopizzo works counter-hegemonically, showing Sicilian business owners 
and consumers that “being on the side of legality does not mean to be a loser and, 
actually, can also be profitable.”439 Because pizzo is a form of symbolic submission,440 
refusing to pay such is a hegemonic blow to Cosa Nostra, one that suggests Addiopizzo 
is helping to bring about a counter-hegemonic era where businessmen and consumers no 
longer need to acquiesce to status quo power structures. This stands in stark contrast, 
therefore, to decades of thought under mafia hegemony where Sicilians widely believed 
that the only sure way to prosper and survive was through participation in and 
acquiescence to the mafia system.  
On several occasions, Cosa Nostra has attempted to challenge Addiopizzo’s 
assault against its symbolic power, but the mafia has failed in coercing business owners 
into submission due to Addiopizzo’s ability to create networks of solidarity where 
Sicilians feel protected and encouraged to denounce. Violence against Addiopizzo 
activists has been rare, although one recent example includes activist Rodolfo Guajana, 
whose hardware store was torched by mafiosi.441 Former president Bertolino concedes 
that “there is still fear and it is understandable,” but Addiopizzo works to quell these 
uncertainties by creating communities of denouncers who can derive support and 
protection from one another. Nonetheless, fear that is still present in Sicilian society can 
be understood as a lasting remnant of Cosa Nostra’s historical ability to patrol non-
consent to the state-mafia system with threats or demonstrations of violence. 
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While the mafia attempts to rely on old tactics of reproducing hegemony using 
threat and violence in the absence of spontaneous consent, these tactics hold little power 
among groups who have demonstrated their ability to stand together in denouncement of 
these hegemonic mechanisms. Today Addiopizzo boasts a business membership of over 
400 stores, with many more Sicilians also pledging to engage in critical 
consumption.442Addiopizzo tour guides proudly sport their antimafia t-shirts as they lead 
curious tourists down the same streets where antimafia activists were once killed a 
decade ago. One tour guide, Eduardo, claims he is not fearful because it is not prudent for 
Cosa Nostra to strike against an organization whose activities do not deliver a substantial 
economic blow to the mafia. Fellow Addiopizzo activists have voiced similar sentiments, 
suggesting that Addipizzo represents “little fish”443 in a larger antimafia sea, and Cosa 
Nostra must now be strategic in its use of violence amongst an increasingly intolerant and 
vigilant society.444 The pizzo accounts for a small percentage of mafia power, which is 
why the mafia does not target stores who proudly display the Addiopizzo sticker in their 
storefronts. The power of denying the pizzo, therefore, is not in its economic, but rather 
its symbolic ramifications. By overturning a tradition of submitting to mafia domination, 
Addiopizzo delivers a more significant blow to mafia hegemony than if the organization 
was depriving Cosa Nostra merely of economic power.  
As Bertolino suggests, Addiopizzo’s success to date as well as the limited 
violence the group has faced reside in the fact that “the businessman feels protects and 
knows that the institutions will reimburse and assist him after his denunciation.”445 
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Moreover, pizzo denouncers have often demonstrated their resolve to fight the mafia in 
the courts, as well, testifying against extortionists that long targeted their businesses. 
Cosa Nostra recognizes these businesses as lost causes not worth targeting because the 
mafia’s threats of violence and coercion hold no weight among these individuals who 
derive protection and support from the alternative medium of Addiopizzo. 446 It is 
evident, therefore, the strides Addiopizzo is making in Palermo at moving past the history 
of the 1990s and Libero Grassi, where brave businessmen stood alone in their decisions 
to denounce, and unknowingly were forced to make the ultimate sacrifice to further the 
antimafia movement.  
Addiopizzo engages in counter-hegemonic initiatives in its attempt to erase the 
influence Cosa Nostra possesses over the minds of Sicilian business owners and 
consumers. By engaging in public awareness campaigns and plastering cities with 
evocative antimafia slogans, Addiopizzo deconstructs mafia hegemony, creates organic 
intellectuals aware and intolerant of pizzo, and creates pragmatic mediums through which 
ordinary Sicilians can participate in counter-hegemonic efforts by generating stores 
where pizzo-free products can be purchased, for instance. By creating a sense of 
community around its counter-hegemonic activities, Addiopizzo shows that communal 
and personal benefits can be derived from mafia denunciation.  
 
IL MOVIMENTO AGENDE ROSSE 
The “Movement of the Red Diaries” is another antimafia organization operating 
in Sicily. Paolo Borsellino’s brother, Salvatore, started the organization in the wake of his 
father’s murder. The Red Diaries was formed in order to investigate the death of Paolo 
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Borsellino, in the hopes of proving who within both the state and Cosa Nostra were 
complicit in this planned murder. The name of the organization refers to Borsellino’s 
infamous “red diary” in which he kept his most coveted notes and ideas about Cosa 
Nostra. It is rumored that this diary also contained leads on which mafiosi were likely 
involved in the murder of his friend and ally, Giovanni Falcone, who was killed a mere 
two months prior to Borsellino’s own death. What is undeniable is that the red diary 
contained testimonies from pentiti that revealed the identities of several state authorities 
who had intimate ties with Cosa Nostra. Borsellino’s red diary disappeared from the 
scene of his death, leading many Sicilians to question who was involved in the crime and 
what incriminating evidence was in the diary.447  
When the Red Diaries began, the organization focused on political initiatives to 
dismantle mafia power. The primary activity of the group at this time was pressuring the 
state to conduct thorough investigations into the death of Paolo Borsellino. The 
organization believed that, as a result of his work with pentiti, Borsellino possessed 
incriminating information about state authorities involved in aiding Cosa Nostra power, 
and thus hoped that putting pressure on the state would entice those complicit to come 
forward. As one Red Diary activist explained, however, in the 1990s with this focus on 
the state, “we couldn’t resolve the mafia problem because it is not a political problem. It 
no longer is about judges or politicians, it is a cultural problem.”448 This volunteer 
explained that there are two ways to address the mafia phenomenon: 1) repressively 
through legislation and police, and 2) by educating the youth through cultural work. The 
time for the latter is now, the young activist acknowledged, as repressive advances were 
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incredibly strengthened in the ‘80s-‘90s and the “laws are beginning to do their job.”449 It 
is apparent that the Red Diaries have redirected their efforts from political to cultural 
work, therefore, based on the recognition that the state was not the only agent that could 
be mobilized to dismantle Cosa Nostra.  
The Red Diaries is committed to dismantling state-mafia hegemony just as 
Borsellino was attempting to do before his untimely death. Immediately following the 
magistrate’s assassination, the organization engaged in publicizing information about 
Borsellino’s work that had uncovered the extent of the state’s involvement with Cosa 
Nostra in order to educate Sicilians about the strength of state-mafia alliances. As 
Borsellino’s diary possessed incriminating evidence of state-mafia ties, the organization 
continues to raise awareness of symbiotic state-mafia relations that the hegemonic bloc 
long worked to discourage. As Salvatore Borsellino, the organization’s founder, stated: 
“He certainly would have informed public opinion of the negotiation [between the state and 
mafia], should there have been no other way of stopping it. For this reason it was of vital 
importance that he be eliminated.”450 Through carrying on the ideology Borsellino devoted 
his life to promoting, the Red Diaries ensure that Cosa Nostra did not simultaneously kill 
Sicilians’ ability to call attention to state-mafia ties and demand reforms to end this 
historical system of symbiosis through their killing of the magistrate.  
Organizing rallies and public events, the Red Diaries operate throughout Italy in 
order to pay homage to Borsellino’s efforts and remember that state-mafia complicity is 
not a thing of the past. The associate thereby promotes the recognition that the 
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eradication of these compromising relations depends on the maintenance of a society that 
is intolerant of such corruption. Another way the Red Diaries promotes awareness about 
the state-mafia system is through the production of educational videos about electoral 
corruption; interviewing Sicilians about their experiences during past elections when 
mafiosi attempted to buy their votes, Red Diaries hopes to draw attention to this 
prominent connection still linking the mafia and the Italian state that Sicilians must resist 
in order to put pressure on the hegemonic bloc. These educational campaigns create 
organic intellectuals who show Sicilians that the state-mafia system is not natural, nor 
something to which they should grant approval—passively or otherwise. 
Another way the Red Diaries works to dismantle pervasive hegemonic ideology is 
by working with Sicilian youth. Hegemonic ideology that has long suggested state-mafia 
relations are natural and that this system delivers benefits to Sicilians has manifested in 
Cosa Nostra’s continued appeal among the youth.  The mafia is not an organization of 
criminals, but rather of artists, the Red Diary activist described. One must possess 
specific skills and character in order to join, as it is not enough merely to be willing to 
engage in criminality.  Particularly today, when repressive legislation has had the effect 
of changing mafia operations into more elusive markets, Cosa Nostra no longer 
showcases its influence in a public way on the streets of Sicily as it once did. Rather, the 
mafia of today is much more concerned with skillfully extracting political alliances, 
contracts, and legal immunity from the state, away from the increasingly watchful eye of 
citizens. Consequently, mafiosi must possess certain skills in order to be an asset to the 
modern-day Cosa Nostra, whose aims and tactics have changed over times as a result of 
changing political climates.  
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With tremendous funds now coming into Southern Italy from the international 
community in order to boost crime fighting, development, and address economic 
problems, it is more prudent than ever for the mafia to infiltrate public offices and have a 
say in the distribution of these funds. The President of the district of Ortigia—a small 
island off of Sicily that recently hosted a G8 conference—notes that significant money 
from the European Community now floods into Sicily, and that “the mafia takes a lot of 
this money, making up fake projects and activities. Where there is money, the mafia is 
ready.”451 Thus, contemporary mafiosi are not the unintelligent thugs and “combatants” 
they are stereotypically depicted as, and are rather selected based on the possession of 
certain marketable “talents,” and overlooked if they do not comply to certain standards 
regardless of familial affiliation.452 As the Ortigia President described, “we shouldn’t 
confuse mafia with micro-criminal activity. The mafia is smart, you must have a 
management-oriented mind. You can’t simply be a criminal.”453 Belonging to this art, 
this “political ideal” continues to attract people, the Red Diary activist explained. 
 The Red Diaries works to delegitimize Cosa Nostra in the eyes of young Sicilians 
by deglamorizing the criminal organization. The organization stations its activities in 
regions affected by the underlying problems that perpetuate mafia power, including 
unemployment, poor educational systems, and illegality. In many poor neighborhoods, 
urban youth learn at a young age how to avoid police, steal, sneak out at night, and avoid 
school. These are youth problems the Red Diaries work to address in the absence of an 
effective state presence in these areas like Siracusa, for instance. The Red Diaries is 
working against a pervasive historical trend, however; as prominent pentito Antonio 
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Calderone attested to, the strength of the mafia lies in the fact that “around every man of 
honor of a certain rank is always a circle of twenty or thirty kids—nobodies who want to 
become something…there to do small favors, to be put to the test…”454  
Based on this recognition, the Red Diaries organization works with boys 10-12 
years old who have already learned to steal mopeds and shoot guns. It is precisely in 
these regions where the mafia is strong. For example, while in Campania, a Red Diary 
activist worked among youth who were enamored by Cosa Nostra—wanting to see 
pictures of their properties and assets, as well as of the jail cells where once prominent 
cappomafia spend the rest of their years. This intrigue needs to be carefully managed; it 
can be channeled into a fascination with antimafia education and the antimafia cause, or 
it can be unaddressed and mismanaged, which would consequently add to the 
glamorization of Cosa Nostra as a medium for respect and success. By working among 
the youth, Red Diaries works to deconstruct mafia hegemony that has long had the effect 
of suggesting that violence and illegality are acceptable and normal. Moreover, Red 
Diaries hopes to bring attention to the real societal problems perpetuating mafia power, 
promoting awareness through lectures and community events that Cosa Nostra need not 
be the solution for these problems of unemployment and destitution, but instead should 
be blamed for amplifying these problems in Sicily and contributing to the state’s 
ineffectuality in mitigating these ills.  
 The Red Diaries not only deconstructs mafia hegemony, but also works to offer 
an alternative conception of reality to Sicilians that further encourages the youth to look 
outside the state-mafia system for livelihood and needed services. One main problem, an 
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activist described, is that “people like belonging to something.”455 Having a sense of 
purpose and a semblance of community have long been features of Cosa Nostra. The fact 
that a collective identity is derived from participation in this organization—where 
nicknames are given to members and a unique “code language” marks those among the 
organization’s ranks—attracts young Sicilians.456 The youth remain intrigued by this 
elusive organization and its secrecy of tactics and rituals, believing that membership in 
Cosa Nostra “situates them ‘outside’ normal society, and, in their view, ‘above’ it.”457 
Thus, the success of this counter-hegemonic movement depends on its ability to offer an 
alternative to the state-mafia system that attracts Sicilian youth and provides them with a 
new group in which to belong. In order to do this, Red Diaries attempts to showcase the 
antimafia movement as “cool,” responsible for imprisoning immoral criminal bosses who 
have long oppressed Sicilians. The Red Diaries seeks to create a collective community of 
young Sicilians who pledge to uphold legality, civic responsibility, and stay in school. 
Red Diaries teaches the youth that they will be valued for their contributions to society in 
fighting the mafia, and that la lotta contro la mafia is an important and respectable 
struggle in which all upstanding citizens should participate.  
The Red Diaries association also works counter-hegemonically in its attempts to 
call attention to the “double consciousnesses” within many Sicilians that effectively stifle 
the ability of civil society to dismantle hegemony. One Red Diary volunteer describes an 
important event in Sicily following Borsellino’s death that highlights this debilitating 
feature still present in many Sicilians. The volunteer discussed a young Sicilian girl, Rita 
Atria, who spoke out against the mafia in the 1980s-90s even though her father was a 
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mafioso.458 She delivered her testimonies to Borsellino, and felt protected enough as a 
result of her friendship with this magistrate to continue her denunciations. When 
Borsellino was murdered in 1992, however, the 23-year-old girl threw herself from her 
balcony, knowing that no one could protect her any longer from Cosa Nostra and its 
resolve to eliminate all denouncers.459 Her own mother, disgusted and horrified at her 
daughter’s involvement in the antimafia movement, vandalized her daughter’s grave after 
the funeral.460 Rita’s mother therefore embodied the double consciousnesses her daughter 
believed existed in many Sicilians when she proclaimed prior to her death that “we 
cannot defeat the mafia until we kill the mafia within ourselves.”461 
 The Red Diaries uses this example as rationale for the need to educate Sicilians of 
the differences in mentality they possess between “theory and practice.” Many are not 
aware of the effect their silence has in perpetuating mafia power. Red Diaries, 
particularly in its work among Sicilian youth, urges that the antimafia is not about words 
or simply waving a flag and proclaiming a dedication to legality. “The power of the 
antimafia,” the volunteer explains, “is in denunciations and helping judges to make 
arrests.”462 Because Cosa Nostra still possesses important political ties and, therefore, 
impunity, it is the role of ordinary citizens to actively denounce against any expression of 
corruption. As the activist noted, “Borsellino told us it was not time to cry, it’s time to 
work. But every year, we are still mourning heroes, not working.”463 The Red Diaries, 
therefore, creates solidarity networks of support that encourage active work in the 
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antimafia cause, helping to mobilize and effectively channel antimafia sentiment into a 
productive fight against Cosa Nostra.  
  By bringing organic intellectuals into Sicilian schools and “at risk” communities, 
Red Diaries helps to demonstrate to Sicilians that counter-hegemony can be incorporated 
into simple, everyday activities. It is not the goal of the Red Diaries to enlist young 
Sicilians to join the antimafia organization, but rather to encourage the youth to stay in 
school and learn values and ideals that will allow them to contribute to the antimafia fight 
when they are older. A Red Diaries activist suggests that the antimafia fight is one in 
which all Sicilians can participate in by being citizens of legality and by denouncing any 
expression of criminality that they witness. Thus, the Red Diaries shows the youth in 
Sicily that they need not be fearful of denouncing Cosa Nostra, and rather can feel 
confident that fellow Sicilians and the state support them in the fulfillment of their civic 
responsibilities.  
  Red Diaries is evidently a counter-hegemonic antimafia organization, as it works 
to dismantle hegemonic ideology by deglamorizing Cosa Nostra in the eyes of Sicilian 
youth, provides Sicilians with a new way of conceptualizing their realities outside the 
state-mafia system, tackles double-consciousnesses in a way that encourages Sicilians to 
put into practice their antimafia sentiments, and lastly promotes simple ways in which 
Sicilians can incorporate counter-hegemonic activities into their everyday lives. 
SUMMARY: Thus, it is clear that Arci, Libera, Addiopizzo, and the Red Diaries are 
counter-hegemonic organizations working to dismantle Cosa Nostra’s power and 
influence in Sicily. These organizations have unique interpretations of why the mafia 
remains strong in Sicily today, which dictates their slightly different methods of 
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approaching the mafia problem. What these four organizations share in common, 
however, is that they all consider the mafia to be a cultural problem requiring cultural 
reforms to effectively address, believing political reforms and targeting the state to no 
longer be as expedient. Moreover, all four organizations advance the counter-hegemonic 
antimafia movement by attending to remaining semblances of hegemonic ideology, 
producing organic intellectuals that reframe reality for Sicilians and pose alternative ways 
to live and prosper outside the state-mafia system, attacking the double-consciousnesses 
of Sicilians, and finally by creating ways in which ordinary Sicilians can incorporate 
counter-hegemonic activities seamlessly into their daily lives and everyday behaviors.  
As Gramsci described, the longer hegemonic forces are in power, the longer it 
takes for a counter-hegemonic movement to dismantle these pervasive ideologies and 
power structures. Because state-mafia hegemony solidified over a period of nearly 120 
years before receiving widespread challenge, the antimafia movement will take time to 
fully remove and mitigate the effects Cosa Nostra has had upon the attitudes and 
mentalities of Sicilians. The recognition of the long-term nature of this counter-
hegemonic movement, however, is precisely what serves as the fuel that propels 
antimafia organizations forward despite uncertain political climates, frequently evolving 
and changing their strategies in hopes of better reaching a population that still bears deep 
scars from Cosa Nostra that cannot easily be removed. There is considerable reason for 
hope, however. In the words of magistrate Paolo Borsellino, the antimafia fight has 
managed to persevere “in spite of everything”—in spite of historical trends of fear and 
apathy, violence against deviance from the state-mafia system, and in spite of symbiotic 
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relations that still persist between state and mafia.464 “In spite of everything,” the 
antimafia movement will continue to wage its counter-hegemonic attack on Cosa Nostra.   
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CONCLUSION: 
This thesis has built upon existing scholarly literature on the antimafia movement 
in Sicily, but has also attempted to fill the void in this scholarship by examining the 
contemporary nature of la lotta contro la mafia and how it has changed since its origins 
in the 1980s. While much has been written about the unique aims of the movement and 
the challenges it faces in attempting to deliver widespread cultural change to Sicily, the 
disproportional scholarly attention the movement has received in recent years compared 
to the 1980s has resulted in a lack of understanding about how the movement has 
changed its strategy from no longer targeting the state, but rather focusing on society as 
the agent that will bring Sicily into a future no longer defined by Cosa Nostra. This thesis 
has employed Gramscian theory to understand why it was prudent for the movement to 
work both within and outside the state in order to bring fundamental changes to the 
island. Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony clearly elucidate the formidable challenge the 
antimafia movement faces in eradicating physical and ideological domination that has 
become entrenched for over a century, deeply pervading Sicily’s economy, politics, and 
culture.   
 By using this Gramscian framework, this thesis has sought to explain how civil 
society is attempting to dismantle the state-mafia hegemonic bloc in Sicily through the 
antimafia movement. This movement first began in the 1980s, when magistrates 
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino aptly recognized growing fissures between the 
Italian state and Cosa Nostra as an opportunity to launch an attack against this hegemonic 
system that had long dominated Sicily. Fissures were always present within the 
hegemonic bloc, but were historically mitigated due to the similar aims and desires of the 
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two hegemons, which long served to hold these two powers intertwined and dependent 
upon one another. Changing circumstances in the 1970s-80s, however, put pressure on 
these tenuous fissures as the mafia grew richer through the drug market and began 
neglecting its roles of protecting citizens and enforcing order—roles that the state 
depended on Cosa Nostra to carry out. The “Second Mafia War,” which jeopardized the 
safety and lives of Sicilians and state authorities, consequently produced deep fissures 
between the state and mafia, but also within the state itself.  
 Falcone and Borsellino utilized their unique political maneuverability as 
magistrates to play upon these fissures, encouraging Sicilians to recognize their 
unprecedented opportunity to dismantle the state-mafia system. Through working with 
mafia pentiti, the magistrates gained critical knowledge about the extent of state-mafia 
ties, as well as the various hegemonic apparatuses within Sicilian society that worked 
daily to reproduce and strengthen hegemony. With this information, the magistrates knew 
what sources of mafia power to target in order to attend to the first task of counter-
hegemony, which Gramsci describes to be the dismantling of hegemonic ideology.  
 The unremorseful demonstrations of mafia power in the 1980s against civilians 
and the state, alike, convinced Falcone and Borsellino of the need to target the Italian 
state to enact political reforms that would end its symbiotic relationship with the mafia. 
The mafia had grown strong over a period of 120 years of state delegation and 
accommodation, but this trend could continue no longer. These magistrates, therefore, 
encouraged Sicilians to join la lotta contro la mafia by pressuring the state to adopt 
legislative reforms against Cosa Nostra and to bring about an era of accountability and 
transparency in Sicilian politics. 
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 Ordinary Sicilians would not become widely mobilized to join the antimafia 
movement until after 1992, however, in the wake of the murders of Falcone and 
Borsellino. Incensed by the deaths of the leaders of the movement, Sicilians became 
motivated to work among their communities and neighborhoods to carry on the fight to 
which the fallen magistrates had devoted their lives. The focus on the state and the need 
to generate political reforms to eradicate Cosa Nostra from the Sicilian landscape 
continued until the mid-1990s. 
 By the mid-1990s, Sicily possessed a thorough legislative framework from which 
to challenge the mafia. While these reforms had brought about many high-profile trials 
and arrests of powerful mafiosi, Cosa Nostra’s power was far from dismantled. By 
focusing almost exclusively on the state and on political solutions in the 1980s-early 
1990s, the antimafia movement had merely addressed the locus of hegemony, not the 
varied hegemonic apparatuses within society that reinforced the hegemonic system daily. 
Therefore, by the mid-1990s it was clear that Cosa Nostra represented a fundamentally 
cultural problem requiring cultural work to fully dismantle. Consequently, the antimafia 
movement turned its focus to society as the medium through which cultural change could 
occur. 
 By examining the activities and aims of four different antimafia organizations 
currently operating in Sicily, this thesis strove to demonstrate how the antimafia 
movement is attending to both Gramscian phases of counter-hegemony: dismantling 
remaining traces of hegemonic ideology, but also offering the masses a new, counter-
hegemonic ideology that provides Sicilians with an alternative reality and system outside 
of the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. The counter-hegemonic nature of Arci, Libera, 
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Addiopizzo, and the Red Diaries has been proven by highlighting how each of these 
groups works to dismantle hegemonic ideology by challenging its remaining 
manifestations in society, produces organic intellectuals that promote a new reality 
outside the state-mafia system, works to challenge double-consciousnesses within 
Sicilians that contribute to their perpetuation of hegemony, and promotes institutions and 
activities that provide Sicilians with practical ways to incorporate counter-hegemony into 
daily behavior. 
 While notable strides have been made towards creating a society that supports and 
embraces mafia denunciation, legality, and the rule of law, much work remains to be 
done. This is understandable, as counter-hegemonic initiatives in Sicily began roughly 
twenty years ago, and are challenging hegemonic forces entrenched and solidified over a 
period of 140 years to date. As Paulo Freire suggests, it is clear that a society has moved 
beyond its oppression when ‘the reality of the oppression has already been transformed, 
[and] this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed but becomes a pedagogy of all 
people in the process of permanent liberation.”465 Because not all Sicilians have yet 
recognized their ability and responsibility to break free from their oppression under the 
state-mafia system, it is clear that “permanent liberation” from hegemony has not yet 
been attained in Sicily.  
 Gramsci himself recognized that counter-hegemonic movements require 
substantial time to carry out. The counter-hegemonic antimafia movement is undoubtedly 
a slow process, requiring deliberate action, unrelenting efforts, and evolving strategies. 
Yet, there are many reasons to be hopeful. There is much evidence that suggests Sicily is 
moving steadfast towards a future no longer defined by Cosa Nostra as a result of the 
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movement’s focus on and investment in the ability of ordinary Sicilians to demand an end 
to state-mafia hegemony. Not only has the state enacted crucial antimafia legislation that 
has provided a legal framework to fight Cosa Nostra, but citizens are coming to 
recognize their ability to participate in daily actions that weaken the mafia’s power, such 
as denouncing against corruption, educating the youth about Sicily’s history under the 
mafia, working in respectable jobs outside the state-mafia system, refusing to pay the 
pizzo, and purchasing mafia-free products at markets across the island. Sicily has seen a 
genuine mobilization against state-mafia hegemony, therefore, and thanks to the work of 
a variety of antimafia organizations and activists, Sicilians are cultivating their individual 
abilities to reclaim their society, their economy, and the politics that govern them. By 
focusing on the contemporary nature of the antimafia movement, I have sought to show 
how Sicilians are making remarkable progress towards dismantling the state-mafia 
hegemonic bloc, and are fostering in its place counter-hegemonic ideals and practices that 
deliver them agency from a system that has long dictated and restricted their behaviors, 
beliefs, practices, and livelihoods.  
 While studying abroad in the small island of Ortigia, there stood a massive 
concrete wall along the coast that was built through Cosa Nostra construction contracts. 
The wall was intended as a future docking platform for cruise ships, but was never 
completed due to lack of funding and waning interest in the initiative. The unfinished 
wall remained for years, blocking an otherwise picturesque view of Sicily’s waterfront. 
Despite frequent protests against the wall—which continued to serve as a symbolic 
reminder of Cosa Nostra’s presence on the island—mafiosi refused to dismantle this 
tangible manifestation of its influence or to recognize and cater to civilian pressure. On 
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my return trip this November, however, the wall was gone. Unrelenting civilian pressure 
from ordinary civilians and antimafia organizations finally succeeded in forcing 
contractors to demolish the once formidable wall that had been built years before when 
state-mafia alliances were so strong that Cosa Nostra easily obtained building contracts 
for nearly all construction on the island.  
 There are a multitude of signs, therefore, that ordinary citizens have been 
mobilized through the antimafia movement and its counter-hegemonic initiatives to 
dismantle physical and ideological manifestations of state-mafia hegemony on the island. 
Sicilians are beginning to recognize that their lives no longer need to be directed by Cosa 
Nostra, particularly when communal networks of solidarity exist to support mafia 
denunciation, and counter-hegemonic organizations have succeeded in developing 
institutions and pragmatic ways to live and work outside the state-mafia bloc.  
 As a result of the counter-hegemonic movement, Sicilians have now come to 
resent vestiges of mafia power like the docking station that conjure up memories from a 
different time—a time when the island was still under the trance of hegemony and did not 
yet possess the means to recognize or resist this oppression. While one wall invoking the 
memory of state-mafia hegemony has come down, the more formidable hegemonic bloc 
still stands in Sicily. However, with the increasing popularity and strength of the counter-
hegemonic movement, the same energy and widespread mobilization that destroyed the 
docking station will in time destroy the state-mafia hegemonic bloc, as well. 
With the docking platform removed, a beautiful view of the Sicilian coast is now 
unobstructed. This spot where the wall once stood—an eyesore that cast a dark shadow 
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along the coastline—is now a favored place among locals to watch the sunrise. A “new 
dawn,”466 indeed, is upon Sicily. 
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